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Political liberalisation and the  
mobilisation of an Anglophone  
identity in Cameroon 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As in other parts of the world, political liberalisation in Cameroon has been 
marked by the construction and mobilisation of ethno-regional identities that 
pose a major challenge to the post-colonial nation-state project (cf. McGarry & 
O’Leary 1993; Rothchild 1997; Zognong & Mouiche 1997). The unitary 
approach to the nation-state project was the predominant choice of African 
leaders in the decades following independence (Wunsch & Olowu 1990). 
Usually this amounted to a continuation of the colonial state’s nation-building 
programme, the primary concern of which had been to integrate the diverse 
ethno-regional groups into the state and place them under one centralised 
authority. It was seen as a sine qua non for avoiding administrative chaos and 
civil war and for achieving rapid development in Africa (Olukoshi & Laakso 
1996). Today it is generally agreed that this approach fostered political mono-
lithism and authoritarianism at the expense of constitutionalism. Alternative 
constitutional arrangements – notably federalism, which according to Elaigwu 
& Orunsola (1983: 282) ‘basically emanates from the desire of people to form a 
union without necessarily losing their various identities’ – were either ignored 
or consciously violated by African leaders or, as in Nigeria, they experienced an 
increasing concentration of power in the federal centre (Thomas-Woolley & 
Keller 1994; Woodward & Forsyth 1994; Olukoshi & Agbu 1997). In the 
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current processes of liberalisation in Africa, highly centralised unitary states are 
facing a serious crisis of legitimacy. 
 In this book we focus on Anglophone Cameroon, which has been at the 
forefront of ethno-regional protests and demands for the rearrangement of state 
power. There is a widespread feeling in this region that reunification with 
Francophone Cameroon in 1961 has led to a growing marginalisation of the 
Anglophone minority in the nation-state project controlled by the Francophone 
political elite, endangering its cultural heritage and identity. It was not until the 
political liberalisation process in the early 1990s that the Anglophone elite 
began to mobilise the regional population against the allegedly subordinated 
position of Anglophones and to demand self-determination and autonomy, 
reintroducing federalism and secession to the political agenda. It soon became 
evident, however, that the Anglophone elite was divided, offering conflicting 
explanations for the origin of and proposals for redressing the so-called ‘Anglo-
phone problem’ (Eyoh 1998a: 249). This cleavage within the Anglophone elite 
can be largely attributed to ethno-regional divisions and tensions within the 
Anglophone community itself, particularly between South West Province (the 
coastal forest area) and the inland-savannah area (the so-called Grassfields), 
now North West Province (see Map 1).  
 The post-colonial state has often taken advantage of existing contradictions 
within the Anglophone community to play off the southwestern elite against its 
northwestern counterpart in persistent efforts to bolster the unitary state and to 
deconstruct the Anglophone identity. 
 In the first section of this introductory chapter, we provide a description of 
the Cameroonian post-colonial state’s nation-state project. In the second section 
we argue that the colonial borders, reunification, and the post-colonial state’s 
nation-state project are responsible for the construction of the Anglophone and 
competing identities. In the third section we discuss the various options for a 
reconfiguration of power proposed by the Anglophone and Francophone elite 
within the post-colonial state. In the fourth section we explain the organisation 
of the book and our research methodology. 
 
 
The post-colonial nation-state project in Cameroon 
 
Like many former colonies in Africa, Cameroon faced a difficult political set of 
circumstances at independence and reunification. Two territories, inherited from 
British and French colonial rule and with different cultural legacies, languages 
and levels of economic development, needed to be merged. There was the 
problem of cultural pluralism and ethnic fragmentation as evidenced by the 
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coexistence of Islam and Christianity alongside indigenous systems of beliefs 
and the presence of more than 200 ethnic groups. And, last but not least, a 
bloody and destructive civil war was taking place at the time of independence 
and reunification in present-day Littoral and West Provinces as a direct conse-
quence of determined efforts by the government and the French to suppress the 
radical nationalist party, the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) 
(Joseph 1977). This was an indication that France would only settle for a token 
independence that would not upset French interests in the territory. 
 The challenge of constructing a nation-state lay with Ahmadou Ahidjo, who 
used to be prime minister (in 1958) and president (in 1960) of Francophone 
Cameroon before becoming the first president of the Federal Republic of 
Cameroon in 1961. He was a Muslim and a Fulbe, the dominant ethnic group in 
northern Cameroon (Azarya 1978; Schilder 1994). Initially, he was considered 
by many to be a mere puppet of the French and he enjoyed very little support in 
the southern part of the country, which had been more exposed to colonial 
capitalism, education and Christianity than the north (Bayart 1979). Soon, how-
ever, Ahidjo was to display an unexpected political craftsmanship that would 
enable him to strengthen his originally weak position and eventually to con-
struct a system of personal rule (Gaillard 1994). Nation-building, or national 
unity, provided ideological support for concentrating political and economic 
power in his office and person (Fogui 1990). Centralisation, coalition-building 
and repression were his major strategies in achieving his aim (DeLancey 1989; 
Derrick 1992; Van de Walle 1993; Konings 1996a).1  
 The first strategy, centralisation, had numerous aspects. There was the intro-
duction of a highly centralised form of federation, the concentration of admin-
istrative decision-making in the capital, Yaoundé, and the use of the constitution 
to focus authority in the office of the president. In addition, there was the 
formation of a single party, the Cameroon National Union (CNU), which was 
completed in 1966 after a two-step process to forge a single party in the 
Francophone region, and then its merger with the remaining parties of the 
Anglophone region. There was also the dissolution of the federation in 1972 to 
form a unitary system of government. Centralisation was enhanced by the 
elimination of autonomous forms of organisation. Previously independent 
organisations became subordinated to the political party through the party’s 
women’s, youth and labour wings or through domination by, or incorporation 
into, government agencies (as had occurred with the Anglophone cooperative 
movement). Related to this were policies to destroy any limited autonomy 
                                                 
1  Such strategies form the core of what McGeary & O’Leary (1993: 23) call 
‘hegemonic control’, one of the most common forms of managing ethnic diversity 
and conflict. 
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enjoyed either by local governments (more a reality in Anglophone Cameroon) 
or traditional governments. 
 The second strategy was coalition-building. In his masterful study of the 
Cameroonian post-colonial state, Bayart (1979) highlighted Ahidjo’s pursuit of 
building a hegemonic alliance out of different elite groups at the national and 
regional levels. This hegemonic alliance was comprised not only of politicians, 
bureaucrats and businessmen but equally of the traditional elite, the chiefs, and 
was pulled together by, among other means, the development of an extensive 
patron-client system. Clients were supposed to owe ultimate and total allegiance 
to Ahidjo, and any attempt to build their own power base was construed as 
betrayal and sanctioned removal from office. Ahidjo selected his clients on the 
basis of ethnic arithmetic or ethnic balancing (Ngayap 1983; Nkwi & Nyamnjoh 
1997). He was conscious that representation in the cabinet, national assembly 
and so on would reflect the various ethnic groups in society. As a matter of fact, 
the government’s hand-picked elite or barons served as transmission belts 
between the president and the different ethnic groups. Thus all the important 
ethnic groups felt represented within the regime and were able to influence 
government policy (Jua 1991: 162-70; Van de Walle 1993). Paradoxically, 
while the politics of ethnic balance served to manage ethnic diversity and 
conflict, it actually tended to create an acute, sustained awareness of ethnic 
belonging and regional affiliation. It engraved on the minds of Cameroonians 
the notion that access to state functions depended not primarily on competence 
and merit but instead on one’s strategic ethnic and regional affiliations (Monga 
2000; Nyamnjoh 1999; Eyoh 1998a and b). 
 Loyal followers in the ethno-client network were rewarded with appoint-
ments and nominations to state offices, access to state resources, and rent-
seeking appointments. Beyond the numerous appointments Ahidjo could make 
to the cabinet and the system at large, he had a variety of other techniques to 
allow individuals to benefit, even though they might not receive a lucrative 
appointment. For some of the president’s associates there were special interest-
free bank loans that they were not expected to repay, and smuggling and 
corruption provided a major avenue for the president to allow supporters to 
receive rewards. Special efforts were also made to appease and maintain support 
among civil servants and bureaucrats. They received excellent salaries com-
pared to the average income of Cameroonian citizens, as well as numerous 
perks including free housing and various degrees of impunity in the face of the 
law. They were allowed to convert their posts into monopoly rent-seeking 
opportunities and they considered the state a resource base from which various 
pathways of capital accumulation could be explored (Geschiere & Konings 
1993). State expansion, particularly in the economic arena, was promoted to 
manipulate and sustain the alliance but it would be wrong to argue that rent-
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seeking and patronage were the only reasons the government promoted state 
expansion after independence. Extensive public ownership conformed to 
prevailing development doctrines, was warmly supported by donors, and 
responded to real development needs. Still, the scope that state ownership was 
to achieve (by 1988 the state had more than 150 parastatals in its portfolio) was 
helped by the fact that it afforded leaders like Ahidjo positions of power to 
distribute. In the context of the patrimonial state, these parastatals were 
converted into prebends for directors-general or to serve other exclusive 
interests of the hegemonic class (Joseph 1978). 
 While Ahidjo constantly emphasised the need for ethnic balance and 
national unity, there is nevertheless sufficient evidence to suggest that three 
elite ethnic groups enjoyed a privileged position regarding capital accumulation. 
There was, first of all, the Muslim Fulbe elite, especially those who originated 
from Garoua, Ahidjo’s home town, the so-called ‘Garoua barons’. Second, there 
were the members of the Christian Beti elite from the southern part of Franco-
phone Cameroon who formed the core of the bureaucratic-administrative 
faction of the hegemonic alliance on the basis of their high educational qualifi-
cations. The Fulbe-Beti axis constituted the regime’s major ethnic underpin-
ning. And thirdly, there were the members of the Bamileke elite from the 
Francophone part of the Grassfields, the present-day West Province. They are 
renowned in Cameroon for their entrepreneurial ethos (Warnier 1993; Tabapssi 
1999) and it was widely believed that Ahidjo was ready to grant the Bamileke 
elite ample room for capital accumulation on condition that they did not meddle 
in politics. Ultimately, in spite of the incentives for cooperation and agreement 
used by Ahidjo, the stability of the regime was based on the widespread use of 
repression and the suppression of human rights. 
 The regime’s apparent political stability, its lack of ideological posturing and 
its liberal investment code appealed to Western donors and business circles. 
With an annual growth rate of some 6-7 per cent between 1970 and 1985, the 
Cameroonian economy was considered one of Sub-Saharan Africa’s success 
stories. It should, however, be pointed out that the country’s seemingly impres-
sive growth rate during this period was inflated by the discovery of oil in the 
Anglophone part of Cameroon. Strikingly, oil output and oil revenues remained 
a state secret throughout Ahidjo’s administration.2 Apparently, most oil reve-
nues were placed in foreign banks as ‘extra-budgetary accounts’. The official 
justification given by Ahidjo for this strategy was the elimination of the boom 
                                                 
2  Under Ahidjo’s successor, Paul Biya, there has been little change in this respect. 
Anglophones have been repeatedly incensed by his arrogant declarations that oil 
revenues and statistics are too complex to be understood by ordinary Cameroonians 
and that no one had the need to concern themselves with such figures. 
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mentality that had crippled agricultural production in other African countries 
following the discovery of oil. Nevertheless, to conform with the regime’s 
patrimonial logic, the primary functions of these extra-budgetary accounts were 
soon to cover parastatal deficits (Van de Walle 1993; Jua 1993) and to bolster 
the personal foreign bank accounts of the president and some of his privileged 
collaborators. 
 Ahidjo voluntarily resigned from the presidency in 1982 and was succeeded 
by Paul Biya, his prime minister since 1975. Unlike Ahidjo, Biya was a 
Christian Beti.3 This political transition did not presage fundamental alterations 
in state-society relations, as patronage and repression remained the main props 
of state power. The most conspicuous aspect of the change was the ethno-
regional realignment at the summit of state power. An abortive coup in 1984, in 
which Ahidjo and senior northern politicians were rumoured to be implicated, 
provided Biya the opportunity to remove from office a number of ministers, 
bureaucrats and politicians who were closely associated with the Ahidjo regime 
or whose loyalties to the new regime were suspect. In 1984, the single party, the 
CNU, was renamed the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM), 
with Biya in firm control (Takougang & Krieger 1998). Despite the regime’s 
continuous emphasis on national integration (Biya 1987), there was an increas-
ing monopolisation of economic and political power by Biya’s ethnic group, the 
Beti. This was a significant reversal of Ahidjo’s policy of ethnic balance and 
formed a threat to political stability. To contain any possible challenges to its 
grip on power by Fulbe political barons, the Biya regime carved up the north 
into three administrative provinces (Adamawa, North and Far North). With this, 
the regime turned to a greater reliance on politicians from northern minority 
ethnic groups (misleadingly lumped together as ‘Kirdi’) as its support base in 
these provinces (Schilder 1994; Burnham 1996; Logo 1999). Fulbe and 
Bamileke businessmen, who had enjoyed a privileged position during Ahidjo’s 
administration, were increasingly replaced by Beti businessmen (often officially 
backed and generously supported financially), the so-called Beti Mafia. In 
protest at such discrimination, Bamileke businessmen withdrew their savings 
from the banks and transferred them to informal saving circuits called tontines 
(Henry et al. 1991). This contributed to the growing liquidity problems facing 
banks. The Biya regime increased the number of civil servants from about 
80,000 in 1982 to about 180,000 in 1988, the majority of the new employees 
having been recruited among the Beti. Some of them were ghost workers – a 
                                                 
3  It is important to emphasise here that the name ‘Beti’ as an ethnic label is a 
historically circumscribed construct and subject to constant change. Since the 1980s 
the term has come to cover a number of ethnic groups in the Centre and South 
Provinces of Cameroon, in particular the Bulu and Eton or Ewondo. President Biya 
belongs to the Bulu group. 
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problem that would occasion repeated censuses of civil servants under the 
supervision of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The 
Beti also increasingly monopolised pivotal positions in government and in the 
security forces. Takougang (1993: 95-96) reported that, as of August 1991, 
thirty-seven of the forty-seven senior prefects (heads of administrative 
divisions), three-quarters of the directors and general managers of parastatal 
corporations in the country, and twenty-two out of the thirty-eight high-ranking 
bureaucrats who had been appointed in the newly created office of the prime 
minister were from the president’s own ethnic group. The new regime’s barons 
appeared to be much bolder in staking claim to the state’s resources than 
Ahidjo’s supporters had been. Corruption and rent-seeking were always funda-
mental characteristics of the regime (Joseph 1978; Médard 1977; Gabriel 1999) 
but after 1984, they increased to a point at which the system became dysfunc-
tional. When this political conjuncture was combined with a severe exogenous 
economic shock, the system finally started to crumble. 
 In the mid-1980s, the post-colonial state was confronted with a severe 
economic crisis (Van de Walle 1993; Konings 1996a). It posed a major threat to 
the economic base of the patrimonial state as well as to the system of preroga-
tives and privilege of the hegemonic alliance. A sharp downfall in commodity 
prices and a slide in the value of the American dollar against the CFA franc 
resulted in a 70 per cent deterioration in the country’s terms of trade between 
1986 and 1993. After some initial hesitation, the Biya government realised it 
had no alternative but to call upon the IMF and the World Bank to implement a 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). 
 By 1990 widespread popular discontent with the regime in power and 
growing dissent within the hegemonic class could be observed. The majority of 
the population held the corrupt, authoritarian regime responsible for the serious 
economic crisis and draconian SAP measures, resulting in its loss of legitimacy. 
Some members of the elite, particularly those who had become dissatisfied with 
the regime because of its promotion of Beti domination, began to express 
general discontent and even tried to organise the urban masses into political 
parties. Taking advantage of widespread Anglophone resentment to their 
allegedly second-rate citizenship in the Francophone-dominated unitary state, 
John Fru Ndi, a book-dealer, launched the first opposition party, the Social 
Democratic Front (SDF), in Bamenda, the capital of the North West Province of 
Anglophone Cameroon in May 1990. By the end of the year, the regime had 
capitulated to demands for the introduction of a multi-party system and a certain 
degree of freedom of mass communication, association and the holding of 
public meetings and demonstrations (Takougang & Krieger 1998). 
 Given the nature of the state-centred system of power, political liberalisation 
opened up the way for the articulation of deeply entrenched feelings of ethno-
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regional injustice. The vast majority of the newly created political parties had a 
clear ethno-regional base and at the time of the 1992 parliamentary and presi-
dential elections, only four out of over 100 political parties claimed a national 
constituency. Still, the core support base and leadership of these four major 
parties were generally identified with particular regions. The party of the 
dominant class, the ruling CPDM party was perceived to be a Beti party while 
the National Union of Democracy and Progress (NUDP) was generally seen as 
a Fulbe party. Considered an Anglophone party backed by the Bamileke, the 
leadership of the SDF was dominated by people from the North West Province 
in Anglophone Cameroon. The stronghold of the Cameroon Democratic Union 
(CDU) was the Bamoun region (Eyoh 1998a and b; Mbembe 1993). 
 Even more significantly with the growing impasse of multi-party politics, the 
ethno-regional elites began to found associations to promote ethno-regional 
interests and achieve a larger ethno-regional share in national economic and 
political resources, including Essingang (Beti elite), La’akam (Bamileke elite), 
the South West Elite Association (SWELA), the Amicale des Elites du Nord 
(AMENORD), and the Dynamique Culturelle Kirdi (DCK) founded by the new 
elite of the ‘silent majority’ (the Kirdi) in the Far North (Nyamnjoh & 
Rowlands 1998; Logo 1999). The Anglophone elite, too, created several 
associations to protest against the supposed subordinate position of the Anglo-
phone minority in the Francophone-dominated unitary state and to lay claims to 
self-determination and autonomy. 
 
 
The construction of an Anglophone identity  
and competing identities 
 
Colonial boundaries have had an ambivalent impact on what has come to be 
known as the Anglophone problem. On the one hand, the boundary between 
Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon has laid the foundation for the 
construction of Anglophone and Francophone identities and the development of 
cleavages between the two elites. On the other hand, this boundary has failed to 
erase the existing ethnic relations between both territories altogether, enabling 
the Anglophone and Francophone elites to cement alliances if they were felt to 
be opportune. Moreover, although the population of the Anglophone territory 
came to share a common colonial legacy, ethno-regional boundaries continued 
to exist between the coastal forest area (the present South West Province) and 
the inland Grassfields area (North West Province) and cleavages developed 
within the Anglophone elite during decolonisation. 
 The colonial process of identity formation was strengthened by reunification 
and the post-colonial nation-state project. Determined to achieve and maintain a 
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unitary state, successive Francophone-dominated post-colonial regimes have 
attempted to deconstruct Anglophone identity by encouraging existing divisions 
within the Anglophone elite and stimulating new ethno-regional identities that 
appear to transcend the Anglophone-Francophone divide. 
 
The construction of an Anglophone identity 
There is general agreement that the roots of the Anglophone problem can be 
traced back to the partitioning of the erstwhile German Kamerun Protectorate 
into British and French mandate and trust territories after the First World War 
(cf. Johnson 1970; Le Vine 1964 and 1971; Benjamin 1972). Separate colonial 
state formation and the development of territorial differences in languages and 
cultural legacies laid the spatial and historical foundation for the construction of 
Anglophone and Francophone identities. That one part of Anglophone Camer-
oon, which came to be called the Southern Cameroons, nevertheless voted for 
reunification with Francophone Cameroon rather than for integration into 
Nigeria in a United Nations-organised referendum on 11 February 1961 can not 
therefore simply be explained in terms of a long-awaited reunion of people 
separated by arbitrarily imposed colonial borders. Other factors seem to have 
been more important. First, having been administered as an integral part of 
Nigeria during the mandate and trust eras, the majority of the Anglophone 
population tended to perceive the integration option as a guarantee of continued 
domination of the Southern Cameroons by Nigerians. Second, ethno-regional 
power struggles between the Anglophone elite prevented them from finding a 
compromise concerning the political future of the Southern Cameroons and 
championing what the Anglophone population wanted, namely an independent 
Southern Cameroons state. And, last but not least, the anti-colonial Africa bloc 
at the United Nations, with the blessings of the United Kingdom, ruled out the 
possibility of sovereignty for the Southern Cameroons, claiming that this option 
was economically unviable and politically undesirable (since it would promote 
a further ‘Balkanisation’ of the continent). 
An even more important factor in the construction of an Anglophone identity 
was the form of state that the Francophone elite imposed upon the Anglophone 
minority during the constitutional negotiations for a reunified Cameroon. The 
Anglophone delegation, led by Prime Minister John Ngu Foncha, had proposed 
a loose form of federation, which it considered a safe guarantee of equal 
partnership for both parties and of the preservation of the cultural heritage and 
identity of each. Contrary to Anglophone expectations, the Francophone 
delegation, headed by President Ahmadou Ahidjo, opted for a highly centralised 
form of federation that it saw merely as a transition phase in the creation of a 
unitary state. The most decisive factor, however, was the nation-state project 
after reunification. For the Anglophone population, nation-building was driven 
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by the Francophone political elite’s firm determination to dominate the Anglo-
phone minority in the post-colonial state and to wipe out the cultural and 
institutional foundation of Anglophone identity (Eyoh 1998a: 262). Gradually, 
Anglophones felt they were being recolonised and marginalised in all spheres of 
public life and were becoming second-class citizens in their own country. 
While there is a general tendency among Anglophones to blame the Franco-
phone elite for the entire Anglophone problem, it cannot be denied that Anglo-
phone political leaders bear an important share of the responsibility for the 
Anglophone predicament. Apparently, when they realised that their influence 
within the Federated State of West Cameroon (the former Southern Cameroons) 
was beginning to be whittled down, the federal arrangements no longer suited 
their designs. They started competing for Ahidjo’s favours and aspiring to 
positions of power first within the single party and the federal government and 
eventually within the unitary state, thus blatantly neglecting the defence of West 
Cameroon’s autonomy and interests (Kofele-Kale 1987). 
The co-opting of the Anglophone elite into the hegemonic alliance and the 
autocratic nature of the Ahidjo regime largely explain why Anglophones failed 
to protest publicly against Francophone domination and recolonisation during 
the Ahidjo era. Immediately after succeeding Ahidjo, Paul Biya promised a 
New Deal to the Cameroonian people. Many Anglophones came to believe that 
Biya’s reform programme would put an end to their allegedly subordinate 
position in the unitary state. They used the limited degree of political freedom 
during the first years of Biya’s presidency to voice their long-standing 
grievances. Unfortunately, Anglophone optimism soon turned to despair as they 
began to realise that the much-trumpeted New Deal slogans were nothing but 
politicians paying lip-service to the problem and that the hegemonic and 
assimilative tendencies of the Francophone-dominated state continued unabated 
under Biya’s rule. It was not until the political liberalisation process in the early 
1990s that Anglophones openly began to organise in associations to defend their 
own interests. 
 
The construction of an ethnic identity transcending  
the Anglophone-Francophone divide 
The newly created Anglophone associations often tend to stress the insurmount-
able gap between Anglophones and Francophones on the basis of their different 
colonial legacies and Francophone hegemonic and assimilative tendencies in the 
post-colonial state. While this is helpful in justifying their claims for either a 
return to the federal state or outright secession, it denies the continuous ethnic 
links between peoples in the so-called southwestern quadrant – the South West 
and North West Provinces of Anglophone Cameroon and the Littoral and West 
Provinces of Francophone Cameroon (Awasom 1998 and 2000). Most of the 
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peoples in the coastal area of the Anglophone South West Province are, in terms 
of indigenous traditions and customs, closely related to the peoples in the 
coastal area of the Francophone Littoral Province, while most of those in the 
Anglophone part of the Grassfields (the North West Province) are closely 
related to peoples in the Francophone part of the Grassfields (the West 
Province) (Ardener 1967 and 1996). 
The Anglo-French boundary was regarded as an unnecessary inconvenience 
by the frontier people in this area, restricting the free movement and trade of 
people belonging to the same ethnic group. It is, therefore, not surprising that 
the idea of reunification arose in this area. The quest for reunification was not 
shared with equal enthusiasm by other peoples in the former German Kamerun 
Protectorate, some of whom had more affinities with ethnic groups in 
neighbouring Nigeria than with the rest of Cameroon.  
It was in the Francophone part of the southwestern quadrant, especially 
among the Bassa in the Littoral Province and the Bamileke in the West 
Province, that the UPC was formed in 1948 (Joseph 1977; Mbembe 1996). This 
radical nationalist party championed rapid independence and reunification. Its 
ideas of reunification influenced the nationalist leaders in the Anglophone part 
of the southwestern quadrant, with whom UPC leaders were in regular contact. 
The Anglophone nationalist leaders used the idea of reunification to obtain first 
a larger measure of autonomy within Nigeria and later separation from Nigeria. 
When the UPC was banned by the French in 1955, many of its leaders fled to 
Anglophone Cameroon where they opened local branches of the party. They 
considered the ethnically-related Anglophone region as offering refuge to their 
armed resistance against the pro-French government of Ahmadou Ahidjo until 
they were eventually expelled by the British. Awasom (1998, 2000) claims that 
John Ngu Foncha – the leader of the Kamerun National Democratic Party 
(KNDP), the pro-reunification party in the then Southern Cameroons – received 
substantial funds from Francophone politicians in the southwestern quadrant to 
support his campaign during the 1961 UN-organised plebiscite. 
Ahidjo was shocked by the plebiscite results because of the close ethnic 
links between the Anglophone and Francophone elite in the southwestern area. 
He had expected the plebiscite to strengthen his position of power, which was 
still vulnerable at the time because of the persistent fierce opposition in the 
southern part of Francophone Cameroon to Fulbe-Muslim rule (Bayart 1979). 
His calculations were that the northern part of Anglophone Cameroon (the 
Northern Cameroons) dominated by the Fulbe Muslim elite, would vote for 
reunification with Francophone Cameroon where their ethnic brothers were in 
power, while the southern part of Anglophone Cameroon (the Southern 
Cameroons), whose elite shared a common colonial heritage with the southern 
Nigerian elite, would vote – with British support – for integration into Nigeria. 
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The plebiscite results turned out to be the exact opposite of his prediction: the 
Northern Cameroons was lost to Nigeria while the Southern Cameroons opted 
to join Francophone Cameroon (cf. Le Vine 1964).  
It was little wonder that Ahidjo started to panic. Instead of increased Fulbe-
Muslim power in a reunified Cameroon, he now foresaw a possible coalition 
between the ethnically-related elite in the southwestern quadrant that was 
capable of destabilising his regime. To survive and consolidate his position, he 
was compelled to implement a number of strategies. First, he took full advan-
tage of both France’s continuous strong support of his regime and Britain’s 
understandable withdrawal of support from its former trust territory that had 
refused to yield to British pressure to vote for integration into Nigeria rather 
than for reunification with Francophone Cameroon in the 1961 plebiscite. 
Capitalising on this situation during the constitutional talks for a reunified 
Cameroon, Ahidjo managed to insert extensive powers for the president of the 
federal republic into the constitution in spite of Anglophone proposals for a 
ceremonial presidency. Secondly, following reunification Ahidjo used his new 
powers to persuade Foncha to restrict the actions of its political parties to their 
region of origin: the Union Camerounaise (UC) of Ahidjo to Francophone 
Cameroon and the KNDP of Foncha to Anglophone Cameroon. Ahidjo was 
thus able to forestall any recruitment efforts by the KNDP in the Francophone 
part of the southwestern quadrant. 
While Ahidjo succeeded in preventing any opposition alliance in the south-
western quadrant during his authoritarian regime, such an alignment did occur 
during political liberalisation when the SDF expanded its base from the North 
West Province to other provinces in the southwestern quadrant, especially the 
West Province where the Bamileke are the dominant ethnic group. By entering 
an alliance – often labelled the ‘Anglo-Bami’ alliance in common parlance – 
with their Anglophone kinsmen, the Bamileke hoped to seize power from the 
Beti. In response to this alliance and the growing influence of Anglophone 
organisations, the Biya government tried to divide the newly founded alliance 
by promoting the so-called Grand Sawa Movement, a realignment of the 
ethnically-related coastal peoples in the Anglophone South West Province and 
Francophone Littoral Province on the basis of alleged North West-Bamileke 
(Grassfields) domination in their provinces. 
 
The construction of a South West and a North West identity 
Colonial boundaries have exacerbated rather than erased the existing ethno-
regional cleavages within the Anglophone region between the coastal forest 
area (the present South West Province) and the inland savannah area (Grass-
fields), the North West Province. The South West elite has been inclined to 
perceive the colonial era as the starting-point of northwestern domination over 
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their region in demographic, economic and political terms. Anglophone identity 
is therefore not homogeneous but marked by contradictions, contentions and 
contestations between the South West and North West elites. 
Colonial rule brought together peoples in the coastal forest and Grassfields 
areas of Anglophone Cameroon who differed in socio-political organisation, 
culture and kinship structures. The highly centralised societies in the Grassfields 
were controlled by powerful, or even sacred, chiefs (Fons) and contrasted 
sharply with the segmented societies in the coastal forest areas where chief-
taincy was a weak institution in most cases and often a colonial creation (Nkwi 
& Warnier 1982; Geschiere 1993; Fisiy 1995; Konings 1999b). According to 
Eyoh (1998a: 270), such regional differences, in popular imagination, gave 
North Westerners an advantage over South Westerners in any struggle for eco-
nomic or political power: 
 
[There is] the representation of North Westerners as a people given to excessive 
deference to traditional authority and ethnic solidarity, and the adverse typing of 
South Westerners as a people with a weak sense of community and incapacity to 
unite behind common goals. 
 
Colonial rule also set in motion massive labour migration from the more 
densely and less developed Grassfields to the coastal plantations created during 
German colonial rule. By 1950, the North West had become the most important 
supplier of labour to the southwestern plantations (Ardener et al. 1960; Konings 
1993a). While initially most migrants returned to their region of origin after 
short spells of work on the estates, a growing number gradually decided to settle 
in the South West after retiring. ‘Settlers’ were soon joined by fellow members 
of their ethnic group who were eager to grow food or cash crops on the fertile 
volcanic soils in the South West or aspired to becoming artisans, traders or 
employees in local enterprises. In some coastal districts, like the Victoria 
District, the local population ‘almost became overwhelmed by these strangers 
even before the Second World War’ (Gwan 1975: 121). Indeed, settlers came to 
form the majority in local towns and villages. 
Initially, settlers were welcomed by the local population and given land in 
usufruct, becoming more or less incorporated in the land-giving lineage. They 
were usually expected to provide a small token of appreciation for the land-
giver. However as plantation agriculture expanded, it soon became evident that 
the local tenure system could not cope with the increasing flow of migrants that 
was leading to the development of a land market, land shortages and numerous 
land disputes (Ardener et al. 1960; Fisiy 1992). Local chiefs and elders 
regularly protested to the British administration about unscrupulous land 
grabbing by strangers in their areas of jurisdiction but they did not receive the 
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support they expected. The British authorities acknowledged the existing land 
problems but did not introduce any structural changes. They did not want to 
disrupt the economic role of immigrants whose entrepreneurial spirit and hard 
work were said to compare favourably with the consumerist attitudes and 
laziness of the local population – a stereotype that has become internalised by 
South Westerners and North Westerners alike to explain northwestern domina-
tion over the South West.  
Land was not the only reason for the development of antagonistic relations 
between the autochthonous population and the settlers. The local population 
also envied the settlers’ success in agriculture, trade and other entrepreneurial 
activities and resented their frequent disrespect for local authority and customs, 
their seduction of local women and their alleged disinclination to invest in local 
development, preferring instead to transfer their accumulated capital to their 
region of origin (Ardener et al. 1960; Ardener 1962). It was generally believed 
that settlers were only interested in exploiting and dominating the local popula-
tion, while continuing to remain loyal to their own ethnic group, as ultimately 
evidenced by their frequent desire either to return home at the end of their 
working life or to be buried on their ancestors’ land. The simmering conflict 
between autochthons and strangers in southwestern communities continued to 
provide explosive material that could easily be manipulated and used by south-
western political entrepreneurs to strengthen the South West identity and to 
incite the local population against North Westerners (Konings 2001b). 
The Anglophone elite initially demonstrated a large degree of unity during 
nationalist struggles after the Second World War but they became increasingly 
divided during the last phase of decolonisation. Different views on the political 
trajectory of the Southern Cameroons tended to be reinforced by personality 
differences between the major political leaders and ethno-regional differences 
within the Trust Territory: the South West-based Kamerun National Convention 
(KNC) party led by Dr Emmanuel Endeley championed integration into 
Nigeria, while the KNDP led by John Ngu Foncha favoured (eventual) reunifi-
cation with Francophone Cameroon. The KNDP’s victory in the 1959 elections 
was a political event with important consequences for South West-North West 
relations. While the South West elite had dominated the political scene in the 
Southern Cameroons until 1959, the KNDP’s victory signified the start of North 
West hegemony in the Anglophone region, with Foncha becoming prime 
minister. 
The results of the plebiscite reinforced the South West-North West divide. 
Pro-reunification votes were significantly higher in the North West than in the 
South West. The South West elite even alleged that the pro-reunification victory 
in the South West could be attributed to the large-scale settlement of North 
Western workers. Interregional elite rivalries reappeared when the Anglophones 
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entered negotiations with the Francophone elite about the creation of a federal 
state. John Ngu Foncha headed the multi-party delegation of Anglophone 
Cameroon at the Foumban constitutional talks in June 1961. The delegation 
exhibited a preponderance of KNDP ministers who were obviously inclined to 
limit the role of the southwestern opposition parties at the deliberations (Ngoh 
1996, 2001). The South West elite is still inclined to interpret the outcome of 
this conference, a highly centralised federation, and the post-colonial nation-
state project as a self-interested betrayal of the autonomy of West Cameroon by 
the North West elite. They point out that northwestern politicians were in 
control of the Federated State of West Cameroon during the 1961-1972 period 
when multi-partyism and federalism were abolished. They add that North 
Westerners used their control over the Federated State to exclude the South 
West elite from administrative and bureaucratic posts and to promote North 
West business expansion (Rowlands 1993; Ngwane 1994). While these south-
western claims cannot be totally dismissed, it would be a historical error to 
exonerate the South West elite from blame for the Anglophone post-colonial 
predicament. The South West-North West divide was one of the most decisive 
factors preventing the Anglophone elite from forming a united front against 
Ahidjo’s attempts to weaken the federal structure and undermine the autonomy 
and identity of West Cameroon. The speed with which the entire Anglophone 
political elite embraced the single-party concept and was incorporated into the 
hegemonic alliance is clear evidence of their lust for power and influence within 
the post-colonial nation-state project (Kofele-Kale 1987), even if equally a sign 
of their weakness in relation to their Francophone counterparts. 
To reduce any danger of united Anglophone action, Ahidjo decided to 
formalise the ethno-regional boundaries between the coastal forest and Grass-
fields areas by dividing the erstwhile Federated State of West Cameroon into 
two provinces, the South West and North West Provinces in the aftermath of the 
establishment of the unitary state in 1972. This decision, masterfully informed 
by the internal contradictions within the Anglophone territory, would exacer-
bate these divisions that in future would be the Achilles’ heel of most attempts 
at Anglophone identity and organisation. 
Political liberalisation in the early 1990s fanned the rivalry between the 
South West and North West elite in their struggles for power at regional and 
national levels. The South West elite became alarmed by the rapid growth of 
both the North West-based SDF and several Anglophone associations. Since 
many members of the Anglophone associations were simultaneously SDF 
members, the South West elite was inclined to perceive these associations as 
auxiliary organisations of the SDF. Out of fear for renewed North West 
domination and in the face of their own inability to come up with a rival 
political party, they attempted to stimulate South West identity and organisa-
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tion, manifest in particular in the foundation of the South West Elite Associa-
tion (SWELA) and the South West Chiefs’ Conference (SWECC). 
Given the intensification of the power struggles between the South West and 
North West elites during the political liberalisation process, the Biya govern-
ment found it increasingly lucrative and politically expedient to tempt the South 
West elite away from Anglophone solidarity with strategic appointments and 
the idea that their real enemy was the unpatriotic, ungrateful and power-
mongering North West elite. Government divide-and-rule tactics culminated in 
the 1996 constitution, promising the southwestern autochthonous minorities 
state protection against the so-called dominant and exploitative North 
Westerners. Appeals to the state for protection were often accompanied by 
threats of ethnic cleansing and the removal of strangers (cf. Geschiere & 
Nyamnjoh 1998 and 2000; Konings 2001b). 
 
 
Anglophones and the reconfiguration of state power 
 
The construction and mobilisation of ethno-regional identities during political 
liberalisation have given rise to widespread demands for constitutional change 
in Cameroon and brought about a fierce struggle between the government and 
ethno-regional political entrepreneurs concerning a reconfiguration of state 
power. The leaders of the newly created Anglophone organisations pose the 
greatest challenge to the continued existence of the highly centralised, unitary 
state by demanding first the reintroduction of a two-state (Anglophone/Franco-
phone) federation and later outright secession. Both options have become a 
bone of contention between the ethno-regional elites within the Anglophone 
community itself and between the Anglophone and Francophone elite, though in 
some cases the Anglophone-Francophone divide appears to have been over-
come. 
The Anglophone political elite had already proposed a two-state federation 
in the decolonisation era with the aim of accommodating the different colonial 
legacies of the Anglophone and Francophone territories. At that time the 
concept of federalism appealed to the metropolitan powers as a means of 
conflict regulation in heterogeneous African states, particularly in countries like 
Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan and Eritrea-Ethiopia where the 
dominant ethno-regional groups tended to be geographically concentrated 
(Young 1998a).4 While the metropolitan powers usually took the initiative or 
                                                 
4  This comes close to the position of experts on federalism who maintain that if the 
territorial boundaries between the components of the federation match the 
boundaries between the relevant ethnic, religious and linguistic communities, i.e. if 
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dominated constitutional negotiations concerning the introduction of a federal 
state, they had no authority and for the most part no inclination to maintain 
federal arrangements after the transfer of sovereignty. As in Cameroon, federal 
arrangements were undermined by the centralisation of power. The intolerance 
of federal arrangements were driven in large part by the desire to dominate state 
processes, which was seen as the principal means of promoting economic 
development and national integration. Moreover, the alluding fear in most 
countries where federalism had been proposed was that it was but a step to 
secession. Ghai (1998) argues persuasively that a refusal of regional autonomy 
is more likely to catalyse secessionist sentiments than federalism, as can be seen 
for example in the case of Sudan. Since its independence in 1956, Sudan has 
known only one decade of civil peace, from 1972 to 1983, when a semi-
federalist system was in place, giving some cultural security to the three 
southern provinces that do not share the Arabic-Islamic culture of the north 
(much less the fundamentalist version that has been dominant since 1989). The 
abolition of southern autonomy in 1983 led at once to a resumption of an 
unending civil war (Young 1998b: 11). 
The apparent failure of the highly centralised unitary state to achieve 
economic development and national integration has given rise, during the 
second wave of democratisation, to renewed demands for the introduction of a 
federal state in several African countries including Cameroon (Basta & Ibrahim 
1999). Currently on the African continent only Ethiopia and Nigeria claim to 
operate federal polities and the legitimacy of their federal status has been 
questioned (Basta & Ibrahim 1999; Bach 1999). The Ethiopian experiment is 
unique in Africa in the sense that the federating units are defined in ethnic terms 
and that the 1995 constitution (Article 39) allows for the secession of new states 
– a provision that could cause problems for the country’s future territorial 
integrity (Abbink 1995 and 1997; Jembere 1999). 
The reintroduction of a federal state is widely supported in the Anglophone 
community in Cameroon but the Anglophone elite appears to be divided on the 
number of states. The leaders of the newly created Anglophone organisations 
advocate a two-state federation based on the Anglophone-Francophone divide. 
The South West elite champions a ten-state federation based on the country’s 
ten existing provinces, which they perceive as a safeguard against renewed 
northwestern domination in a two-state federation. The SDF supports a four-
state federation to appease its Francophone membership’s persistent resistance 
to Anglophone demands for the return to a federal state. Interestingly, the 
renewed calls for the reintroduction of federalism seem to have transcended the 
                                                                                                                       
there is a federal society, then federalism can be an effective conflict-regulating 
device. See, for instance, McGeary & O’Leary 1993: 33. 
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Anglophone-Francophone divide. A small minority of the Francophone elite, 
most belonging to the opposition, also favours a federation but they, like the 
Anglophone elite, seem to differ on the number of states that should be estab-
lished (Donfack 1998). 
Faced with the Francophone-dominated state’s refusal to enter into negotia-
tions about a return to federalism, the leaders of the Anglophone organisations 
began to propagate secession. Like federalism, secession (from Nigeria) and the 
concomitant establishment of an independent Anglophone state was already an 
option in the Anglophone territory in the period preceding independence and 
reunification. Apparently, it was the preferred option in the region until eventu-
ally being dismissed by Britain and the United Nations. Subsequently, it was 
propagated only by small political parties like the Kamerun United Party 
(KUP), the Cameroons Commoners’ Congress (CCC) and the Cameroons 
Indigenes Party (CIP), which boycotted the 1961 UN-organised plebiscite. 
Secessionist demands reemerged in Anglophone Cameroon in the mid-1980s 
when a prominent Anglophone chief and lawyer, Fon Gorji Dinka, demanded 
the immediate promulgation of an independent Anglophone state which he 
called the Republic of Ambazonia (Mukong 1990: 93-105). 
Secession has been a rare option in post-colonial Africa and has been 
strongly opposed by the new independent states and the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU) to safeguard territorial integrity. Secessionist attempts, as 
witnessed in Nigeria (Biafra), Congo/Zaire (Katanga) and Sudan are the 
exception. Secessionist demands have been on the increase since the early 
1990s but appear mostly to revolve around the re-establishment of colonial 
partition-lines that were once erased or transformed into internal administrative 
boundaries. Eritrea’s independence in 1993 after several decades of a national 
war of liberation is the only example of a formal reorganisation of the 
continent’s political map. It may be interpreted as the re-establishment of the 
frontier that separated the former Italian colony from Ethiopia until it was 
invaded by Mussolini’s troops in 1936. In the Horn of Africa, the Somali 
conflict has provoked a de facto return to the boundary that existed between the 
ex-British Somaliland and the Italian Somali until they merged in 1960. Further 
to the south, the United Republic of Tanzania – born out of the unification of 
Tanganyika (a former German colony) and Zanzibar (a former British protec-
torate) in 1964 – has been confronted with demands for the constitution of a 
separate government for the mainland. In Zambia, calls have been made for 
Barotseland to become a bastion of resistance against attempts by the Zambian 
government to act against the terms and spirit of the Barotseland Agreement 
signed in 1964 between Northern Rhodesia, Barotseland and Great Britain 
(Akashambatwa 2001). In West Africa, the Saharawi independence movement 
has been fighting for decades to secure international recognition of a boundary 
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that has undisputed colonial origins. Elsewhere, agitation in Senegal’s 
Casamance and in Anglophone Cameroon is rooted in the assertion of identity 
claims that draw some of their specificity from distinct colonial and linguistic 
legacies – Portuguese in the first case, British in the second (Bach 1999). 
Strikingly, the Anglophone secessionist demand is not only strongly opposed 
by the Cameroonian government but also faces far more resistance than 
federalist demands in the Anglophone community itself. The South West elite 
and the SDF in particular continue to insist on the preservation of national unity 
and territorial integrity. It could even be argued that the re-emergence of the 
secessionist option has contributed to recent attempts to transcend the Anglo-
phone-Francophone divide, as manifest in the creation and articulation of 
alliances such as the Grand West (the North West-Bamileke alliance) and Grand 
Sawa (the coastal South West-Littoral alliance). 
In reaction to Anglophone demands for a return to a federal state or outright 
secession, the ruling regime continued to uphold the unitary state but eventually 
was willing to concede to a degree of decentralisation based on the ten existing 
provinces. Decentralisation is supported by the majority of the Francophone 
elite and the pro-CPDM Anglophone elite. Some members of the Francophone 
elite, however, seem to advocate a larger measure of decentralisation than the 
government is proposing (Olinga 1994; Donfack 1998). They claim that this 
would be a politically more acceptable and economically more effective method 
than federalism to accommodate the widespread dissatisfaction with the unequal 
regional distribution of power and income and the concomitant pursuit of 
regional autonomy in both the Anglophone and Francophone parts of the 
country. And finally, they argue that the Anglophone-Francophone divide has 
been exaggerated by some Anglophone power seekers, referring in particular to 
the close ethnic relations between Anglophones and Francophones in the 
southwestern quadrant. 
 
 
Organisation of the book and research methodology 
 
Having provided in this introductory chapter an overview of the most important 
themes that are to be explored, we can now proceed to explain how the book is 
organised and how we arrived at the research findings on which it is based. 
Chapter 2 traces the historical trajectory of Anglophone Cameroon to reuni-
fication with Francophone Cameroon and the Francophone imposition of a 
highly centralised form of federation upon the Anglophone minority during 
constitutional talks proceeding reunification. 
Chapter 3 outlines the various strategies by the Francophone-dominated state 
to undermine the autonomy and identity of Anglophone Cameroon during the 
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federal and one-party unitary state (1961-1990) and the development of an 
Anglophone consciousness. 
Chapter 4 describes the emergence of Anglophone organisations in the 
aftermath of political liberalisation in 1990 and their struggle first for a return to 
a federal state and later for secession. 
Chapter 5 reviews the most important strategies employed by the Biya 
government during political liberalisation to deconstruct the Anglophone 
identity and uphold the unitary state. 
Chapter 6 provides the reader with an insight into Anglophone and Franco-
phone responses to the Anglophone movements’ views and calls for autonomy, 
showing that both groups are by no means homogeneous and monolithic blocs.  
Chapter 7 pays particular attention to two of the major confrontations 
between the government and the Anglophones, namely the struggle for the 
preservation of the Anglophone educational and economic legacy. During these 
struggles Anglophones have displayed a large measure of solidarity and forced 
the government to make some (temporary) concessions. 
Chapter 8 summarises the book’s major findings and provides some sugges-
tions on how the present stalemate between the regime and the Anglophone 
movement could be broken and how the Anglophone problem could be solved. 
The present study is based on our long-standing research in the Anglophone 
region of Cameroon. During fieldwork in 1998 and 2001 we consulted primary 
and secondary sources in libraries, archives, departments and ministerial 
offices. The rich historical material kept at the Buea National Archives was of 
particular use and interest. We also interviewed several leaders of various 
Anglophone organisations as well as a number of government officials and 
members of the Anglophone and Francophone communities who were either 
supporters, sympathisers or opponents of the Anglophone movement. Finally, 
the Scncforum on the Internet helped us to follow the current debate surround-
ing the Anglophone problem and to regularly update our research findings. 
We recognise that the focus of our research has been mainly on the Anglo-
phone elite. This is to a certain extent understandable since nationalism in 
Anglophone Cameroon, as in other parts of the Third World, has been first and 
foremost a project of the elites. Nevertheless, we are fully aware that grassroots 
considerations are necessary for a comprehensive account of the Anglophone 
problem in Cameroon. It would be interesting to know what impact the Anglo-
phone struggle has had on the regional peasantry and we encourage future 
research on this subject to complement our own study. 
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Southern Cameroons on  
the road to reunification  
and federation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The roots of the current Anglophone problem can be traced back to the First 
World War when the British and French occupied the erstwhile German 
Kamerun Protectorate and divided its territory into two parts. This partition 
gradually gave rise to the development of a different cultural heritage and 
identity in the British and French regions, a development that would create 
serious problems for any future attempts at reunification. It is therefore 
necessary to explain why, cultural and identity differences notwithstanding, the 
majority of the population in the southern part of the British Cameroon (which 
came to be called Southern Cameroons) voted for reunification with Franco-
phone Cameroon in a UN-organised plebiscite in 1961. 
An even more decisive factor in the current Anglophone problem was the 
form of state that the leaders of the Francophone majority more or less imposed 
upon the Anglophone minority following reunification. Anglophone leaders 
had proposed a loose form of federation that they considered a safe guarantee 
of the equal partnership of both parties and of the preservation of the cultural 
heritage and identity of each. Contrary to Anglophone expectations, however, 
the Francophone leaders opted for a highly centralised form of federation, 
which they saw as merely a transitory phase in the total integration of the 
Anglophone minority into a centralised unitary state.  
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Eyoh (1998a) has rightly remarked that the narratives of pre- and post-
reunification experiences by the present Anglophone leaders have often been 
characterised by an impressive dose of historical amnesia – willed acts of 
selective remembrance of the past so that the Francophones would be seen fully 
responsible for the Anglophone problem. We want to show in this chapter that 
the divisions among the Anglophone political elite and their struggles for power 
are also responsible for reunification and the present Anglophone predicament. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first presents a concise 
outline of the emergence of nationalism and the idea of reunification in the 
Southern Cameroons. The second section explains why the majority of the 
Southern Cameroonian population voted for reunification in the February 1961 
United Nations plebiscite. And the final section describes the Francophone 
imposition of a highly centralised form of federation upon the Anglophone 
delegation during the July 1961 constitutional conference in Foumban. 
 
 
The emergence of nationalism and reunification ideas  
in the Southern Cameroons 
 
Several authors have narrated in considerable detail the complex historical 
trajectory of the Southern Cameroons toward reunification (cf. Le Vine 1964; 
Welch 1966; Johnson 1970; Ngoh 1990; Ebune 1992; Awasom 2001). Here we 
discuss only those elements that are important to the arguments in this book.  
Southern Cameroons came into being after the First World War when the 
erstwhile German Kamerun Protectorate (1884-1916) was partitioned between 
the British and the French, first as ‘mandates’ under the League of Nations and 
later as ‘trusts’ under the United Nations (Rudin 1938; Gardinier 1963; Le Vine 
1964; Joseph 1977). As a result of this partitioning, the British acquired two 
narrow non-contiguous regions in the western part of the country stretching 
from the Atlantic coast to Lake Chad and bordering Nigeria. The southern part 
and the focus of our study was christened Southern Cameroons, and the 
northern part was christened Northern Cameroons.1 Significantly, the British 
territory was much smaller than the French one, comprising only one fifth of 
the total area and population of the former German colony. 
The partitioning of the territory into an English and a French sphere had 
some significant consequences for future political developments. For one thing, 
it had a lasting effect on the construction of Anglophone and Francophone 
                                                 
1  For the history of the Northern Cameroons, see, for instance, Le Vine 1964 and 
Welch 1966. Northern Cameroons voted in the 1961 plebiscite for integration into 
the Federation of Nigeria. 
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identities in the territory. The populations of each sphere came to see them-
selves as distinct communities, defined by differences in language and inherited 
colonial traditions of education, law and public administration, and world view. 
Second, it could be argued that the very fact of partitioning the territory into 
two unequal parts sowed the seeds for the ultimate emergence in a reunified 
Cameroon of an Anglophone minority and a Francophone majority (Awasom 
1998) that would affect the structure and distribution of power, resources and 
opportunities between the two communities in the postcolony. Third, the 
partitioning led to marked differences in the administration and level of 
development of the two parts. French Cameroon was incorporated into the 
French colonial empire as a distinct administrative unit, separate from 
neighbouring French Equatorial Africa. British Cameroon was instead 
administered as part of Nigeria. Whereas the Northern Cameroons was 
administered as an integral part of the Northern Region of Nigeria, the Southern 
Cameroons was initially governed as part of the Southern Provinces of Nigeria 
and later as an integral part of the Eastern Region of Nigeria. Differential 
administration also led to differential allocation of investment funds. Being 
administered as a separate unit, French Cameroon received substantial 
development funds from the mother country during the mandate and trust 
periods, resulting in a higher level of socio-economic development than in 
British Cameroon (Ndongko 1975). Being administered as a mere appendage of 
Nigeria, British Cameroon was starved of development funds by the adminis-
tering authority and its economy remained centred around the plantations which 
had been established under German rule (Ardener et al. 1960; Epale 1975; 
Konings 1993a). There was not even a separate budget for the Southern 
Cameroons until 1954 when it achieved a quasi-regional status and a limited 
degree of self-government. Although no exact figures were kept about the 
territory’s revenues and expenditures, the Southern Cameroons seems to have 
run at a deficit throughout the mandate and trust periods, and it required 
subsidies from the Nigerian budget. The question of the Southern Cameroons’ 
economic viability outside the Nigerian structure became important as the 
separational and reunification movements grew stronger (Le Vine 1964: 201; 
Rubin 1971: 78; Mbuagbaw et al. 1987: 86-87).  
Blatant neglect of regional development was only one consequence of the 
administration of Southern Cameroons as an integral part of Nigeria. Another, 
and maybe even more important one for future political developments, was the 
increasing migration of eastern Nigerians, especially Igbo and Ibibio, to the 
Southern Cameroons. Their dominant position in the Southern Cameroonian 
economy was deeply resented by the local population. The ‘Igbo scare’ was 
going to be exploited by regional politicians during the nationalist struggles 
after the Second World War (Kleis 1980; Amazee 1990). It is beyond any doubt 
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that both the Southern Cameroonian peripheral position as a ‘colony of a 
colony’ (Nigeria) and the Nigerian domination of the Southern Cameroonian 
economy contributed to the development of a Cameroonian identity and nation-
alism among the local population. 
The nationalist movement began with the creation of several associations 
and pressure groups formed by the Southern Cameroonian elite, the first of 
them being established in Lagos in 1939. These organisations, like the 
Cameroons Youth League (CYL) and the Cameroons National Federation 
(CNF) (Chiabi 1982; Ebune 1992; Ngoh 2001), began to attack the subordinate 
position of the Southern Cameroons in the British-Nigerian colonial system. 
Their most important claims were initially a larger representation of the 
Southern Cameroonian elite in the Nigerian administration and later regional 
autonomy. Such claims received special encouragement after the Second World 
War when the Southern Cameroons became a trust territory under the 
supervision of the United Nations. The United Nations Charter stipulated that 
trusteeship was intended to promote the political advancement of the trust 
territories towards self-government and independence. The United Nations 
Trusteeship Council had the right to undertake investigations and to secure 
reports to determine if such advancement was occurring. The Council sent 
missions to the Southern Cameroons in 1949, 1952, 1955 and 1958 to receive 
petitions and interview representatives of Southern Cameroonian political 
groups. Such missions were important stimuli to the formation of local groups 
and the articulation of their demands (DeLancey 1989: 36). 
Interestingly, from the late 1940s onwards the question of reunification 
cropped up in the programmes of the various Southern Cameroonian pressure 
groups and newly created parties, raising the possibility of an alternative 
political option for the Southern Cameroons to escape from its subordinate 
position in the British-Nigerian colonial system and from Igbo domination. 
Several factors underpinned their reunification campaign. There was the 
emergence of the ‘Kamerun Idea’ among some members of the Southern 
Cameroonian elite – the belief that the period of German rule had created a 
Cameroon identity or nation (Welch 1966: 158-88; Johnson 1970: 42). Some 
authors have pointed out that this idea hardly corresponded with reality since 
German colonial rule had been too short to create a Cameroon identity among 
the multiplicity of ethnic groups in its territory (Ardener 1967; Le Vine 1964; 
Chem-Langhëë & Njeuma 1980). Kofele-Kale (1980), however, argued that it 
was not the reality of the German experience but rather the memories (factual 
or otherwise) or myths that inspired the Southern Cameroonian elite to start 
advocating reunification. To strengthen their arguments, the Southern 
Cameroonian elite often referred to the close relationships that existed between 
ethnic groups on both sides of the British-French border. In some cases, this 
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border had even divided the same ethnic groups in the so-called southwestern 
quadrant (see Chapter 1). 
The idea of reunification was particularly promoted by settled migrant 
communities from French Cameroon in the Southern Cameroons. These 
migrants fell into two categories. The first was composed of traders, mostly 
Bamileke and Bamum, who were involved in a dynamic commercial traffic 
across the frontier. A crucial aspect of this was the existence of relatives, 
cultural and other support systems on both sides of the frontier. They saw 
reunification principally as a means of lifting the customs restrictions between 
British and French Cameroons. The second category consisted of a Franco-
phone elite residing in the Southern Cameroonian urban centres. They 
considered reunification principally as a way to eradicate discrimination by the 
British Administering Authority and remove their second-class citizenship in 
the Southern Cameroons. One of their best-known leaders, Mr R.J.K. 
Dibongue, was instrumental in forming the French Cameroons Welfare Union 
(FCWU) in 1948 and the Kamerun United National Congress (KUNC) in 1951 
to advance the political and economic position of Francophone Cameroonians 
and the idea of reunification (Amazee 1994; Njeuma 1995; Awasom 2000). 
Another factor that encouraged the idea of reunification was the formation 
of a radical nationalist party in French Cameroon in 1948, the Union des 
Populations du Cameroun (UPC) (Joseph 1977; Mbembe 1996). This party 
stood for immediate independence and reunification. Soon after its formation, 
the UPC sought contact with the ethnically-related Southern Cameroonian 
leaders and tried to influence their political awareness (Takougang 1996), 
taking advantage of the refuge offered to some of its persecuted members to test 
the waters and sow the seeds of reunification in the region. 
It must, however, be admitted that for a long time the idea of reunification 
remained a vague ideal towards which few steps were being taken. None of the 
Southern Cameroonian political leaders ever described or outlined the form 
which reunification should take. Moreover, contrary to the UPC, most were 
inclined to look upon reunification as an evolutionary trajectory. They 
appeared, in fact, to be more concerned in the meantime with internal issues, 
particularly the improvement of the Southern Cameroonian position within the 
Nigerian Federation. They often brought up the issue of reunification in their 
petitions to the United Nations missions as a way of gaining ‘home rule’ within 
Nigeria (Welch 1966: 150; Ngoh 1996: 187). For instance, one of the leading 
Southern Cameroonian nationalists, Dr E.M.L. Endeley, used the issue of 
reunification mainly as an instrument to embarrass the colonial administration 
and to create support for the push towards an autonomous province within 
Nigeria (Le Vine 1964: 203). In response to Southern Cameroonian pressures, 
the British authorities gradually increased Southern Cameroonian representa-
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tion in the Nigerian administration after the Second World War. Following 
successive constitutional changes, they granted Southern Cameroons a quasi-
regional status in 1954 and a limited degree of self-government, and in 1958 
full regional status within the Federation of Nigeria (Ngoh 1990). 
From the mid-1950s onwards, nationalist leaders in the Southern Cameroons 
became increasingly divided. Different points of view on the political trajectory 
of the Southern Cameroons tended to be reinforced by personality differences 
between the major political leaders and ethno-regional differences within the 
territory. The key players were Dr Emmanuel Endeley and John Ngu Foncha, 
both early leaders in the Southern Cameroons national struggles.  
Endeley, a medical doctor by training, was from the Bakweri, an ethnic 
group in the coastal forest area of the Southern Cameroons (the present South 
West Province). He was the leader of the then-ruling South West-based 
Kamerun National Convention (KNC) party. Following constitutional changes 
Endeley became the Leader of Government Business in 1954 and the first 
Prime Minister of the Southern Cameroons in 1958. He had moved from an 
anti-Nigeria and pro-reunification stand towards a more positive view of 
Nigeria when Southern Cameroons became a quasi-region within Nigeria in 
1954. His new position was even strengthened when Southern Cameroons 
achieved full regional status in 1958. From his perspective, regional status 
seemed an adequate answer to the problems of Nigerian domination, the lack of 
Southern Cameroonian participation in the Nigerian political system, and 
economic stagnation. With regional status, Southern Cameroonians could rule 
themselves, maintain their ties to the British inheritance, and avoid the violence 
and chaos of the civil war in French Cameroon that had been going on since 
1955 when the UPC was banned by the French authorities and subsequently 
engaged in an armed rebellion (Joseph 1977). Being married to a woman from 
Yorubaland in Nigeria might have influenced his positive attitude and 
enthusiasm towards Nigeria (Mbile 2000). Endeley’s increasing championship 
of integration of the Southern Cameroons into Nigeria received the overt 
blessings of the British authorities who intended to integrate the Southern 
Cameroons into Nigeria in the same way as British Togoland, another United 
Nations trust territory under the United Kingdom, had been incorporated into 
Ghana in 1956 through a UN-organised plebiscite (Brown 1980). Being a 
Bakweri, he was most likely to attract political support in the South West. 
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to consider his party as an exclusively 
ethno-regional party. Endeley also enjoyed some support in the inland 
Grassfield part of the Southern Cameroons (the present North West Province). 
While he was often admired for his high educational and political achieve-
ments, all his life histories equally reveal that his personality often estranged 
potential voters in the South West and North West alike.  
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He was widely seen as extremely arrogant. He frequently boasted of being 
the most highly educated citizen in the Southern Cameroons and he regarded 
his political contemporaries as mere intellectual minions, and villagers as 
outright natives. He spoke a sophisticated English and even in the heat of an 
election campaign he would refuse to speak to the northwestern chiefs in the 
language they understood (pidgin English) with the excuse ‘I am sorry about 
speaking my “big” English ... but I cannot speak any other way’. He was also a 
Bakweri chauvinist. Endeley’s ethnic loyalties sometimes combined with his 
own personal pride to generate hostility among other ethnic groups. On one 
occasion he is reported to have bragged to an audience in the Mamfe District of 
the South West that its peoples would never produce someone of the standing 
of the leaders produced by the Bakweri (referring, no doubt, to himself). This 
hurt, and the Mamfe electorate later remembered his words. In addition, 
Endeley’s attitudes and behaviour tended to alienate the chiefs, particularly 
those in the North West. The northwestern population was largely controlled by 
powerful, or even sacred, chiefs (or Fons as they are called throughout the 
North West) whose authority was highly respected by their subjects, including 
the newly created elite. The position of chiefs in the highly centralised states of 
the North West contrasted sharply in this respect with that of their colleagues in 
the segmentary societies of the South West where chieftaincy was a weak 
institution in most cases and often a colonial creation (Geschiere 1993; Fisiy 
1995; Konings 1999b). Firm support from chieftaincy in the densely populated 
North West could be crucial in elections. Though a Bakweri prince (some even 
said the heir-apparent), Endeley made many mistakes in dealing with the 
symbols and spokesmen of tradition in the territory. He would offend the fons 
by shaking their hands, sitting at their side on stools reserved for their fellow 
fons or by addressing them by the wrong title or at the wrong times.2 Endeley’s 
attitude towards chieftaincy was nevertheless complicated. He was by no means 
unaware of the chiefs’ prestige since he was himself the son of the most 
important Bakweri chief. But he was also a highly educated person living in an 
era when power was obviously shifting from the traditional to the modern elite. 
He acknowledged he could not do without the chiefs’ support completely and 
was therefore not opposed to their repeated demands for a House of Chiefs 
(Johnson 1970: 162-63; Welch 1966: 190-94; Wache 1991: 6-7; Konings 
1999b). 
                                                 
2  Endeley has been reported to have treated one of the most important northwestern 
chiefs, Fon Galega II of Bali, with levity. One version holds that on a trip to London, 
after alighting from the plane, he peremptorily asked the fon to carry his bag.  N.N. 
Mbile, another illustrious South Western politician who was on the same trip, has 
recently strongly denied this story, claiming that it was an opposition plot to win the 
support of the Bali people. See Mbile 2000: 105-10. 
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Endeley's opponent, John Ngu Foncha, was a teacher by profession and 
hailed from the North West.3 Foncha had been a leading figure in Endeley’s 
KNC until 1955 when he broke away to form his own party, the North West-
based Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP). Foncha and his supporters 
blamed Endeley for no longer adhering to the original KNC programme of 
evolutionary reunification of the two Cameroons and for his new pro-Nigeria 
stance. While Foncha’s political views on the future of the Southern 
Cameroons were not always consistent, he seems to have mostly crusaded for 
secession from Nigeria and (eventual) reunification with French Cameroon. 
Political dissension, however, was not the only reason for Foncha’s break with 
Endeley’s party. He thought that a North West-based party was more likely to 
represent and defend northwestern interests than a South West-based party. 
Ethnically different from the South West peoples, North Westerners had also 
been left at a socio-economic disadvantage during the colonial period through 
the more extensive development of education, infrastructural provisions, agro-
industrial and other enterprises in the South West. Furthermore, leaders of the 
South West dominated those from the North West in political affairs. 
According to Ebune (1992: 152-53), Foncha, as a staunch Catholic, was also 
disturbed that all the four KNC members of the first executive council 
established in 1954 were Protestants. He was subsequently encouraged by the 
Catholic Church to form a more Catholic-oriented party. 
Unlike the highly educated, arrogant and Protestant Endeley, Foncha was an 
uncomplicated, devout Catholic headmaster who perhaps felt more secure 
speaking pidgin English or an indigenous language than standard English. 
Foncha was basically a grassroots politician who would walk all day to reach a 
remote village of voters (Soh 1999). He presented himself as an African who 
was proud of wearing a sumptuous traditional boubou rather than a suit and tie, 
and preferred eating African food to European food. Folklore has it that on one 
visit to London, Foncha carted along achu (a Grassfield delicacy), which he 
publicly ate with relish to show his attachment to things African. Above all, 
Foncha displayed great respect for tradition, both its symbols and custodians. 
His attitude to them was scrupulously deferential if not reverent, and earned 
him the recognition and ear of the fons. Foncha and other KNDP leaders like 
Augustine Ngom Jua made good use of the support of the fons during the 1959 
elections (Welch 1966: 190-94; Johnson 1970: 162-63; Wache 1991: 6-7; 
Konings 1999b). 
With the approaching independence of Nigeria and French Cameroon in 
1960, the 1959 elections became a relentless struggle for hegemony between 
the dominant parties and leaders in the Southern Cameroons. It was generally 
                                                 
3  For Foncha’s biography, see Soh 1999. 
 
30 
understood beforehand that the victor in these elections would be given a 
mandate to negotiate the political future of the territory. One of the dominant 
parties, Endeley’s KNC had in the meantime formed an alliance with another 
South West-based party, N.N. Mbile’s Kamerun People's Party (KPP). Pursuing 
the same objective – the integration of the Southern Cameroons into Nigeria – 
both parties later merged to form a new party, the Cameroon People’s National 
Congress (CPNC). The obvious aim of their alliance and later merger was to 
create a united front against the KNDP, seen and treated as a Grassfields threat 
to South West interests and prominence. 
During the election campaign, the KNDP used various strategies to defeat 
the CPNC. The first was the attempt to capitalise on the widespread ‘Igbo 
scare’, an issue that the CPNC apparently underestimated. The KNDP leaders 
alleged that a vote for the CPNC would mean the integration of the Southern 
Cameroons into Nigeria and the continuation of Igbo domination. A vote for the 
KNDP would instead imply the separation of the Southern Cameroons from 
Nigeria and the end of Igbo domination. Remarkably, while singling out the 
issue of separation from Nigeria as a major campaign issue, the KNDP tended 
to underplay its championship of an eventual reunification with French 
Cameroon. This was a deliberate strategy as the party had become painfully 
aware during its campaign that reunification was not popular among the 
electorate who appeared to be not only afraid of the repercussions of the violent 
civil war going on in French Cameroon, but also unfamiliar with, and even 
distrustful of, the French colonial heritage. A second strategy was the attempt 
to present itself as a regional party, especially when campaigning in the North 
West. Since most of its main leaders hailed from the North West, the KNDP 
could easily project itself as a party that was more likely to defend North 
Western interests than the South West-based CPNC. Several political blunders 
by the Endeley government tended to confirm the party’s claim. One such 
mistake, which seriously undermined Endeley’s support in the North West, was 
the enforcement of contour ploughing. This threat to long-established agricul-
tural practices infuriated northwestern women, the traditional producers of food 
in the area (Konings 1995a; Goheen 1996). One of the KNDP leaders, 
Augustine Ngom Jua, exploited female discontent in his home area by inciting 
the Kom traditional women’s organisation called Anlu to stage various actions 
against Endeley’s government and party (Nkwi 1985; Shanklin 1990). A third 
strategy was to lobby influential chiefs and chiefs’ conferences, particularly in 
the North West, well aware that the fons still exercised a large measure of 
control over the local population’s voting behaviour. The wide-ranging 
influence of northwestern chieftaincy on domestic politics was clearly 
recognised by one of the principal CPNC leaders, Mr N.N. Mbile, in September 
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1959 when he commented as follows on the role of chiefly authority during a 
session of the United Nations Fourth Committee: 
 
Much of the present struggle was really between the grassland tribes in Bamenda and 
the people of the southern coastal forest belt. His own opinion was that even a 
plebiscite would not serve to make clear what the real wishes of the people were, for 
they were still loyal to their tribal leadership, especially in the Bamenda Grassfields, 
and might well vote against that own interest if such was the wish of their chiefs.4 
 
By employing such strategies, the KNDP was able to win the 1959 elections. 
On the one hand, its victory was a political event with important consequences 
for South West-North West relations. While the South West elite had 
dominated the political scene in the Southern Cameroons up to the 1959 
elections, the KNDP’s victory signified the start of North West hegemony in 
the territory. Henceforth, the North West elite began to play a dominant 
political and economic role at regional and national levels. In pre-empting for 
itself the choicest jobs and lands in the South West, it provoked strong 
resentment among South Westerners (Kofele-Kale 1981; Ngwane 1994). South 
West sentiments have been intensified by the gradual success of the entrepre-
neurial North Westerners in dominating most sectors of the South West 
economy, in particular trade, transport and housing (Rowlands 1993). On the 
other hand, the KNDP’s victory was so narrow, winning 14 of the 26 seats, that 
it did not provide Foncha with a clear mandate to start negotiating the political 
future of the Southern Cameroons. The United Nations visiting mission, which 
left the territory shortly before the elections, recommended therefore consulting 
the population in a plebiscite unless general agreement could be reached among 
all the major political parties regarding the constitutional future of the territory. 
 
 
The 1961 United Nations plebiscite 
 
Less than a month after the January 1959 elections, Foncha and Endeley flew to 
New York to attend the resumed thirteenth session of the United Nations 
General Assembly, called solely to debate the future of the Cameroons. During 
the debate both leaders continued to defend their different views. The General 
Assembly finally agreed that a plebiscite should be held to decide the issue. 
The two party leaders then became divided on the questions that should be 
presented to the voters in the plebiscite.  
Foncha proposed a choice between separation from the Federation of 
Nigeria and association with it. He stressed that the KNDP first wanted 
                                                 
4  UNGA A/C.4 SR 885 of 24 September 1959. 
 
32 
separation from Nigeria before starting any negotiations for an eventual 
reunification with French Cameroon. He even suggested the trusteeship period 
be extended for a few years to offer the Southern Cameroons the opportunity to 
develop politically, economically and culturally, which would enhance its 
bargaining position with French Cameroon. Endeley, in turn, proposed a choice 
between reunification with an independent French Cameroon and association 
with an independent Nigeria. In his statement, he noted that during the elections 
campaign the issue of reunification had been pushed into the background and 
the question of domination by the Eastern Region of Nigeria raised instead. He 
stressed that secession could not be an end in itself but only a first step. Hence, 
voters were to choose between association with an independent Nigeria and 
reunification with an independent French Cameroon. 
The two men refused to budge from their positions and a compromise could 
not be reached. The General Assembly then recommended that the wording of 
the plebiscite questions be decided at the fourteenth session after the Southern 
Cameroonian leaders had considered the matter further. 
Neither Foncha nor Endeley would yield during the summer despite the 
General Assembly’s resolution. Upon the urging of the Governor-General of 
Nigeria, a summit conference of chiefs and political leaders was held in Mamfe 
in August 1959 to discuss the matter but no agreement could be reached. 
Interestingly, one of the newly created South West parties, the Kamerun United 
Party (KUP), even proposed another option: separation from Nigeria and the 
establishment of an independent Southern Cameroons state. Its leader, Mr P.M. 
Kale (1967), questioned the necessity of a plebiscite, arguing that the terms of 
the Trusteeship Agreement guaranteed the Cameroons ‘the right to the 
enjoyment of self-government or independence ... even if Nigeria had not set 
the ball rolling’ (Ngoh 1990: 173). The chiefs supported his position of 
secession without reunification. In a colourful and memorable statement, their 
spokesman, Fon Achirimbi II of Bafut, metaphorically presented French 
Cameroon as ‘being on fire’ because of the civil war that was raging there, and 
giant Nigeria as the ‘water’ in which the Southern Cameroons would easily 
drown should it chose to go there. He reminded the delegates that ‘we rejected 
Dr Endeley because he wanted to take us to Nigeria; if Mr Foncha tries to take 
us to the French Cameroons we shall also run away from him’ (Awasom 2000: 
108-9). What clearly emerged from the conference was that reunification was 
not a popular theme, the vast majority advocating either integration into Nigeria 
or secession from Nigeria (Foncha’s KNDP supported secession and ultimate 
reunification, while Kale’s KUP supported secession and complete independ-
ence). 
Unable to resolve their differences at the Mamfe conference, Foncha and 
Endeley returned to the fourteenth general assembly of the United Nations in 
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September 1959. During the debates it became manifest that the General 
Assembly, and in particular the African and anti-colonial delegations, opposed 
secession. Foncha’s option of secession and continuing trusteeship was rejected 
because it would imply the prolongation of colonialism. Kale’s option of 
secession and complete independence for the Southern Cameroons – an option 
that was even supported by both Endeley and Foncha for a brief moment during 
the heated discussions – was rejected for two main reasons. First, the African 
delegates were fearful of a further Balkanisation of Africa by granting a 
separate independence for the tiny Southern Cameroons. And second, the 
British had informed the United Nations that the Southern Cameroons was not 
sufficiently economically viable to constitute an independent state. The British 
source of information was the Phillipson Report commissioned by the Foncha 
government in 1959 to investigate the financial, economic and administrative 
situation in the Southern Cameroons (Phillipson 1959). The findings of this 
report, however, could be disputed for an economic survey by Dr K.E. Berill, 
held in the same year, came to a different conclusion (Berill 1960). Hesitant 
about making any large investments in a region that was supposedly unattrac-
tive economically, the British were also opposed to extended trusteeship. The 
British Secretary of State for the Colonies once warned the Southern Cameroo-
nian leaders that the golden key to the Bank of England would not be handed 
over to the Southern Cameroons in the case of an extended trusteeship period. 
Having ruled out both continuing trusteeship and an independent Southern 
Cameroons state, the United Nations then limited the choice of questions to be 
asked in the plebiscite to: Do you want to achieve independence by joining 
Nigeria or by reuniting with the Republic of Cameroon (the new name of 
former French Cameroon after independence on 1 January 1960)? It is evident 
that the two alternatives closely reflected Endeley’s previous proposals. Foncha 
was eventually persuaded to accept the two options if Endeley agreed to 
compromise and accept a delay in the plebiscite with a view to giving the 
parties more time to educate the Southern Cameroonian population on the 
implications of the two alternatives5. The compromise between the two leaders 
was embedded in General Assembly Resolution 1352 (XIV) of 16 October 
1959, which requested that the plebiscite be held no later than March 1961. 
Three smaller Southern Cameroonian parties – the Kamerun United Party 
(KUP) led by Paul Kale, the Cameroons Commoners’ Congress (CCC) led by 
Chief Stephen Nyenti, and the Cameroons Indigenes Party (CIP) led by Jesco 
Manga Williams – immediately contested the outcome, insisting on the 
                                                 
5  Foncha also hoped that the continuing civil war in Francophone Cameroon, which 
might constitute an obstacle for the electorate to vote for reunification during the 
plebiscite, would come to an end during this period of delay.  
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inclusion of an independent Southern Cameroons state as a third option in the 
plebiscite. They sent several petitions to the United Nations threatening to 
boycott the plebiscite if their wish was not honoured. Their protest actions, 
however, did not bear fruit (Ngoh 1990: 179-80). 
Foncha was embarrassed. The decision by the United Nations forced him to 
come to grips with the issue of reunification, a matter to which he had not given 
serious thought and that, as he had painfully realised, was likely to enjoy little 
support among the vast majority of the Southern Cameroonian population. 
Most KNDP members felt betrayed because Foncha had made promises before 
his departure for New York that he would advocate an extension of the trustee-
ship period for another two or three years (Ebune 1992: 180). Apparently, some 
party leaders were even considering replacing Foncha as prime minister. His 
deputy, Mr Augustine Ngom Jua, in particular, challenged his leadership 
(Johnson 1970: 147).  
To overcome the widespread opposition to his new stand, Foncha attempted 
to transform the concept of reunification into one of federation (Njeuma 1995: 
33). From his experience with Nigeria, Foncha was familiar with federal 
institutions and the machinery of federal government. And, maybe even more 
importantly, he had witnessed at firsthand a trend in Nigeria towards a ‘looser’ 
form of federalism, with a large measure of regional autonomy (Ezera 1964; 
Walker 1992). Foncha then began to propagate the idea of a similar form of 
federation, almost a confederation, which he perceived as a safe guarantee for a 
large measure of autonomy for the Southern Cameroons after reunification, 
equal partnership and preservation of the cultural heritage of each partner. With 
such a federalist conception, he tried to regain the confidence of his party 
members and to assure the Southern Cameroonian population that no 
fundamental change would occur after reunification. Foncha’s major problem, 
however, was that he would have to enter into concrete negotiations with 
French Cameroon – a territory with a fundamentally different political culture 
and constitutional set-up – about the constitutional modalities of a future union 
should the Southern Cameroons vote for reunification in the plebiscite.  
Ahmadou Ahidjo, who was prime minister of French Cameroon for about 
two years before becoming president of the independent Republic of Cameroon 
on 1 January 1960 (Bayart 1979), appears to have been lukewarm about the 
ideas of reunification and federation (Awasom 2000, 2001). In his inaugural 
speech in the French Cameroon Legislative Assembly on 18 February 1958, he 
committed himself to the reunification and independence of the two 
Cameroons. He indicated that if reunification was the wish of British 
Cameroon, he could not object to it. But he hastened to warn that under no 
circumstances would reunification delay the independence of French 
Cameroon, implying that reunification was not his priority. Ahidjo’s 
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endorsement of reunification and independence appears to have been largely a 
tactical strategy to appropriate the cherished slogans of the UPC rebels and 
deprive them of their ideological platform and relevance. Moreover, he had 
ambivalent feelings about the political consequences of reunification. On the 
one hand, he was apprehensive that in any such reunion the Southern 
Cameroons would join forces with his political foes in the southern part of 
French Cameroon and bring about his own political downfall. His anxiety arose 
from his perception of the Southern Cameroons as being all too similar 
ethnically and politically to the rebellious elements in the southwestern part of 
French Cameroon. Bands of UPC maquisards were already using the frontier 
zones of the Southern Cameroons as a safe haven to which to escape after 
carrying out attacks in French Cameroon. On the other hand, however, he 
showed a keen interest in reunion with British Northern Cameroons, which was 
geographically, religiously, ethnically and culturally closer to the northern part 
of French Cameroon, his home region. Reunion with British Northern 
Cameroons could greatly enhance his political fortunes: it would widen his 
ethnic and political base significantly. 
Given his lukewarm and somewhat ambivalent feelings about reunification, 
it is understandable that Ahidjo remained sceptical and evasive with regard to 
Foncha’s repeated invitations to enter into negotiations on the establishment of 
a federal state after an eventual reunification. On the rare occasions when he 
openly expressed his views on the matter, he intimated that reunification would 
involve a gradual process and that it would not imply an annexation of the 
Southern Cameroons by the Republic of Cameroon. He also assured Southern 
Cameroonians that discussions about the issue of reunification would take place 
in an atmosphere of complete freedom and equality between representatives of 
the Republic of Cameroon and the Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons. 
When he finally entered into negotiations with Foncha, it soon became manifest 
that he strongly opposed Foncha’s proposal of a loose federation as being 
incompatible with the highly centralised constitution he advocated himself. 
Ahidjo clearly lacked Foncha’s experience with the intricate workings of 
federalism. His thoughts had been shaped by the centralised and assimilative 
administrative structure characteristic of the French colonies. He had also been 
engaged in the drafting of a constitution for the independent Republic of 
Cameroon that laid the foundation for a highly centralised state and a strong 
executive power largely based on the constitution of the Fifth Republic (Le 
Vine 1964). The March 1960 constitution had been adopted in an extremely 
difficult political climate and was intended to help Ahidjo consolidate his 
position in the newly independent Republic of Cameroon (Bayart 1979; 
Awasom 2001). Foncha’s proposals, being tantamount to the decentralisation 
and deconcentration of power and the adoption of a completely new political 
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framework, would have had the nefarious effect of weakening Ahidjo’s newly 
achieved power base and erasing Francophone political culture. Moreover, the 
paradigm of modernisation, which dominated the literature on political and 
economic development in the 1950s and 1960s, reinforced Ahidjo’s views on 
the importance of a strong unitary state for nation-building and economic 
reconstruction in Africa (Cameroon National Union 1968).  
Foncha and Endeley had been requested by the United Nations to define 
publicly, prior to the plebiscite, the form of union they envisaged with Franco-
phone Cameroon and Nigeria respectively. Less than seven months before the 
plebiscite, during Ahidjo’s first official visit to the Southern Cameroons on 15 
July 1960, Foncha had openly to confess that no form of union with Franco-
phone Cameroon had yet been worked out. Time was running out for Foncha as 
the plebiscite campaign was supposed to be launched on 1 October 1960 when 
Nigeria acceded to independence. The position of Endeley’s CPNC on the issue 
of integration with Nigeria was well known. In the eventuality of the Southern 
Cameroons opting to join Nigeria, the territory would become a self-governing 
region, equal in all respects to the other regions in the Nigerian Federation. 
Ridiculed and castigated by Endeley for gambling with the destiny of the 
Southern Cameroonian people, and pressured by the British to produce a 
document clearly spelling out the envisaged form of union with Francophone 
Cameroon, the KNDP panicked. Foncha was requested to bring more pressure 
to bear upon Ahidjo and draft a document at all costs for the purpose of the 
plebiscite. 
Eventually, on 14 October 1960, Ahidjo and Foncha issued a joint 
communiqué announcing that they had agreed on a union of both Cameroons on 
a federal basis should the Southern Cameroons vote for reunification in the 
plebiscite. The document, however, conspicuously failed to define the exact 
division of power between the federal government and the component units of 
the federation. Some vague phrases like ‘first stage’ and ‘second stage’ were 
used without the slightest attempt to define them. The constitutional terms of 
the Southern Cameroons joining the Republic of Cameroon were laid down in 
barely two and a quarter pages of The Gazette in contrast to those of the 
Southern Cameroons joining Nigeria that covered six pages. Apparently both 
parties failed to make any further progress due to their diametrically opposed 
political traditions and interests. Ahidjo strongly dismissed Foncha’s proposal 
of a loose federation. Given the particular situation of uniting two territories 
with different colonial legacies, he appeared nevertheless prepared to concede 
to a highly centralised form of federation, almost a non-federation, which he 
saw as a necessary transitory phase to his ultimate goal, namely the full 
integration of the two component entities into a strong, unitary state. 
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Dissatisfied with the outcome of these protracted negotiations, Foncha 
resorted to two different strategies. On the one hand, he continued to tell the 
Southern Cameroonian population that a loose federation would be formed 
after reunification (Ngoh 1990: 191-94). He was able to do so because any 
report of his negotiations tended to be vague. On the other hand, he appeared to 
be ready to simply abandon the idea of reunification and its complex constitu-
tional implications for some time. Like Endeley, he was under severe pressure 
from the majority of the Southern Cameroonian elite to continue fighting for 
the establishment of an independent Southern Cameroons state. When the 
CPNC proposed to the KNDP that the two parties request that the United 
Nations cancel the upcoming plebiscite and grant the Southern Cameroons 
independence, Foncha agreed. A conference was organised in London in 
November 1960 to obtain the approval of the British government.  
The British authorities initially showed some sympathy for the predicament 
of Southern Cameroonians but eventually it rejected the proposal on the 
grounds that ‘the United Nations in adopting the two alternatives of joining 
Nigeria or the Cameroon Republic, clearly ruled out a period of continuing 
trusteeship or separate independence for the Southern Cameroons’ (Ngoh 1990: 
195-98). As a result of the failure of this conference, Foncha was obliged to 
restart his negotiations with Ahidjo. The only noteworthy outcome of this 
conference was the confusion it created in the minds of the Southern 
Cameroonian voters due to insufficient information or even misinformation. 
Although the request had been rejected, some Southern Cameroonians started 
to believe that the second alternative had been altered into ‘secession without 
reunification’. Others thought that the Southern Cameroons had been granted a 
probationary period of reunification with the Republic of Cameroon. If 
Southern Cameroonians did not find reunification rewarding at the end of this 
period, they could still pull out of the union and form a separate independent 
state. The KNDP politicians, realising that the confusion was to their 
advantage, remained unmoved, while the CPNC failed to clarify to the 
electorate the true outcome of the conference. As a result, a considerable 
number of Southern Cameroonians seemed to have voted during the plebiscite 
for the second alternative thinking it implied ‘secession without reunification’ 
or a ‘probationary period of reunification’ (Ngoh 1990: 197-98; Chem-Langhëë 
1976, 1997). 
The United Nations set the date of the plebiscite for 11 February 1961. 
Under United Nations auspices a public-education campaign was started to 
explain the constitutional consequences of the Southern Cameroons joining 
either Nigeria or the Republic of Cameroon. One hundred thousand copies of 
an official brochure, The Two Alternatives (Federation of Nigeria 1961), were 
printed and distributed as part of this campaign. It is, however, most unlikely 
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that in a society with a low literacy rate such as the Southern Cameroons, 
complex written explanations of constitutional guarantees had any significant 
impact. By all accounts it is evident that the various parties appeared to be more 
interested in the number of votes gained than in educating the people about the 
constitutional consequences of their choice. 
Both the KNDP and the CPNC used similar tactics to those employed during 
the 1959 elections to win votes. The KNDP tried to attract voters by stressing 
again those issues that most Southern Cameroonians resented such as Igbo 
domination, the British-Nigerian neglect of the territory and the possible 
swamping of the tiny Southern Cameroonian population within Nigeria. The 
party also sought to capitalise on vague sentiments of Cameroonian ‘brother-
hood’. The vagueness of the constitutional proposals made by Ahidjo and 
Foncha permitted the KNDP to proclaim that the Southern Cameroons would 
enjoy a large degree of autonomy and that its language and cultural heritage 
would be maintained. The CPNC singled out terrorism in the Republic of 
Cameroon in order to scare Southern Cameroonians from voting for reunifica-
tion. It also tried to impress upon the electorate that reunification would mean a 
complete change in language, system of government and way of life (Welch 
1966: 231-33; Johnson 1970: 147-52). Both parties appealed to ethnic 
sentiments and loyalties. For example, the KNDP used to ask the audience at 
their rallies in the North West whether they were going to vote in support of Dr 
Endeley, a Bakweri, or for Foncha, a Bamenda man. Foncha made good use of 
his position as prime minister and the fact that the KNDP was the party in 
power. He often underlined that a vote for reunification was a sign of loyalty to 
the government. The KNDP sometimes even obstructed the campaigning of the 
CPNC, especially in the North West. Other tactics employed to win votes 
included making unsubstantiated promises, telling lies, bribing people and 
distributing gifts to the electorate (Ebune 1992: 182-91). According to Awasom 
(2000: 111), the KNDP propaganda machinery was heavily supported by 
Francophone businessmen and politicians in the southwestern quadrant who 
favoured reunification with the ethnically-related Anglophone population in 
their pursuit of economic and political power. 
The KNDP emerged victorious from the plebiscite held on 11 February 
1961: 233,571 Southern Cameroonians voted for reunification with the 
Republic of Cameroon while only 97,741 voted for integration into Nigeria (see 
Table 2.1). The ratio of votes for and against reunification, however, was 
significantly higher in the North West (3.5 to 1) than in the South West (1.5 to 
1) (Welch 1966: 235). The CPNC leaders protested strongly to the United 
Nations about the results, which to them were very unsatisfactory. The party 
held that ethnic elements had played a vital role in influencing opinions during  
 
39 
Table 2.1 
Results of the 1961 Southern Cameroons Plebiscite 
Plebiscite Districts Number of votes Number of votes 
 for Nigeria  for Cameroon 
North West Province 
Bamenda Division 8,073 18,839 
East 1,822 17,858 
Central West 1,230 18,027 
Central East 529 18,193 
West 467 16,142 
South 220 19,426 
Total 12,341 108,485 
 
Wum Division 
North  1,485 7,322 
Central 3,644 3,211 
East 1,518 13,133 
West 2,137 3,449 
Total 8,784 27,115 
 
Nkambe Division 
North 5,962 1,917 
East 3,845 5,896 
Central 5,059 4,288 
South 7,051 2,921 
Total 21,917 15,022 
 
South West Province 
Victoria Division 
Southwest 2,552 3,756 
Southeast 1,329 4,870 
Northwest 4,744 4,205 
Northeast 3,291 9,251 
Total 11,741 22,082 
 
Kumba Division 
Northeast 9,466 11,991 
Northwest 14,738  555 
Southeast 6,105 12,827 
Southwest 2,424 2,227 
Total 32,733 27,600 
 
Mamfe Division 
West 2,039 8,505 
North 5,432 6,410 
South  685 8,175 
East 1,894 10,177 
Total 10,050 33,267 
Grand Total 97,741 233,571 
Source: Welch 1966: 235; Ebune 1992: 229-30. 
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the plebiscite. It called on the United Nations to interpret the results on an 
ethnic basis. Where an ethnic group had voted in favour of union with Nigeria 
or the Republic of Cameroon, it should be allowed to join the country of its 
choice. The appeal was rejected and the United Nations accepted the results as 
they were.  
Ahidjo was equally shocked by the plebiscite results but for a different 
reason. The exact opposite of what he had hoped for had happened. While the 
Southern Cameroons had opted to join Francophone Cameroon by a very wide 
margin, the British Northern Cameroons, which was of the same ethnic 
extraction as his home region, had voted in a separate plebiscite for integration 
into Nigeria. The plebiscite results thus appeared to weaken rather than 
strengthen Ahidjo’s power position. He particularly feared an alliance between 
the Southern Cameroons and the ethnically-related Francophone opposition in 
the southwestern quadrant after reunification. 
Ahidjo’s first reaction to the plebiscite results in the British Northern 
Cameroons was that ‘foul play had been committed and the results had been 
falsified’ (Le Vine 1964, 1971). He immediately lodged a complaint with the 
United Nations to the effect that the plebiscite did not represent the free choice 
of the British Northern Cameroons voters. In one of its sessions on 21 April 
1961, the United Nations General Assembly Fourth Committee rejected his 
complaint and approved the February plebiscite results. It then invited the 
administering authority and the governments of the Southern Cameroons and 
the Republic of Cameroon to start urgent negotiations with a view to finalising 
before 1 October 1961 ‘the arrangements by which the agreed and declared 
policies for a union of the Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroon 
would be implemented’ (Mukong 1990: XVIII). 
The Fourth Committee proposed the appointment of three constitutional and 
administrative experts nominated to assist in the discussions. Given their 
conflicting views on the details of the federal constitution, one would have 
expected Foncha and Ahidjo to welcome the United Nations’ initiative aimed at 
assisting them to finalise a constitution for the union. Paradoxically, Ahidjo, 
with the tacit support of Foncha, turned down international assistance on the 
grounds that the two Cameroons were already engaged in constitutional talks 
and that the involvement of international experts would constitute an unneces-
sary interference in a strictly Cameroonian affair. Foncha’s naive complicity in 
this matter proved to be fatal to the Southern Cameroonians as subsequent 
events proved (Awasom 2001). 
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The 1961 Foumban constitutional conference 
 
Following the United Nations General Assembly’s approval of 1 October 1961 
as the date of termination of British trusteeship and reunification, very little 
time remained for the complex negotiations to establish a new constitution.  
It soon became evident that Foncha’s bargaining position during the 
negotiations had been seriously weakened by the lack of any substantial and 
meaningful British support. Since the Southern Cameroons had voted for union 
with the Republic of Cameroon against the British-preferred option of 
integration into Nigeria, Britain decided to play second fiddle in the post-
plebiscite discussions, being more anxious to quit the territory on 1 October 
1961, the date prescribed by the United Nations, than to lead the Southern 
Cameroonian politicians through the intrigues and complexities of constitution-
making. The British government, in a spirit of abandonment, appeared not to 
care whether the new constitution sufficiently protected the Anglophone 
minority or would survive the post-reunification era. During a session of the 
British parliament in August 1961, Lord Thompson, a member of the 
opposition, pointed out Britain’s indifference to the constitutional talks 
between the Anglophone and Francophone leaders: 
 
There can be no doubt that given the difficulties facing the two countries, with 
different systems of administration and different languages, federation is the only 
practical system, certainly in the interests of the Southern Cameroons. But there is no 
clarity as to how far this is a definite commitment from the Republic of Cameroon. I 
am wondering what our government is doing to ensure firm agreement in black and 
white that there should be a proper federal system, which will allow the two territo-
ries to work out their future harmoniously and gradually.6 
 
The British Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr Hugh Fraser, 
replied that the ‘actual constitutional arrangements [were] essentially matters 
for Cameroonians themselves’,7 clearly indicating that Britain had washed its 
hands of the Southern Cameroons and ceded the territory to the French sphere 
of influence. 
In contrast, Ahidjo could definitely count on France’s support. France was 
able to win Britain over to the view that the union of the two Cameroons was 
bound to take place on 1 October 1961 and that any imperfections in the federal 
constitutional draft should be shelved for the post-reunification period 
(Awasom 2001). Britain subsequently decided to put pressure on the KNDP 
leadership to reach a modus vivendi with the other Cameroon, regardless of the 
                                                 
6  House of Commons debate, 1 August 1961, pp. 1337-38. 
7  Ibid., p. 1347. 
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form or content. This development was an unfortunate turn of events, compel-
ling the KNDP to come to terms with the Ahidjo government at all costs. 
Acting almost single-handedly, Foncha and his KNDP lieutenants still 
managed to oppose Ahidjo’s proposals for a highly centralised federal state for 
some time, persistently championing the creation of a loose federal union that 
would allow the two Cameroons to preserve their specific identities. According 
to Awasom (2001), it was only after the failure of the Buea Tripartite Talks of 
15-17 June 1961 that Foncha finally acquiesced in a secret deal with Ahidjo to 
the introduction of a highly centralised federal state and the transfer of 
sovereignty to Ahidjo after reunification in exchange for important portfolios. 
The Buea Tripartite Talks preceded the Bamenda All-Party Constitutional 
Conference that was scheduled to take place on 26-28 June 1961. This 
conference would bring together the Southern Cameroonian political and 
traditional leaders for the purpose of drafting a comprehensive set of proposals 
as a basis for future negotiations with representatives of the Republic of 
Cameroon. A few days before the conference, Ahidjo handed his constitutional 
proposals to Foncha, asking him to discuss them with his cabinet members. 
Foncha came under fire from the other KNDP ministers for his secret scheming 
with Ahidjo and his acceptance of the majority of Ahidjo’s proposals, which 
appeared to be a breach of the KNDP plebiscite pledge. Counter proposals were 
produced which adhered more closely to the loose federal union that the KNDP 
had propagated during the plebiscite. During the Bamenda conference, Foncha 
refused to report on the outcome of his secret negotiations with Ahidjo for fear 
that the opposition would sabotage the conference and derail the constitutional 
process. As a result, the delegates eventually adopted proposals for a loose 
federation that were greatly at variance with Ahidjo’s proposals. 
The Southern Cameroons proposals included a ceremonial rather than an 
executive head of state; a bicameral federal legislature; a governor or head of 
each state, with a prime minister as the head of an accountable government in 
each of the component states; separate state and federal citizenship; the 
allocation of a wide range of legislative powers to the states, particularly in the 
early stages after union though with an acknowledgement that some of these 
could be transferred to the central government at a later date; the entrenchment 
of a large number of provisions by means of a procedure that would make 
amendment difficult, and depending either on the consent of a two-thirds 
majority in each state legislature or approval in separate state referenda; the 
reservation of a certain quota of ministerial portfolios at the federal level for 
each state; the transfer of the federal capital from Yaoundé to Douala; the 
adoption of French and English as the federation’s official languages; specific 
provisions for the protection of fundamental human rights; power vested in the 
president to veto legislation considered detrimental to the rights of states, or of 
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minorities within them; as well as matters of some particular concern to the 
Southern Cameroons itself, such as the maintenance of the general legal system 
and of the state, the retention of the House of Chiefs, and safeguards for the 
continued existence of the customary court system (see Rubin 1971: 111-12). 
Foncha was fully aware of the fact that Ahidjo would reject these proposals but 
he went ahead with sending them to Ahidjo to make him realise that they 
expressed the popular will of the Southern Cameroonian people and not just the 
position of the KNDP government. 
It was Ahidjo who chose the timing and setting of the constitutional 
conference between the Anglophone and Francophone representatives. Consti-
tutional talks were to be held from 17-21 July 1961 in Foumban, the capital of 
the Bamun, an ethnic group in present-day West Province in Francophone 
Cameroon that is closely related to ethnic groups in the neighbouring North 
West Province of Anglophone Cameroon. 
Mr N.N. Mbile (2000: 166-67), who was a Southern Cameroonian repre-
sentative at this conference claims that Ahidjo had deliberately selected the 
town of Foumban for the occasion: 
 
Foumban looked ideal for this historic come-together. Free from all the unrest that 
had scared Southern Cameroonians and blessed with a most congenial climate and 
people, the Francophone authorities had picked the place deliberately for the 
occasion. The entire town had been exquisitely cleaned up and houses splashed with 
whitewash. Charles Okala, the Foreign Minister, an amiable host ... had flown in two 
orchestras, one from Yaoundé, the other from Douala. Our hosts had taken 
meticulous care to provide the best lodging possible. Food was good and receptions 
lavish. As a matter of fact, we could see the weeks of effort put in by our hosts to 
cement the impression that the term ‘brothers’ went deeper than on mere lips and the 
climate in Foumban real or artificial went far to convince us that despite the stories 
of ‘murder and fire’, there could be at least this island of peace, east of the Mungo.8 
 
The Foumban Constitutional Conference posed a political risk for both 
Foncha and Ahidjo. Both statesmen were publicly and privately committed to a 
federal union, and a new federal constitution had to emerge from some form of 
political consultation. Just before the conference, in an effort to minimise 
frustrations, discord and the loss of tempers, they struck a secret deal in which 
no direct constitutional debates would take place between the two delegations 
during the conference (Awasom 2001). Instead of debate, there would be a brief 
reception in honour of the Southern Cameroonian delegation given by President 
Ahidjo. Ahidjo would talk privately to Foncha first and then receive the 
delegates of the Southern Cameroons one at a time. The Foumban conference 
would therefore be brief and the delegates would then return home. Thereafter, 
                                                 
8  The Mungo is a river dividing Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon. 
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reunification negotiations for a proper federal constitution would be worked 
out, and the consensual constitution would be ratified by the legislatures of the 
new federation. 
On the first day of the conference, 17 July, the Southern Cameroonian 
delegates were shocked when Ahidjo communicated to them that he would 
prefer to talk to them individually instead of holding a bi-national constitutional 
debate. They angrily turned down this proposal outright, thus unknowingly but 
successfully torpedoing the secret agenda of Ahidjo and Foncha. Ahidjo then 
reluctantly agreed that the Anglophone delegates could discuss the constitu-
tional proposals, while the Francophone delegates would await the results of 
the Anglophone deliberations. Both delegations were to meet in a final session 
that was allowed to last only one and a half hours. 
Ahidjo then made the translated draft constitution to the Southern Cameroo-
nian delegates available for study. It was presented as a simple revision of the 
constitution of 4 March 1960 of the Republic of Cameroon. Most Southern 
Cameroonian delegates felt embarrassed when they saw for the first time 
Ahidjo’s constitutional package for a strongly centralised federal state, with 
only residual powers for the federated states. Overwhelmed by brotherly 
sentiments, however, they ignored their embarrassment and agreed to examine 
the proposals on the spot. In retrospect, it is now evident that Ahidjo had few 
illusions about the eventual relationship between the two territories: the 
Francophone territory, with a much larger size and population and a much 
higher level of economic development than the Anglophone one, had to be the 
dominant element in the new union. And even more importantly, by the time of 
these negotiations, the Southern Cameroons was obliged to achieve its 
independence by joining the sovereign Republic of Cameroon, enabling Ahidjo 
to dictate the terms for federation by capitalising on his territory’s ‘senior 
status’. Ahidjo refused to consider the Bamenda constitutional proposals and 
did not even hesitate in proclaiming that he would accept recommendations 
concerning his own constitutional proposals but that he and his delegation 
would be the final arbiters of what would be accepted (Stark 1976: 112; Fonge 
1997: 184-85). 
The Southern Cameroons delegation examined Ahidjo’s proposals in three 
sessions and produced a number of recommendations aimed at mitigating the 
full impact of these proposals for a highly centralised regime on the institutions 
of the future Anglophone state. By no means all their recommendations were 
dismissed but the most important ones – those intended to safeguard the 
greatest degree of autonomy for each state – were clearly overwritten.  
The final version of the federal constitution changed the names of the two 
states that came to constitute the Federal Republic of Cameroon: the former 
Republic of Cameroon would henceforth be called the Federated State of East 
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Cameroon, and the former Southern Cameroons would be called the Federated 
State of West Cameroon.9 The official languages of the federal republic would 
be French and English. To the consternation of Anglophones, the final version 
of the constitution appeared to deny the equal status of both languages, 
stipulating in Article 59 that ‘the revised constitution shall be published in 
French and English, the French text being authentic’. Dual citizenship, as 
proposed by the Southern Cameroons delegation, was rejected by Ahidjo but he 
eventually agreed to insert a clause into the constitution, affirming the federal 
state’s adherence to the fundamental freedoms set out in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the Charter of the United Nations (Article 1). 
The most important constitutional arrangements were the following: 
The constitution granted almost total authority to the federal state. 
According to Article 5, a number of tasks were to come under federal jurisdic-
tion immediately upon independence, such as foreign affairs; the internal and 
external security of the federal state; development planning; foreign aid; the 
monetary system; taxation; civil, criminal, and contract law; and secondary and 
post-secondary education. Article 6 stipulated a comprehensive list of further 
tasks that were to become federal matters as time went on. No specific list of 
tasks that were to fall permanently within the jurisdiction of the state govern-
ments was provided. Article 38 reads: ‘Matters other than those specified in 
Articles 5 and 6 and other than those which under the present constitution are 
to be subject of a federal law shall lie exclusively within the competence of the 
federated states’. The customary courts of West Cameroon and primary 
education had some constitutional warrant for being taken as state tasks. Other 
tasks left to the states in the early years, by convention rather than constitu-
tional prescription, were local government, social welfare, archives and 
antiquities, agriculture, forestry, cooperatives, internal trade, state public 
works, and other minor projects. Moreover, the constitution provided for no 
autonomous financial resources for the federated states, thus depriving them of 
any means of exercising real power (Ardener 1967: 310; Johnson 1970: 219; 
Benjamin 1972: 82).  
The constitution created a presidential regime at the federal level. In contrast 
to the Bamenda proposals, the president of the federal republic was to be an 
active, powerful chief executive rather than a mere figurehead. He was to be 
head of state, head of the federal government, and head of the armed forces. He 
was responsible for the conduct of the affairs of the federal republic, and was 
not accountable to the legislature for his actions. Since no real separation of 
powers was provided for by the constitution, the president could play an 
                                                 
9  The constitution of the Federal Republic of Cameroon is reproduced in Enonchong 
1967: 253-66. 
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important role in the legislative process through his ability to propose 
legislation or to delay or prevent the passage of legislation he did not like. 
Moreover, in many instances he had the power to legislate by decree and 
without reference to the national assembly. He could even declare a state of 
emergency on his own and rule entirely by decree. Nor did he need to seek 
legislative approval for his appointments. He appointed ministers, governors, 
judges and high-level civil servants, and they were entirely dependent on his 
favour to remain in office. It is not surprising, therefore, that the constitution 
has been judged in terms of its contribution to ‘presidentialism’ rather more 
than for its accomplishments in federalism (Rubin 1971). 
The president was to be assisted in his duties by a vice-president. On the 
recommendation of the Southern Cameroons delegation, it was laid down in 
Article 9 of the constitution that the president and vice-president must not be 
natives of the same federated state. Both were to be elected on a single list by 
universal suffrage and direct secret ballot. The function of vice-president was 
held by Anglophones (Foncha, 1961-70; Muna, 1970-72) until 1972 when it 
was abolished following the creation of a unitary state. It should, however, be 
pointed out that the subordinate position of the vice-president was made very 
clear by the constitution. Undoubtedly, he had some potential powers – he 
succeeded to the presidency automatically if that office became vacant for 
whatever reason, although he was only to remain in office until a new president 
was elected not more than fifty days later – but he was not given any specific 
powers of his own.  
While Article 4 of the constitution defined federal authority as residing in 
the federal president and the federal national assembly, the latter played a far 
inferior role within the framework of federal power. In the framing of the 
constitution, the Southern Cameroons proposal for a bicameral legislature was 
rejected, and a unicameral system was adopted. The choice was justified on the 
grounds of economy and efficiency but it is most likely that Ahidjo saw the 
proposal as a threat to the centralised character of the constitution, as well as a 
means of impeding the federal government. Representation of the federated 
states in the federal assembly was proportionate to the population of each state, 
and each member was to represent 80,000 citizens. On the basis of the figures 
given in the constitution, there were to be fifty seats in the assembly, forty of 
which represented East Cameroon and ten West Cameroon. Both the number 
and the duration of the assembly’s sessions were limited by the constitution: it 
was to meet twice a year for sessions that were not to exceed thirty days, 
although it could also be convened for an extraordinary session of not more 
than fifteen days at the request of the president or of two-thirds of its members. 
The role of the legislature was both limited, in the sense that specific legislative 
powers were conferred on the president, and diluted in the sense that the 
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president was able to exercise powers concurrently with the legislature on those 
tasks not exclusively set aside by the constitution for the attention of the 
national assembly.  
Curiously, Ahidjo eventually allowed a Southern Cameroons recommenda-
tion to be incorporated into the constitution that created a potential safeguard 
against the adoption of federal legislation harmful to one of the federated states. 
Article 18 created a procedure whereby the president might require a bill to be 
read a second time, either of his own accord or at the request of the prime 
minister of either federated state. At the second reading, the bill had to receive 
the approval of a majority of the national assembly members from each 
federated state. This element of a second reading was one of the few respects in 
which the constitution envisaged curtailment of the powers of the federal 
authority through the actions of state representatives. Although this provision 
could have made a significant contribution to the safeguarding of West 
Cameroon interests, it was never actually applied. Relations between West 
Cameroon and the federal government in the first five years were mediated 
mainly by the powers of decree of the president, and from 1966 all West 
Cameroonian representatives in the national assembly belonged to the 
Cameroon National Union (CNU), the single party in the federal republic. 
The constitution provided for a state structure whereby a presidential regime 
at the federal level was combined with a parliamentary regime at the level of 
the federated states. Although the federated states had almost no powers, they 
were furnished with separate constitutions outlining the character of their 
respective institutions.10 Both states had a parliamentary form of government, 
with governments collectively responsible to their legislatures. Remarkably, the 
constitution made no major modifications to the formal governmental structures 
that had existed in the two states prior to reunification. West Cameroon 
retained its House of Assembly (renamed the West Cameroon Legislative 
Assembly), its House of Chiefs, and its ministerial system, complete with a 
prime minister and cabinet (ministers in both states are now called secretaries 
of state). East Cameroon retained its own legislature, unaltered save in name 
(from National Assembly to East Cameroon Legislative Assembly), and its 
ministerial system of prime minister and secretaries of state. Not wishing to 
create an autonomous power base for chieftaincy in the federal republic, Ahidjo 
reluctantly agreed to the Southern Cameroons delegation’s demand for the 
preservation of the bicameral character of its state legislature in recognition of 
the important role Anglophone chieftaincy had played in the process of 
reunification (Konings 1999b), but he bluntly refused to create a House of 
                                                 
10  The constitutions of the federated states of East and West Cameroon are reproduced 
in Enonchong 1967: 267-91. 
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Chiefs in East Cameroon where none had existed before reunification. As a 
result, a potentially dangerous disequilibrium was created between the two 
federated states, which could in the long run have frustrated the chiefs in East 
Cameroon. No wonder that Ahidjo was quick to abolish the West Cameroon 
House of Chiefs after the promulgation of the unitary state in 1972. 
The constitution created a judicial system that largely reflected the govern-
mental system established in the federal republic. The court system in both 
federated states remained unaltered, and the courts continued to function on the 
basis of the pre-unification legal systems based on French principles and 
procedures in East Cameroon and on the British version in West Cameroon. At 
the top of the legal structure, however, the constitution introduced two new 
courts: the Federal Court of Justice to handle appeals from the highest state 
courts, to adjudicate interstate or state-federal disputes, and to give advisory 
opinions to federal authorities in certain limited situations; and a special panel, 
the High Court of Justice, to try cases involving high treason, conspiracy 
against the state, or crimes committed by the highest-level federal or state 
officials. 
The final version of the constitution left no room for legal secession from 
the federation, although some Southern Cameroons delegates had wanted a 
proviso inserted into the constitution sanctioning peaceful withdrawal from the 
federation.  
The constitution laid down a federal system significantly different to the one 
Foncha had promised Southern Cameroonians. The majority of the Anglophone 
elite felt that the dominant Francophone majority had imposed its will on the 
Anglophone minority. What embittered them even more was that Ahidjo 
neither resumed the constitutional talks, as had been proposed at Foumban, nor 
submitted the federal constitution for final approval to a constituent assembly 
composed of Anglophone and Francophone representatives. The final version 
of the constitution was approved only by the parliament of the Republic of 
Cameroon on 1 September 1961, one month prior to reunification. That is why 
the present Anglophone movements declared in 1993 that ‘the union between 
the Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroon had proceeded without 
any constitutional basis’ (All Anglophone Conference 1993). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Our narrative of the complex historical trajectory of Anglophone Cameroon 
towards reunification and federation with Francophone Cameroon has thrown 
some doubts on the widespread belief among Francophones that Southern 
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Cameroonians warm-heartedly and freely embraced reunification and federa-
tion.  
This chapter has shown that for a long time reunification remained a vague 
ideal, the political and economic implications of which were never clearly spelt 
out. Foncha had picked it up merely as an electoral slogan to combat Endeley’s 
new position of advocating the territory’s integration into the Federation of 
Nigeria. But even Foncha tended to perceive reunification not as an immediate 
goal but rather as an issue to be negotiated after the territory’s prior separation 
from Nigeria and a period of continued trusteeship or independence. Immediate 
reunification became one of the two alternatives in the 1961 plebiscite only 
after the Southern Cameroonian political elite had failed to agree on the future 
of the Southern Cameroons and the United Nations had refused to grant the 
territory an extended trusteeship or independent status – options considered to 
be politically undesirable and economically unattractive. 
The 1961 plebiscite campaign that was waged between Foncha’s ruling 
KNDP party and Endeley’s CPNC party was probably the most decisive event 
in the history of Southern Cameroons. The campaign clearly demonstrated that 
most Southern Cameroonians found neither of the two alternatives acceptable. 
They were inclined to reject integration into Nigeria fearing persistent Igbo 
domination, but they were also not sure of reunification with Francophone 
Cameroon, a territory with a different cultural heritage and involved at that time 
in a violent civil war. They failed to see why a third alternative – full independ-
ence – was denied them by the United Nations and the Administering Author-
ity. That they eventually did vote for reunification was due not only to the fact 
that they preferred reunification to the sole alternative, joining Nigeria, but also 
to a number of other factors including lack of information or even misinforma-
tion of the political and economic implications of reunification, ethnic loyalties 
to the party in power, and Foncha’s strong assurances that reunification would 
imply a loose form of federation guaranteeing Southern Cameroons a large 
degree of autonomy, equal partnership and preservation of its cultural heritage. 
The constitutional talks after the plebiscite did not produce the form of 
federal state that Southern Cameroonians expected. The Foumban conference 
was presented to the electorate as a historic occasion where estranged brothers 
were to mutually agree upon the constitution of a reunified Cameroon, but it 
turned out to be an event largely staged to ratify earlier understandings between 
Ahidjo and Foncha. During the conference, Ahidjo used his superior bargaining 
power to control the negotiations, accepting only those suggestions and 
amendments of the Southern Cameroonian delegation that posed no threat to 
his well-prepared draft constitution. By the end of the conference, Foncha and 
the KNDP had nothing to offer Southern Cameroonians except what they had 
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promised the electorate they would guard against: a highly centralised form of 
federation.  
Some Anglophone authors, like Ngoh (1996) and Njeuma (1995), place the 
blame for these developments first and foremost on Foncha and other KNDP 
leading figures whom they accuse of negotiating poorly with Francophone 
counterparts. In their view, Foncha was naive, secretive and egoistic, and failed 
to involve other Anglophone parties, public opinion and experts in the 
negotiations with Ahidjo on the nature of the federal constitution. This type of 
interpretation is too restrictive and one-sided and does not take into account a 
number of other factors that militated against the introduction of a loose form 
of federation safeguarding the protection of the Anglophone minority and the 
preservation of the Anglophone identity, notably the serious time constraint 
facing the Foncha-Ahidjo constitutional talks before and after the February 
1961 plebiscite, the prevailing circumstances of insecurity in the Republic of 
Cameroon and the still precarious power position of Ahidjo, the alien aspects of 
federalism to most Francophones, the abandonment of the Southern Cameroons 
by the British and the continuing strong support of the French for Ahidjo, the 
absence of UN experts, and, last but not least, the internal divisions among the 
Anglophone elite. 
 
3
The development of an Anglophone
consciousness during the federal and
one-party unitary state, 1961-1990
Having succeeded in imposing a highly centralised form of federalism upon the
newly created union between East and West Cameroon, the President of the
Federal State, Ahmadou Ahidjo, gradually and cautiously undertook the
realisation of his ultimate goal: the establishment of a strong, unitary state. In
this chapter, we highlight the various strategies he used to achieve this
objective including his attempts to weaken the federal structure of the new state
and to undermine the autonomy and identity of West Cameroon, his formation
of a single national party in the entire federation, his replacement among the
West Cameroonian political elite of supporters of state autonomy by advocates
of increasing federalisation of state powers, his creation of ethno-regional
clients and, last but not least, his use of severe repression.
The outcome of his moves appears to have been ambiguous. On the one
hand, they succeeded in establishing a unitary state in 1972, taking advantage
of the internal divisions among the Anglophone political elite and their
personal ambitions in the rapidly changing power constellation in the federa-
tion. On the other hand, they created disillusion among the majority of Anglo-
phones who strongly resented the loss of their region’s autonomy and the
Francophone hegemonic and assimilative tendencies. Gradually, one could
observe the emergence of an Anglophone consciousness: a feeling among
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Anglophones that their community with its distinct colonial legacy was subject
to marginalisation, exploitation and assimilation by the Francophone-dominated
state and even by the Francophone population as a whole. During the Ahidjo
period of the one-party unitary state, fear of violent treatment of those who
dared to contravene its policies dissuaded Anglophones from openly protesting.
It was not until a limited degree of liberalisation was introduced by Ahidjo’s
successor, Paul Biya, that Anglophones started voicing their grievances.
Anglophones and the dismantling of the federated state
of West Cameroon, 1961-1972
From the birth of the federation on 1 October 1961 onwards, the President of
the Federal State, Ahmadou Ahidjo, started weakening the federal structure of
the newly created state and undermining the autonomy and identity of West
Cameroon.
As already seen in Chapter 2, the 1961 federal constitution granted few
powers to the federated states. Making use of the constitutional provisions,
Ahidjo succeeded in bringing most of these state powers under federal jurisdic-
tion by 1967 (Ardener 1967; Stark 1976). By claiming nearly all the most
important functions of state business itself, the federal government ensured the
redundancy of the governments of the federated states and denied them any
raison d’être, except a political one, and even that was purely cosmetic.
Moreover, the 1961 federal constitution had not provided for any autono-
mous financial resources for the federated states. West Cameroon was to give
up its sources of customs and other revenues and was to be financed by federal
subventions until a revenue allocation prescription could be fixed. However,
such a formula was never found. Although the first prime minister of West
Cameroon, J.N. Foncha, regularly requested the installation of a revenue
allocation committee during the first years of the federation’s existence,1
Ahidjo simply refused to do so. As a result, West Cameroon continued to be
dependent on the federal government for subventions from the beginning to the
end of the federation to finance its activities. This situation served as a kind of
pressure for the further federalisation of state functions. As Ardener (1967:
317) put it: ‘The necessity to apply annually for federal help over the years
made the economic arguments for the federalisation of many state services
seem irresistible’.
                                                                       
1 See, for instance, the letter from the Prime Minister of West Cameroon to His
Excellency Ahmadou Ahidjo, President of the Federal Republic of Cameroon,
Yaoundé, dated 9 April 1962, in BNA, File Oc (1962) 3, Discussions with the
President [Secret].
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Another issue that was soon to become a source of conflict between the
West Cameroon leaders and President Ahidjo was the question of territorial
administration. The Anglophone delegation in Foumban gave little thought to
the constitutional clause that dealt with federal administration and so the
proposal advanced by the Francophone delegation was adopted. Soon after
reunification, Ahidjo, in exercising the powers conferred upon him by the
constitution, passed decrees that enhanced federal supervision and control over
the political and administrative life of West Cameroon. Decree no. 61-DF-15 of
20 December 1961 stipulated that the territory of the federal republic be
divided into six regions. Each of the regions was placed under an inspector of
administration, a civil servant appointed to the post by the president and
directly responsible to him. These federal inspectors were charged with
‘representation of the federal government in all acts of civil life and in judicial
matters, supervision of the enforcement of federal laws and regulations, and the
maintenance of order according to the laws and regulations in force’, having at
their disposal the police force and gendarmes, as well as federal services. Under
this system, West Cameroon was designated as only one of six regions. Ahidjo
thus introduced an administrative system that basically ignored the federal
nature of the country. The duality of authority it created in West Cameroon
aimed at further weakening the authority of the West Cameroon government. In
1962, Foncha strongly protested to Ahidjo against this administrative system:
By this administrative division, West Cameroon has the same status as any of the
five administrative regions into which East Cameroon is divided. We regret that
this is inconsistent with the status of West Cameroon as a state in our federation of
two states. Furthermore, we cannot at the same time regard West Cameroon as a
state in the Federation and as a province in the same Federation. The powers given
to the Inspector of Administration are far more extensive than those of either the
Prime Minister of West Cameroon or the House of Assembly and Government.
This system is anachronistic and in fact a resuscitation of what existed in the early
colonial system. It is also derogatory to the authority and dignity of our Prime
Minister and our government. It is tending to change the system of administration
in this state and is causing a great deal of frustration and disappointment among
citizens of West Cameroon. It is adversely affecting the operation not only of the
state government but also of the federal machinery..2
Unfortunately, the Francophone federal inspectors in West Cameroon were
generally hungry for power and acted as though they were senior to the prime
minister of West Cameroon. There was a running battle for jurisdiction
                                                                       
2 Top Secret Representation to His Excellency, the President of the Federal Republic
of Cameroon by the West Cameroon Government requesting the Rectification of
Certain Matters Tending to Hinder the Smooth and Effective Functioning of the
Federal Republic, dated 4 October 1962, in ibid.
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between the two officials until the late 1960s (Stark 1976; Johnson 1970; Fonge
1997). In addition, the federal inspectors were not only beyond the control of
the state government but also exercised authority over local officials, some of
whose duties fell within both the federal and local state’s jurisdictions. All this
created much confusion and, at times, tension. Moreover, as federal powers
expanded, these officials, like district officers, spent more and more time on
federal rather than on state work.
And last but not least, the federal inspector was authorised to use the armed
forces, gendarmes and police to reinforce his authority if he deemed such action
necessary. Since the army and gendarmerie were federal forces, their presence
in West Cameroon gave the federal inspector an edge over West Cameroon
state officials, who could not employ these forces without approval from
Yaoundé. The overzealous gendarmes themselves gave the impression that they
were above the West Cameroon state authorities, a matter that was reinforced
by the fact that Ahidjo declared a state of emergency in large parts of West
Cameroon immediately after reunification for the claimed purpose of
combating the UPC rebels who, he believed, used the territory of the ethnically-
related Anglophone peoples as a safe haven when attacking Francophone
targets. On occasions, gendarmes stopped and searched top West Cameroon
government officials, parliamentarians and even secretaries of state by the
roadside for no apparent reason other than to demonstrate their power over
these officials. The demeanour of the gendarmes generated considerable public
protest in Anglophone Cameroon but it also indicated that effective power was
in the hands of the federal inspector of administration who had direct control
over the gendarmes (Fonge 1997: 190-91).
Simultaneously, Ahidjo put in place policies aimed at eradicating some of
the Anglophone economic and cultural heritage and integrating the Anglophone
community more and more into the Francophone-dominated federal state.
Ardener (1967: 290) correctly observed that the story of the first few years of
federation was ‘one of various attempts to link West Cameroon in some
effective way to its partner, and of the gradual discovery of new ways of doing
this by the East’.
In 1962 Ahidjo replaced the Nigerian pound in West Cameroon with the
Communauté Française d’Afrique (CFA) franc, which then became the only
legal tender for the whole country. The exchange rate was 692 CFA francs to
the pound. This occurred without any consultation of West Cameroonian
leaders. One of the West Cameroon newspapers asserted that the pre-reunifica-
tion rates had been 800 CFA francs to the pound.3 As a result, there was a sharp
and painful decline in the standard of living in West Cameroon (Ndongko
                                                                       
3 The Cameroon Times, 18 June 1962, p. 1.
55
1975). In the same year (1962), traffic in West Cameroon was made to drive on
the right-hand side of the road in conformity with the practice then in existence
in East Cameroon. In 1964, Ahidjo replaced the West Cameroon imperial
system of weights and measures with the East Cameroon metric system. Of
even greater significance was Ahidjo’s termination of West Cameroon’s ties
with the Commonwealth of Nations and the sterling bloc. In their October 1960
Joint Declaration (see Chapter 2), Ahidjo and Foncha had agreed that a
reunified Cameroon would at no time be a part either of the French Community
or the British Commonwealth. Nevertheless, Ahidjo soon thereafter signed a
series of cooperation agreements and treaties with France, which directly tied
the then Republic of Cameroon to France (Joseph 1978: 16). Soon after
reunification, Ahidjo cut West Cameroon’s ties with the Commonwealth but
left the Franco-Cameroonian accords in force. In 1963, Prime Minister Foncha
reminded President Ahidjo that:
All agreements made between Britain or any other foreign country and the then
Southern Cameroons as well as similar agreements or treaties made between France
or any other foreign power and the then Republic of Cameroon, which were
devolved on the Government of the Federal Republic of Cameroon upon reunifica-
tion should now be reviewed.4
Ahidjo simply ignored Foncha’s reminder. One effect of the withdrawal
from the Commonwealth was the loss of ‘Commonwealth preferences’ for
certain West Cameroonian export products. Those most threatened by the loss
of preferences were West Cameroonian banana producers who had previously
been allowed to export their bananas to Britain at a price that was 15 per cent
higher than on the world market (Ngoh 1990: 193-94; Ndongko 1975; Konings
1993a). Another effect was the need in West Cameroon to shift away from
British and Nigerian imports to French and East Cameroonian imports. Johnson
(1970: 331) estimated that the difference in prices between the two states might
have been as high as 100 per cent, a fact that severely affected the West
Cameroon population. Moreover, the two West Cameroonian ports of Victoria
(Limbe) and Tiko became virtual ghost towns as most imports and exports to
and from West Cameroon were diverted to the port of Douala in East Cameroon
(Ngwafor 1989). To facilitate the transfer of West Cameroon export products
through Douala, the Tiko-Douala Road, known as the Reunification Road, and
the extension of the Douala-Mbanga railway line to Kumba were opened in
1969. In addition, the closure of West Cameroon Electric Power (Powercam),
                                                                       
4 See the letter from the Prime Minister of West Cameroon and Vice-President of the
Federal Republic, Honourable John Ngu Foncha, to His Excellency Ahmadou
Ahidjo, President of the Federal Republic, dated 14 September 1963, in Personal
Library of S.T. Muna, File no. 98 (57), KNDP correspondence.
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the company that supplied (relatively cheaper) electricity throughout West
Cameroon, and its replacement with the more costly Société Nationale
d’Electricité (Sonel) from East Cameroon were seen by most Anglophone
Cameroonians as another attempt to exploit West Cameroon and make it
economically dependent on East Cameroon (Kofele-Kale 1987).
Ahidjo’s attempts to undermine and Gallicise the Anglophone cultural
heritage met with stronger resistance in West Cameroon than his attacks on
West Cameroon administrative and economic autonomy, as they were
perceived as a direct onslaught on the Anglophone identity. Foncha, in particu-
lar, had been deeply concerned about the protection of cultural autonomy at the
Foumban conference, and he consistently maintained this attitude throughout
his time as prime minister of West Cameroon (1961-1965). As a consequence,
Ahidjo’s attempts to harmonise the educational and legal systems in favour of
the Gallic system largely failed (Chem-Langhëë 1997; Fonge 1997; Stark
1976). One minor reform was the harmonisation in 1965 of the school calendar
by shortening that of elementary schools in Anglophone Cameroon from eight
to seven years. Although English and French were the constitutionally
designated official languages, Anglophones proved incapable of warding off
the decline and corruption of English. The Ahidjo government’s failure to make
any real efforts to implement a policy of bilingualism in a country where
Anglophones formed less than one quarter of the population ‘naturally tilted the
scales in favour of French ascendancy’ (Chumbow 1980: 298). The French
language became increasingly the language of the administration, police, army,
university, and so on. In short, it became the language of oppression and
repression. Little wonder that Anglophones had the impression that English was
only an official language of secondary importance and that official bilingualism
was merely an attempt to convert English-speaking Cameroonians into Franco-
phones, all the more so since Ahidjo himself never bothered to learn English,
preferring to command directly in French or to adopt pidgin English in
conciliatory moments.
These developments created disillusion with the federation among the West
Cameroonian population. In 1967, the following observations were made about
Anglophone attitudes towards the federation:
Though in the long run the advantages would well outweigh the disadvantages, right
now West Cameroonians tend to feel they are getting a raw deal. The influence of
the French-speaking East is now, for the first time, really being felt: not only are
Yaoundé’s powers considerable, but prices have risen considerably; French and
Common market goods are replacing the familiar British and Nigerian goods; the
power of East Cameroon is being felt. Good or bad, if West Cameroonians were
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today given the choice, they might well choose independence - from Nigeria and the
French-speaking East.5
It is evident from our narrative so far that West Cameroonian political
leaders, like Foncha, regularly protested against the growing loss of West
Cameroonian autonomy and identity, and the blatant lack of West Cameroonian
participation in the decision-making process during the first years of the
federation’s existence. The most articulate spokesman for West Cameroonians
was to become Dr Bernard Fonlon, one of the few highly educated leaders of
the ruling KNDP and an author of international reputation.6 Fonlon had studied
at the Sorbonne, Oxford and the University of Ireland where he obtained a PhD.
He was generally regarded as the most accomplished Cameroonian of either
colonial culture. He had been the secretary at the Foumban conference and later
joined Ahidjo’s staff at the presidency. Owing to his educational achievements,
his fluency in both English and French and his political-administrative career,
Fonlon was highly respected by both West and East Cameroonian political
leaders. His influence was enhanced by his election in the spring of 1964 to the
Federal National Assembly and his subsequent appointment by Ahidjo to the
post of deputy minister of foreign affairs. Fonlon had helped in founding the
bilingual cultural journal Abbia. In March 1964 he published an article in it
entitled ‘Will We Make or Mar?’7 in which he condemned the unequal position
of West Cameroon in the federation:
The two specimens of culture that are met in the country today are not of equal
strength. The Anglo-Saxon is weaker, and this, for obvious reasons. The result of
this many-sided inequality is that, in this federation ... the power to introduce policy,
to shape the course of events in things political, economic, social and cultural, lies,
to all intents and purposes, entirely in the hands of East Cameroonians.
In three years of unification, sundry uses and institutions, thanks to articles five
and six of the federal constitution, have now come from the East to the West.
Furthermore, in West Cameroon, they now drive on the right, the franc has replaced
sterling as legal tender, the school year has now been streamlined to fit that of the
East and the scientific metric system has now replaced the unwieldy British
measures.
But I have searched in vain for one such use or institution brought into the East
through West Cameroon. Outside its own federal frontiers, the influence of West
Cameroon is practically nil. Therefore, unless the East Cameroon leader and
intellectual, in whose hands cultural initiative lies, is prepared to share this authority
with his brother from West of the Mungo, unless he is prepared to make the giant
effort necessary to break loose from the strait-jacket of his French education, unless
he will show proof of his intellectual probity and admit candidly that there are things
                                                                       
5 West Africa, 8 July 1967, p. 880, quoted by Le Vine 1971: 102.
6 For his career and ideas, see Lyonga 1989 and Monono 1991.
7 See Abbia, no. 5, (March) 1964.
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in the Anglo-Saxon way of life that can do this country good, there is little chance of
survival, neither for English influence, nor even for African values in the Federal
Republic of Cameroon.
With African culture moribund, with John Bullism weak and in danger of being
smothered, we will all be French in two generations or three.
Fonlon stressed that cultural equality and equal participation would have to
become the guiding principles of the federation if political integration was to be
fully realised. To achieve cultural equality, he argued strenuously for genuine
bilingualism in terms of a specific programme for the schools, which he
considered to be the principal instrument for forming Cameroonian culture. He
was especially anxious to see the newly created University of Yaoundé become
a unique and serious experiment in bicultural and bilingual studies. Bilingual-
ism for Fonlon was a means of preventing West Cameroonian values and
cultures from being overwhelmed but it also stemmed from a sincere intellec-
tual cosmopolitanism (Stark 1976). In September 1964, Fonlon organised a
closed-door meeting of the top leaders of the ruling parties in the two states,
Foncha’s KNDP and Ahidjo’s Union Camerounaise (UC). During this meeting,
he expressed the KNDP’s dissatisfaction with the inequality of treatment of the
West Cameroon state in the federation, especially in the formulation of policy
at the federal level, and the need for a constitutional review in order to restore
some of the authority the states had lost to the federal government. Conse-
quently, he demanded effective KNDP participation in the conception, elabora-
tion and application of policy in every field of government in the form of
regular consultations on government policy between the parties and an equal
quota of cabinet ministers in the federal government. Fonlon was thus able to
stir up West Cameroon regional feelings briefly in the mid-1960s but his efforts
were frustrated by Ahidjo’s growing power in the federation and divisions
among the West Cameroon political elite itself. Ahidjo was quick to realise that
by the antagonism that developed among them, the Anglophone leaders had
become like toothless bulldogs. They could bark but in no way could they bite.
The party splits and political fighting in West Cameroon during the first
years of the federation’s existence would fill a small volume. It is important to
emphasise here that the divisions among the West Cameroonian political elite
were not based on any ideological differences. It was rather their persistent
struggle for the seizure, consolidation and expansion of power within the new
federal state that divided the Anglophone political elite and preventing them
from forming a united front against Ahidjo’s attempts to weaken the federal
structure and undermine the autonomy and identity of West Cameroon. Their
unbridled jockeying for positions of power intensified when they understood
that the source of power was rapidly shifting from the Federated State of West
Cameroon to the federal state. As Le Vine (1971: 96) pointed out, the years
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1962-1966 which were a prelude to the formation of a single national party,
‘witnessed a complex political ballet in which the principal parties and
politicians simultaneously strove to retain their influence in the West and
manoeuvred to put themselves in the best possible position for the merger of all
parties at the national level’.
Ahidjo was able to dominate the federation during the first years of its
existence by playing off Anglophone political parties against each other and
eventually persuading them to support the idea of a single national party. Only
one month after reunification, in November 1961, Ahidjo first appealed for the
formation of a single national party, which he rightly perceived as a major step
to the realisation of his main objective: the creation of a highly centralised
unitary state. Employing various strategies including intimidation, proscription,
co-option and patronage, he succeeded by 1962 in transforming his UC party
into the single party in East Cameroon. He then directed his attention to West
Cameroon. The internal political developments in West Cameroon combined
with his skilful use of federal constitutional powers and patronage ensured the
outcome of political unification so desired by Ahidjo. At one time or another,
all the parties in West Cameroon were for or against the idea of a single party,
depending on whether to their own estimation, it increased or reduced their
power and influence, and thereby their ability to bestow patronage (Johnson
1970: 280). The speed with which the West Cameroonian political elite, who
had always championed a multi-party democracy, eventually embraced the
single-party concept is clear evidence of their lust for power and influence
within the changing power constellation in the federal state (cf. Kofele-Kale
1987).
Dr E.M.L. Endeley, the leader of the South West-based CPNC, was the first
to be converted to Ahidjo’s idea of a one-party state. For example, during
Ahidjo’s trips to West Cameroon in 1961 and 1962, Endeley expressed his
party’s willingness to support Ahidjo’s vision of national unity and a central-
ised federation, including the formation of a single national party. Apparently,
there were two main reasons for his swift support of a one-party state. First, as
the leader of West Cameroon’s minority party, Endeley saw Ahidjo’s plans not
only as an opportunity for him to play a role in national politics but also as a
means of preventing domination of his party by the majority KNDP. In his
opinion, minority parties were constantly harassed in independent African
states and were forced to stifle their views for fear of being accused of subver-
sive activities against the government.8 Second, he and other party members
                                                                       
8 For example, Endeley himself was arrested on 10 October 1962 after he had given an
exclusive interview to the Nigerian Daily Times entitled ‘My Country is in a Bad
State’ but he was later released on bail with a surety of FCFA 69,200. See letter from
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saw South Westerners as a subordinate group in West Cameroon. They were
therefore inclined to embrace the one-party state and saw it as a way for the
South West to escape North West domination. They regularly accused the
ruling North West-based KNDP of giving preferential treatment, at the expense
of the South West, to the North West in terms of development. They also
frequently alleged that the KNDP government tended to discriminate against
South Westerners in appointments and promotions in the civil service and to
arbitrarily dismiss them from their posts, particularly if they had any history of
association with opposition party members, whether by political affiliation,
friendship or even marriage.9 Due to these two factors, the CPNC became the
principal advocate in West Cameroon of the idea of a one-party state (Rubin
1971: 150; Stark 1976: 435; Johnson 1970: 265-67, 276).
The fear that an Ahidjo-Endeley agreement could undermine his authority as
prime minister of West Cameroon and leader of the KNDP prompted Foncha
on 27 April 1962 to agree to an alliance between his party and Ahidjo’s UC in
the Federal Assembly and the formation of a National Coordinating Committee
between his party and the UC. Among other things, the committee was
designed to explore ways of merging the two parties into a single national
party. But until that goal was achieved, the agreement called on both the KNDP
and the UC to restrict their political activities to their own states. Such a
restriction was important to both Ahidjo and Foncha because it removed the
opportunity of an alliance by either man with any political parties or groups in
either East or West Cameroon that might undermine their authority. However,
the idea of uniting the two parties was not immediately popular in KNDP
circles and many voiced their opposition when the KNDP met in Bamenda in
June that same year.
A major factor that encouraged support for the one-party state was the
internal struggle for power within the KNDP itself. A rift occurred within the
KNDP when Foncha, who had retained the post of prime minister of West
                                                                                                                                                                              
J.N. Foncha, Prime Minister of West Cameroon, to the Minister Delegate to the
Presidency, dated 3 October 1962, in BNA, File Vb/b (1962) 2, Dr E.M.L. Endeley.
9 Due to these perceived North West injustices against the South West, a South
Westerner, Walter Wilson Mbong, started propagating a Victoria-Kumba-Mamfe
Alliance (VIKUMA) to destroy North West domination over the South West and to
establish a separate South West state in the federation, with or without the inclusion
of related ethnic groups in East Cameroon. In 1965, he was jailed and his newspaper
The Cameroon Spokesman was banned. See Ngwane 1994: 9 and The Cameroon
Spokesman, 14 November 1964. It is noteworthy that A.N. Jua, Foncha’s successor
as prime minister of West Cameroon formed a coalition government between the
KNDP and the CPNC in 1965. Endeley then became leader of government business,
a position he had previously held during the British trusteeship period. See Mbile
2000: 196-98.
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Cameroon along with that of vice-president of the federal republic, was
requested by the constitution to relinquish one of the offices by 1965. Foncha’s
decision to give up the post of prime minister of West Cameroon resulted in a
contest for the vacated premiership, starting in 1963, between Augustine Ngom
Jua and Solomon Tandeng Muna. Jua, who was the West Cameroon minister of
finance at the time, enjoyed the support of the rank and file and had cultivated
an image of being determined to brook no nonsense on matters of West
Cameroon’s interests in the federation. Muna, who was the federal minister of
transport, works and telecommunications at the time, had the support of the
party leadership because of his long administrative experience. He portrayed
himself as being a federalist first and then a West Cameroonian. The victory
eventually went to Jua. When Muna refused to accept defeat, he and his
supporters were expelled from the KNDP. They quickly formed a party of their
own called the Cameroon United Congress (CUC) ‘with policies and initials
aimed at reflecting Ahidjo’s ideas and obtaining his favour’ (Stark 1976: 435;
Johnson 1970: 274). The CUC pledged support for the federal constitution but
advocated the creation of a single political party and a unitary system for the
whole country. Its popular slogan was ‘one country, one government, one flag,
one currency’.
The rivalry among West Cameroon political leaders provided an excellent
opportunity for Ahidjo to call for the dissolution of West Cameroon’s parties
and the formation of a single national party. To most West Cameroonians, the
idea of a single national party was abhorrent. The newspapers, especially the
usually pro-government Cameroon Times, wrote editorials and carried letters
from their readers denouncing the idea of a single party, which they felt would
invariably lead to dictatorship (Johnson 1970: 264). Even some KNDP leaders
came out strongly against the formation of a single national party. In early
1966, Fonlon (1966: 7-8) stated that:
Everywhere in Africa, people are being told that in order to speed up the economic
and social development of the continent, the one party state has become a must. But
almost everywhere where the system is being implemented, we witness the suppres-
sion of liberty, the elimination of debate, the imposition of silence and the use of
despotism.
Afraid of being upstaged by members of the CUC and the CPNC who had
expressed support for Ahidjo’s call for a single party, even those leaders of the
KNDP who had initially been opposed to the single party idea were forced to
embrace the idea so as not to lose positions of power and influence in the
federal state. On 11 June 1966, Ahidjo summoned the leaders of the three
surviving West Cameroon political parties and the prime ministers of the two
federated states to Yaoundé. He then reiterated that the multi-party system
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formed an obstacle to national unity and development, leading instead to strife,
conflict and embitterment. He urged the party leaders to dissolve their parties.
Within two days, each and every one of them consented and agreement was
reached on the creation of a national party, to be called the Cameroon National
Union (CNU) (Takougang & Krieger 1998; Johnson 1970; Fonge 1997).
Once agreement on the creation of the CNU had been reached, Ahidjo
moved fast to set the month of August 1966 as the deadline for the birth of the
new party. Details of its framework were left to a steering committee whose
composition reflected the dominant position of the eastern state’s single party,
which supplied 22 of the 30 committee members. The western state’s parties
combined were given only 8 members: four from the KNDP and two each from
the CUC and the CPNC. The West Cameroon newspapers strongly protested
against the lack of West Cameroonian influence in the CNU steering
committee. They insisted that Fonlon be appointed Secretary-General of the
Steering Committee. In addition, they alleged that the newly presented CNU
constitution did not provide any safeguards for the preservation of the culture
and institutions of the Anglophone minority, and they expressed their fear that
the creation of a single national party in the federation would eventually lead to
the creation of a unitary state.10 Despite such criticisms, the CNU was launched
on 1 September 1966. Ahidjo became its president and Foncha became one of
its vice-presidents.
While the euphoric celebrations of the birth of the CNU were still reverber-
ating, Ahidjo attempted to introduce one of his anti-federalist reforms. On 1
October 1966, the Kumba-based newspaper, The Mirror, published a story
captioned ‘Federal Regions May be Recarved’. The paper stated that Ahidjo
planned to redivide the existing administrative divisions in such a way that the
East Cameroon administrative divisions would cross the Mungo border and
incorporate the West Cameroon administrative divisions. This information
alarmed Anglophones who saw in such a measure a blatant attempt to submerge
them and destroy the federal character of the country. Prime Minister
Augustine Ngom Jua reacted swiftly and resolutely to this alarming news:
It must be emphasised that the Federal Republic of Cameroon is a federation of two
states with different backgrounds, cultures and traditions; the present arrangement
was in fact envisaged as the most ideal solution to reunification... Any exercise,
therefore, that is designed to alter this arrangement ... will clearly alter the basis on
which the entire Federation rests and will throw our present system of government
into complete disarray ... It is equally clear that since ours is a democratic republic, a
matter of far-reaching significance and consequences cannot be conceived and
                                                                       
10 See, for instance, The Cameroon Star, 1 August 1966, 5 August 1966, 13 August
1966 and 15 August 1966; The Cameroon Times, 6 August 1966; The Iroko, 6
August 1966.
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executed in secret without the full knowledge and concurrence of the people of West
Cameroon through their accredited representatives, to wit, the West Cameroon
Government.11
Ahidjo’s rejoinder was not long in coming. He did not deny the authenticity
of the newspaper report but he did question what Jua meant by ‘integration and
absorption of one part of Cameroon by another part’, stressing that there was a
single Cameroon nation in which citizens had equal rights and duties. He
asserted that:
The people of West Cameroon massively voted in favour of reunification; after
reunification itself we freely consented that it was necessary to create a federation
between the two states, and to create federal institutions. But that does not permit us
to say there are two Cameroon nations.12
The controversy that the ‘recarving’ of the Cameroon Federation generated
clearly brought Jua into the limelight as a champion of West Cameroon
identity, and demonstrated the difficulties of his coexistence with centralist
Ahidjo. Jua was definitely not the type of collaborator Ahidjo could work with
towards the realisation of his unitary schemes.
Following the establishment of a one-party state, Ahidjo started consolidat-
ing his hold on West Cameroon by giving positions of power to supporters of a
strong centralised federal state among the Anglophone political elite. In 1968,
Jua, a staunch advocate of the state’s rights, was replaced by Muna as prime
minister of West Cameroon. In 1970, Foncha, the West Cameroonian architect
of the federation, was replaced as vice-president by Muna. On this occasion,
Ahidjo had the constitution amended to allow Muna to accumulate the
functions of federal vice-president and prime minister of West Cameroon.
Foncha did not protest against his removal. Foncha was a simple, modest,
honest and religious person who was too weak and naive to be able to challenge
someone of Ahidjo’s cunning and subtlety.13 After Foumban, he lost control
                                                                       
11 The Cameroon Times, 29 October 1966, p. 1.
12 Ibid.
13 In his unofficial biography of Foncha, Soh (1999) mentions two major blunders
made by Foncha in the post-reunification period, seriously weakening his power
position. First, his refusal in 1965 to run for the presidency, opting instead to run for
the post of vice-president for the sake of peace and stability in the young nation.
Foncha’s decision was not pleasing to Ahidjo’s political opponents in Francophone
Cameroon. In fact, the opposition leaders in the southern part of Francophone
Cameroon who had been victimised by Ahidjo and the Bamileke were hoping to
throw their weight behind Foncha and remove Ahidjo from power. Second, his
agreement in 1966 to fuse his KNDP party with Ahidjo’s UC party led to the
formation of the one-party state. By so doing, he made himself a political underling
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over developments in his former party, the KNDP, and in the federation. In late
1971, Fonlon, who was considered to be too independent, was dropped from
Ahidjo’s cabinet. Bilingualism, the cause he had fought for within the
federation, was still official government policy but was symbolic only. Fonlon
might have been dropped but his support and faith in Ahidjo’s leadership
qualities remained firm, even at the risk of straining his relations with Paul
Biya when the latter became president in 1982, with Ahidjo staying on briefly
as party leader.
With the changing power relations in the federation, the Anglophone
political elite appeared to be more interested in seeking Ahidjo’s patronage
than in safeguarding West Cameroonian autonomy and identity. The Anglo-
phone administrative elite, too, increasingly favoured the federalisation of state
services, enticed by the higher salaries and better conditions in the federal
services than in the state services (Fonge 1997). Given this situation, Ahidjo
played his trump card. On 6 May 1972, he announced in the National Assembly
that he intended to transform the federal republic into a unitary state provided
the electorate supported the idea in a referendum that would be held on 20 May,
thereby abrogating Clause 1 of Article 47 of the 1961 federal constitution,
which read: ‘Any proposal for the revision of the present constitution, which
impairs the unity and integration of the Federation shall be inadmissible’. This
important clause had been specifically inserted into the constitution to assure
West Cameroonians that the federation could not be dissolved. Even if the
constitution were to be amended, it should not be done by referendum because
Clause 3 of Article 47 stipulated that ‘proposals for revision shall be adopted
by simple majority vote of the members of the Federal Assembly, provided that
such majority includes a majority of the representatives of each of the
Federated States’.
Ahidjo probably chose the use of a referendum to avoid any public debate
about the new constitution and to secure an overwhelming turnout in its favour
(Le Vine 1976: 276). The president’s justification for what he referred to as a
‘peaceful revolution’ was that federalism was too costly an administrative
system for a developing country and that it fostered regionalism and impeded
economic development. Yet, there were still two other even more important
reasons for his proposal. First, there was the discovery of oil in West Cameroon
in 1967. And second, there was Ahidjo’s persistent suspicion that the Anglo-
phones might secede from the federation. This suspicion was given added
weight by the outbreak of civil war in Nigeria in 1967 – a war provoked by
secessionist tendencies among the Igbo with whom the West Cameroonians had
                                                                                                                                                                              
to Ahidjo, who could move him around as he liked. As long as Foncha’s KNDP
party existed, Ahidjo was afraid of it because it was a vast political organisation that
could mobilise votes even East of the Mungo and throw him out of power.
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shared a common colonial administration. In sharp contrast to the Cameroonian
federal government, the Anglophones tended to sympathise with the breakaway
Eastern Region of Nigeria that had established itself as the independent
Republic of Biafra. The Ahidjo government was afraid that should the
secession of the Eastern Region of Nigeria succeed, the chain reaction of the
domino theory could affect West Cameroon. Ahidjo’s call for a unitary state
thus aimed to contain any threat of secession by West Cameroon and to ensure
that the petro-dollars would not escape his control.14
The Ahidjo regime claimed massive popular support for the draft constitu-
tion during the referendum, and hence the immediate establishment of the
United Republic of Cameroon.15 Given the growing disillusionment of the West
Cameroonian population with the union between Anglophone and Francophone
Cameroon as sketched above, the referendum results are more likely a
manifestation of the regime’s autocratic nature than of the West Cameroonian
population’s support. In other words, fear prevented West Cameroonians from
expressing their objective interests. The ballot was far from secret, election
results were arranged beforehand, and it was neither politically wise nor
politically safe to hold and express views different from the president’s, let
alone oppose in words or deeds any of his plans or actions. Anecdotes to show
that the referendum was completely stage-managed by party stalwarts abound.
At the Cameroon College of Arts, Science and Technology in Bambili, for
example, only ‘yes’ ballots were provided. When students refused to vote in the
absence of ‘no’ ballots, the army was rushed in under the pretext of pre-
empting any disruption of the voting process. Professor Kofele-Kale noted that
‘there were Bakweri villages where people had all gone to their farms and thus
did not vote, yet the returning officers turned in vote tallies of 99.9 per cent,
suggesting that the results were cooked’.16 The West Cameroon political elite,
too, was well aware of the widespread opposition of the Anglophone
population to the introduction of a unitary state but it lacked the courage to tell
Ahidjo, for fear of losing pockets of power and privilege. In 1991, Solomon
Tandeng Muna, who was at the time of the referendum prime minister of West
Cameroon and vice-president of the federal republic, admitted in a radio
interview that he had not dared to reveal to Ahidjo the true feelings of the
Anglophones in the referendum because it would have been tantamount to
signing his own death warrant (Boh & Ofege 1991: 16).
                                                                       
14 See Ngoh 1992 and 1996. See also the interview with François Sengat Kuo, who
confessed to have drafted the 1972 constitution, in Le Messager, 9 June 1992, p. 10.
15 The government claimed that 98.7 per cent of the country’s 3,326,280 voters went to
the polls, 99.9 per cent of them voting ‘yes’. See Mbuagbaw et al. 1987: 133.
16 Cited in The Post, 7 June 2000, p. 3.
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The new constitution increased the already enormous powers in the hands of
the president.17 It eliminated the office of the vice-president, of prime minister
of West and East Cameroon together with the cabinets of the two states, the two
legislatures and the West Cameroon House of Chiefs. Although the post of
vice-president was abolished, Muna remained second in the hierarchical order
in the unitary state, becoming speaker of the largely ceremonial National
Assembly. To reduce any danger of united Anglophone action, Ahidjo decided
a few months later to divide the erstwhile Federated State of West Cameroon
into two provinces, the South West and North West Provinces, informed by the
internal contradictions within the Anglophone community between the
coastal/forest peoples (in the South West) and the Grassfields peoples (in the
North West). Like the other five Francophone provinces, the two Anglophone
provinces were headed by a governor appointed by the president and directly
responsible to him through the minister of territorial administration.
Anglophones and the one-party unitary state, 1972-1990
There is no doubt that the vast majority of the Francophone elite welcomed the
abolition of the federation. Like the Ahidjo government, it tended to perceive
the massive approval of the unitary state in the 20 May 1972 referendum as the
final triumph in the strive for national unity after reunification.
There is sufficient evidence that the Francophone elite was never in favour
of federalism. Immediately after the February 1961 plebiscite in the then
Southern Cameroons, influential Francophones, who were organised in the
Cercle Culturel Camerounais led by Dr Bebey-Eyidi, made it known that
‘federalism was not the best form of reunification’. Nonetheless, they were
willing to admit that ‘federalism was appropriate for the immediate situation
since it would take time to harmonise the different cultures and habits of the
two territories’. They went on to add that ‘federalism should be fundamentally
provisional, transitory and should lead, at the earliest possible time, to a unitary
state’. Even the UPC, which was at that time fighting a guerrilla war against the
Ahidjo government, supported the idea of a unitary state because ‘only a
unitary government can guarantee the security and unity of a reunified
Cameroon’ (Ngoh 1990: 199).
In sharp contrast to the Francophones, the vast majority of the articulate
Anglophones tended to perceive the abolition of the federation as a major threat
to the preservation of their cultural identity and the representation of their
                                                                       
17 The constitution of the United Republic of Cameroon is reproduced in Gonidec &
Breton 1976: 55-62.
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interests. For them, the unitary state was a clear expression of the hegemonic
tendencies of the Francophone-dominated state and even of the Francophone
population as a whole, which would invariably lead to a further ‘marginalisa-
tion, exploitation and assimilation’ of the Anglophone region. They soon
started to resent their region’s loss of autonomy and the perceived reality of the
subordinate position of the Anglophone minority in the unitary state. Their
numerous grievances were mainly of a political, economic and cultural nature.18
In the political domain, Anglophones complain of Anglophone exclusion
from the key government and party positions and of their inferior role in the
decision-making councils and organs. Anglophones have never held ministerial
posts in the most important and sensitive ministries, such as the Ministries of
Defence, Foreign Affairs, Territorial Administration, and National Education.
They are instead usually appointed to ministerial posts in ministries with a
lower status, such as the Ministries of Transport and Mines, which thus have
become stigmatised ‘Anglophone ministries’. It is also rare to find an Anglo-
phone director in the civil service. A general complaint among Anglophones is
that they are assumed to be only fit to play ‘deputy’ or ‘assistant’ to Franco-
phones, even when they have clearly superior expertise.
In the economic domain, Anglophones complain of the dismantlement or
neglect of their region’s infrastructure, the lack of public investment in their
region, and the rape, drain and squander of their region’s economic resources.
They claim that their region has failed to benefit from its extensive oil
resources that have enriched pillaging Francophones and made them even more
arrogant. Oil resources are allegedly used by the Francophone-dominated state
to feed ‘the bellies’ of its allies (Bayart 1989) and to stimulate economic
development in Francophone regions. Anglophones strongly resent the fact that
the Société Nationale de Raffinage (Sonara), the oil refinery near Victoria
(Limbe), continues to be headed and predominantly staffed by Francophones
who treat them condescendingly and with indifference.
In the cultural domain, Anglophones complain of the continuous attempts at
‘Frenchification’ or what Kofele-Kale (1987) has called ‘the Gallicising of
public life’, that is the pre-eminence of French as the official language and of
inherited French institutions and bureaucratic practices in all aspects of state
administration and public life. They may have experienced little real contact
with the primary vehicles of Anglo-Saxon cultural values during the colonial
era but today Anglophones are united by a common frustration with the
devaluation and exclusion of whatever they have come to imagine as constitu-
tive of an Anglo-Saxon way of life.
                                                                       
18 For the multitude of Anglophone complaints, see, for instance, Mukong 1990 and
All Anglophone Conference 1993.
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Anglophone complaints about the ‘Gallicising’ of state and public life are
not without merit. By a five to one ratio, the complaints reflect the demographic
balance between the official language communities and the fact that the
harmonisation of inherited political and administrative systems was bound to
favour the senior (Francophone) partner of the union (Eyoh 1998a: 262). More
problematic are the claims of systematic political and economic discrimination.
Most analysts of Cameroonian politics agree on the effective integration of
Anglophone elites into the hegemonic alliance (cf. Bayart 1979; Ngayap 1983;
Kofele-Kale 1987). The conclusion or inference of much of this analysis is that
these complaints are self serving. In treating Francophones as a homogeneous
group, Anglophone elites suppress the fact that the grievances they seek to
particularise are shared by other sub-national groups. It is worth noting, as the
Anglophone economist Wilfred Ndongko (1980) has ably demonstrated, that
the problem of economic deprivation in Anglophone Cameroon is not unique to
the region. Summarising the most pertinent economic data, he shows that two
Francophone regions, the North and the East, join Anglophone Cameroon in
forming a triad of the most economically underdeveloped regions in the
country.19 This is not to suggest that Anglophone complaints about the relative
backwardness of their region should be brushed aside, especially when we take
into account the fact that this region is the nation’s breadbasket and the source
of its considerable oil wealth. We only wish to signal that this problem cannot
be explained in isolation but can be better understood when viewed within the
context of inequalities among and within the regions in the country, not in
Manichean terms as a distinction between a developed Francophone and an
underdeveloped Anglophone Cameroon (Kofele-Kale 1987: 65-67).
A number of factors, notably severe repression, an elaborate system of
ethno-regional patronage by the regime (Jua 1991), and fierce competition
between the North West and South West elites for power positions in the
unitary state, largely precluded the Anglophone elite from openly expressing
criticism of Francophone domination during Ahidjo’s presidency of the one-
party unitary state. Fonlon again appears to have been one of the few members
of the Anglophone elite who dared to raise the ‘Anglophone problem’ in this
period. In 1980, he wrote a letter to Ahidjo in which he described Anglophone
feelings as follows:
There is a deep feeling of apprehension amongst the Anglophones. This fear is
because after almost 18 years of unification, they still have the impression of being
kept away from certain aspects of national life. Some Cameroonians do not hide it
from them that they are regarded as second-class citizens. Hence, the generally held
                                                                       
19 For more recent economic data on Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon, see,
among others, Konings 1993, 1997 and 1998; Van de Walle 1993; Mama 1996.
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view (which for some has become a firm conviction) that Anglophones can be in the
best of cases only assistants, in no matter which ministry.
If the Anglophones who are so placed under Francophones were less qualified or
less experienced than the latter, this situation could easily have been understood. But
this is not always the case. Mr President you will thus understand why I have spoken
of a deep feeling of frustration amongst the Anglophones (Collectif ‘Changer le
Cameroun’ 1992: 265-66; our translation).
Anglophone expectations were raised when Prime Minister Paul Biya
succeeded Ahidjo as president on 6 November 1982.20 Initially, there were some
hopeful signs that the new president might end Anglophone marginalisation and
their second-class status in the unitary state. In his maiden visit to the Anglo-
phone region Biya tried to dispel the deep-seated feelings of apprehension
amongst Anglophones. He addressed them in English. This was actually the
first time the Anglophone population had heard their president address them in
English. On this occasion, Biya raised issues that were close to the hearts of
Anglophones, including the large degree of centralisation in the unitary state
and the lack of infrastructural facilities in the Anglophone region. He then
promised to tackle these issues immediately. Nothing more, however, was
heard about them after he had returned to Yaoundé. If anything, he soon would
be accused of making matters worse for Anglophones. His early honeymoon
with the English language would die a natural death, as Biya would stubbornly
insist on speaking French not only to his Anglophone collaborators but even to
visiting English-speaking foreign dignitaries.
Even more significantly, in his inaugural speech Biya proposed a ‘New
Deal’ to the Cameroonian people. Its main policy guidelines were to be ‘rigour
and moralisation’ and ‘national integration’. These guidelines were intended to
bring about a state characterised by the judicious and stringent management of
public affairs, transparency and public accountability by government officials
as well as total absence of ethno-regional particularism and favouritism (Biya
1987; Takougang & Krieger 1998). However, as Anglophones soon came to
realise, these professed policies were mere slogans, probably used by Biya to
extricate himself from Ahidjo’s shadow (Konings 1996a: 250). Corruption and
mismanagement in public life rapidly reached unprecedented levels. It was,
therefore, not surprising that Anglophones were inclined to attribute the severe
economic crisis that affected Cameroon from the mid-1980s first and foremost
to the corruption and mismanagement of the Biya regime (Jua 1991; Konings
1996a). During the economic crisis and subsequent structural adjustment
programme one could observe a mounting anxiety in Anglophone Cameroon
that its major agro-industrial enterprises, particularly the Cameroon Develop-
                                                                       
20 For a detailed discussion of the position of Anglophones during the Biya regime, see
Konings & Nyamnjoh 2002.
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ment Corporation (CDC) and Plantations Pamol du Cameroun Ltd (Pamol),
would be either liquidated or sold to Francophone or French interests (Konings
1996b, 1997). National integration soon turned out to be an ideological
justification for effacing and assimilating the Anglophone cultural legacy. What
fuelled Anglophone frustration was that, in spite of its promise to create a
society where national concerns transcended ethno-regional interests, the Biya
regime instead encouraged ethno-regional favouritism. Especially after the
failed military coup in 1984, it became manifest that there was an increasing
monopoly of key posts by members of President Biya’s ethnic group, which is
loosely classified as Beti. As of August 1991, according to Takougang &
Krieger (1998: 94-95), 37 of the 47 senior prefects were Beti, as were three-
quarters of the directors and general managers of the parastatals, and 22 of the
38 high-ranking bureaucrats who had been appointed in the newly created
Office of the Prime Minister. Such a lion’s share of positions by Francophones
of Beti origin meant that even fewer positions were available to Anglophones.
One of the most belittling experiences for them was to have Francophone
prefects and governors speak to them through interpreters, all in the name of
national unity.
In the wake of the limited degree of liberalisation that Biya introduced after
assuming power in November 1982, Anglophones began voicing their long-
standing grievances. In September 1983 the minister of national education
promulgated an order modifying the Anglophone General Certificate of Educa-
tion (GCE) examination by making it similar to the Baccalauréat. Apparently,
the order was intended to facilitate the entry of Anglophone students into the
professional and technical institutes in Cameroon, which were exclusively
based on the French system. Anglophone students, however, interpreted the
proposed reform as a subtle attempt by the Francophone-dominated state to
assimilate the Anglophone educational system. They maintained that the
problem of Anglophone exclusion from the professional and technical institutes
in the country could not be resolved by assimilation but rather by the creation
of institutes based on the English system. Ensuing demonstrations and the
boycotting of classes by Anglophone students at the University of Yaoundé and
in the Anglophone urban centres met with extreme police brutality (Nyamnjoh
1996a). English-speaking students at the University of Yaoundé used this
protest action to voice some of their other grievances, including the dismissal of
Dr Bisong, an Anglophone lecturer in the Faculty of Law and Economics, who
offered one of the few courses in English in the officially bilingual university.
In a petition addressed to the minister of national education, they took up the
issue as follows:
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With regard to the University of Yaoundé, we strongly condemn the discrimination
in the teaching languages as glaringly exemplified by the ignominious suppression of
the courses offered in English by Dr Bisong (Accounting - 2nd Year; and Cost
Accounting and Budgetary Control - 3rd Year, Economics Department) for the sole
reason that such courses were offered in English. The Francophone students of the
department had protested to the Chancellor of the university that such important
courses could not be delivered in English. Immediately Dr Bisong was accused of
inefficient delivery of his lessons and they were handed over to a Francophone
lecturer. The inefficiency was surely the use of the wrong language and not the
substance of academic stuff delivered.21
The situation did not calm down until 11 days later when President Biya
issued a statement calling on all students to return to classes and announcing
the setting up of a commission of highly qualified and experienced Anglo-
phones and Francophones to look into the students’ grievances.
Even Solomon Tandeng Muna, the then speaker of the National Assembly
and constitutionally second-in-command in the unitary state, highlighted the
failure of national integration in a memorandum entitled ‘Some Points of Social
Justice’ which he addressed to the head of state in January 1984. It is worth
recalling that Muna used to be prime minister of West Cameroon and vice-
president of the Federal Republic of Cameroon, and that he had closely collabo-
rated with Ahidjo in dismantling the federal institutions. In his memorandum,
he appeared to identify with the general Anglophone feeling of frustration
regarding their second-class citizenship:
Virtually every Anglo-Saxon qualification is inferior to French ones, and so Anglo-
Saxon standards are supposed to be inferior to French ones. This gives an idea of the
frustrations which English-speaking citizens face virtually at all levels in the univer-
sity, in the public service and in state corporations with regard to their progress.22
Indeed, for a long time, Anglo-Saxon certificates and diplomas, held mainly
by Anglophones, were grossly undervalued and belittled by the Francophone
leaders and elite. Consequently, Anglophones entered the public service at
points far below those of Francophones with equivalent qualifications. At the
University of Yaoundé in particular, this situation hindered and delayed the
promotion of Anglophone lecturers to higher positions. Anglophone complaints
were ignored for a long time. It was not until the tail end of the Ahidjo
administration that a petition by PhD holders teaching at the University of
                                                                       
21 Petition of English-speaking students, University of Yaoundé, to the Minister of
National Education, dated 19 November 1983, reproduced in Mukong 1990: 26.
22 Some Points of Social Justice. Memorandum addressed by Honourable Solomon
Tandeng Muna, Speaker of the National Assembly, to the Head of State, Yaoundé,
dated January 1984, reproduced in Mukong 1990: 27.
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Yaoundé addressed to the government and some foreign embassies yielded a
positive response. As a result, the notion of ‘terminal degree’, which virtually
puts a PhD on a par with a Doctorat d’État, came into vogue. Nevertheless,
Francophones often continued to regard Anglo-Saxon certificates and diplomas
as being inferior to French ones allegedly because it took relatively fewer years
to obtain them than was possible with their French equivalents (Chem-Langhëë
1997: 93).
One month later, in February 1984, President Biya, without warning or
consultation, changed the official name of the country from the United
Republic of Cameroon to simply the Republic of Cameroon – despite vehement
Anglophone protests that this was the name of independent Francophone
Cameroon prior to reunification. The new name appeared to deny that the
Cameroonian state was composed of two distinct entities. Biya argued that the
name change was not only a demonstration of the political maturity of the
Cameroonian people after almost twenty-five years of independence but also a
sign that the people had finally overcome divisions caused by seventy years of
European colonisation (Biya 1987: 6). In Anglophone circles, however, Biya’s
unilateral name change seems to have given rise to two different interpreta-
tions.
Some Anglophones consider this action as the boldest step yet taken toward
their assimilation and disappearance as a distinct founding community. For
them, the new name was clear evidence that, as far as Biya was concerned, the
Anglophone territory and its people had lost their identity and had become an
indistinguishable part of the former Republic of Cameroon, thus carrying to its
intended conclusion Ahidjo’s designs of absorbing and assimilating the Anglo-
phone minority into the Francophone-dominated state.
Other Anglophones argued that, by this action, La République du
Cameroun23 had unilaterally seceded from the union and thus lacked a constitu-
tional base from which to continue ruling the former Southern Cameroons.
They are often inclined to appeal to the United Nations to assist its former
Trust Territory in peacefully separating from La République. This view was
first expressed by the eminent Anglophone lawyer and first president of the
Cameroon Bar Association, Fon Gorji Dinka. On 20 March 1985, Dinka
addressed a memorandum to Paul Biya entitled ‘The New Social Order’. In it,
he declared the Biya government unconstitutional and called for the Southern
                                                                       
23 Reference to the incumbent regime as the government of La République du
Cameroun, the name adopted by Francophone Cameroon at independence, has
become a key signifier in the replotting of the nation’s constitutional history as a
progressive consolidation of the recolonisation of Anglophone Cameroon by the
post-colonial Francophone-dominated state. See Eyoh 1998a: 264.
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Cameroons to become independent and to be rebaptised as the Republic of
Ambazonia:24
[On 4 February 1984] Comrade Biya promulgated law no. 84-001 abolishing the
United Republic of Cameroon whose President he was. Again either by design or by
default the law failed to include a clause stating that the institutions of United
Republic of Cameroon were to be retained as institutions of the newly revived
Republic of Cameroon. So the law abolished all the institutions of the Republic of
Cameroon with it. Since the revived Republic of Cameroon has not yet set up its own
institutions, it has neither a government nor a legislature nor any other institutions of
administration. So Comrade Paul Biya is neither President of the United Republic of
Cameroon, which has been abolished, nor of the newly revived Republic of
Cameroon.
We now come to the sad end of the story. By reviving the old Republic of
Cameroon, which the Foumban Accord had submerged in order to create a Federa-
tion with Southern Cameroon-on-Ambas, the Republic of Cameroon has irretrievably
seceded from the union.
So unless a new accord is included so as to create a basis for a union between the
two states, any claim, by the Republic of Cameroon to govern Southern Cameroon-
on-Ambas, would simply mean annexation pure and simple.25
Dinka was arrested and imprisoned without trial until January 1986, earning
him the status of martyr for the Anglophone cause.
The Bamenda congress of the ruling party in 1985 not only changed the
name of the ruling party from the Cameroon National Union (CNU) to the
Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) but was also the forum of
unprecedented debate compared with previous party congresses. However, this
new relative freedom of expression led to the unmasking of themes less
welcome to the regime. Two memoranda submitted to the congress by Anglo-
phone elite groups resident in Douala expressed Anglophone resentment about
their region’s loss of autonomy and illustrated with a multitude of examples the
recolonisation of their region by the Francophone-dominated state:
Once more we respectfully seize this opportunity to draw your attention to our
memorandum ... concerning the humiliating and revolting colonial status that is
gradually but systematically being imposed on the English-speaking Cameroonians
by the administration...
                                                                       
24 This name is derived from Ambas Bay at the foot of Mount Cameroon. This was the
first area of permanent British settlement in the present Anglophone region. In 1858,
the British Baptist missionary, Alfred Saker, purchased land from the King of
Bimbia, becoming de facto governor of the little colony of Victoria named after the
British queen. See Ardener 1968.
25 ‘The New Social Order’ by Fon Gorji Dinka, 20 March 1985, reproduced in
Mukong 1990: 98-99.
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We have over the years watched with increasing alarm the various unilateral
manipulations of the constitution to the extent that the English-speaking region of
Cameroon is now being treated by the administration either as a conquered country
or as a buffer zone, and its citizens as foreigners.
Because of this colonial status which has been imposed on us both dictatorially
and through political chicanery, we now find ourselves almost completely stripped of
that cherished British cultural heritage to which some of us were born and nurtured.26
In the period 1985-1990, however, the number of Anglophone petitions and
memoranda addressed to government and party declined.27 This was undoubt-
edly due to the fact that the Biya government was stepping up repression in this
period because of the deteriorating economic and political crisis in the country
(Takougang & Krieger 1998). With the introduction of multipartyism in late
1990, Anglophones started openly to organise for the defence of their interests.
Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted the various strategies used by the Ahidjo regime to
abolish the federation and replace it with a one-party unitary state in 1972.
These moves affirmed the original intent of the Francophone elite – to destroy
the autonomy and identity of West Cameroon. Their design came to a logical
conclusion in 1984 when Ahidjo’s successor, Paul Biya, renamed the country,
changing its name from the United Republic of Cameroon to the Republic of
Cameroon. For the Anglophones, this change of name was a clear indication
that the Francophone elite simply denied the fact that the Cameroon state was
made up of two distinct entities, thus suggesting that either the Anglophone
territory had been assimilated and absorbed by the former Republic of
Cameroon or that the former Republic of Cameroon had unilaterally seceded
from the union.
The hegemonic and assimilative tendencies of the Francophone-dominated
state were strongly resented by the majority of the Anglophone population,
leading to the development of an Anglophone consciousness with the feeling
that their territory with a distinct colonial legacy was being subjected to
marginalisation, exploitation and assimilation by the Francophone-dominated
state and even by the Francophone population as a whole. But we have also
pointed out that the Anglophone political elite bears an important share of
                                                                       
26 Memorandum presented to the Head of State and Chairman of the Cameroon
People’s Democratic Movement by a Joint Committee of the Elite of the North West
and South West Provinces Resident in Littoral Province, reproduced in Mukong
1990: 63-64.
27 For the Anglophone petitions and memoranda during this period, see Mukong 1990.
75
responsibility for the Anglophone predicament. Generally speaking, they did
not resist the abolition of the federation, which they had initially embraced as
the embodiment of the highest ideals of reunification. Apparently, as soon as
they came to realise that their influence within the Federated State of West
Cameroon had begun to be whittled down, the federal arrangements no longer
suited their designs. They started competing for Ahidjo’s favours, aspiring to
positions of power and privilege within first the single party and the federal
government and eventually within the unitary state, blatantly neglecting the
defence of West Cameroonian autonomy and interests. The co-opting of the
Anglophone political elite into the ‘hegemonic alliance’ (Bayart 1979) and the
autocratic nature of the Ahidjo regime largely explain why Anglophones failed
to protest openly against Francophone domination and recolonisation until the
limited liberalisation introduced by Biya after succeeding Ahidjo as president
in 1982.
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Anglophones have not only played a leading role in the accomplishment of 
political liberalisation in Cameroon, they have also used the liberalisation of 
political space to create or reactivate several organisations for the representation 
and defence of their interests. In this chapter we show that these Anglophone 
organisations soon came to form a major challenge to the Francophone-
dominated unitary state, insisting that the government should place federalism 
on the constitutional reform agenda. Confronted with the government’s 
persistent refusal to enter into negotiations about a return to the federal state, 
they gradually adopted an even more radical stand, striving for secession and 
independence of the Anglophone territory.  
In their pursuit of self-determination or autonomy, in the form of either a 
return to the federal state or outright secession, the Anglophone organisations 
have tried to muster the support of the international community and the Anglo-
phone population. They have engaged in both a diplomatic offensive, regularly 
sending missions to relevant embassies, states and international organisations, 
and a ‘sensitisation campaign’ to inform the Anglophone population about their 
objectives and strategies and to mobilise it for action against the Francophone-
dominated unitary state. They enjoyed growing popularity in the Anglophone 
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territory in the period 1992-1996, having scored some successes in their 
struggle for autonomy. While the Anglophone movements for various reasons 
lost their initial momentum from 1996 onwards, the unexpected proclamation 
of the independence of the Anglophone territory on 30 December 1999 appears 
to have provided a new impetus to the Anglophone struggle. 
  
 
The growth of Anglophone organisations 
 
Given the Anglophone frustration with the Francophone-dominated state, it is 
not surprising that the first opposition party in the country emerged in Anglo-
phone Cameroon. In 1990 the Social Democratic Front (SDF) was formed in 
Bamenda, the capital of North West Province, demanding liberalisation of the 
political space and capitalising on popular frustration among Anglophones 
following three decades of marginalisation. Its chairman was John Fru Ndi who 
was to enjoy widespread popularity among the urban masses because of his 
courage and populist style of leadership (Gwellem 1996; Takougang & Krieger 
1998; Konings 2001a). After the massive rally to launch the SDF on 26 May 
1990 ended in the deaths of six young Anglophones, the state-controlled media 
tried to deny government responsibility for this bloody event and to distort the 
true facts (Nyamnjoh 1996b: 26-27). Anglophone students at the University of 
Yaoundé who demonstrated the same day in support of the SDF and political 
liberalisation were falsely accused by the regime of having marched in favour 
of the re-integration of Anglophone Cameroon into Nigeria and having sung the 
Nigerian national anthem and raised the Nigerian flag (Konings 2002). Leading 
members of the CPDM strongly condemned the Anglophones for this 
‘treacherous action’ and what they considered as the premature birth of 
multipartyism in the post-colonial state. Their reaction to these peaceful 
demonstrations shocked many in the country. Anglophone Cameroonians were 
termed ‘Biafrans’, referred to as ‘enemies in the house’, and asked by the then 
Minister of Territorial Administration, Ibrahim Mbombo Njoya, ‘to go else-
where’ if they were dissatisfied with ‘national unity’. Indignant at his own 
party’s behaviour, Foncha, the Anglophone architect of the federal state, 
resigned as first vice-president of the CPDM in June 1990. As Foncha 
explained: 
 
The Anglophone Cameroonians whom I brought into the union have been ridiculed 
and referred to as ‘les Biafrais’, ‘les ennemies dans la maison’, ‘les traîtres’ etc., and 
the constitutional provisions which protected this Anglophone minority have been 
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suppressed, their voice drowned while the rule of the gun replaced the dialogue 
which the Anglophones cherish very much.1 
 
There is general agreement that the launching of the SDF was a decisive 
factor in changing the political landscape in Cameroon. Under considerable 
internal and external pressure (Konings 1996a), the Biya government 
introduced a larger measure of political liberalisation. In December 1990 it 
announced the advent of multipartyism as well as a certain degree of freedom of 
mass communication and association, including the right to hold public 
meetings and demonstrations.2 As a result, several political parties, pressure 
groups and private newspapers were established in Anglophone Cameroon and 
began to express and represent Anglophone interests (Nyamnjoh 1996b: 38-49). 
Subsequently, the SDF spread its influence to the South West Province and 
soon became the major opposition party in Anglophone Cameroon, and among 
Anglophones in the diaspora at home and abroad. Nevertheless, informed by 
not so distant experiences of perceived domination by Grassfielders, the South 
West elite continued to be suspicious of the aspirations of the SDF leaders for 
fear of renewed North West domination. With the exception of the Liberal 
Democratic Alliance (LDA), which has attempted with only limited success to 
become a serious political formation, the South West has failed to produce a 
strong and credible party mainly because of personal animosities. Indeed, the 
subsequent leadership struggle in the LDA between Mola Njoh Litumbe and 
Lydia Belle Effimba is but a further indication that the elite in the South West 
has yet to come up with an effective alternative to the SDF.3 
The leaders of the SDF helped to turn the Anglophone region into a veritable 
hotbed of rebellion, leading to several fierce confrontations with the regime in 
power, especially during the 1991-1992 ghost-town campaign, which was 
essentially a prolonged demonstration of civil disobedience organised by the 
SDF and the allied opposition parties to force the Biya government to hold a 
sovereign national conference.4 The impact of this on the Anglophone commu-
nity was particularly visible during the ensuing presidential elections when Fru 
Ndi received 86.3 and 51.6 per cent respectively of the votes cast in the North 
                                                 
1  John Ngu Foncha’s letter of resignation from the CPDM is reproduced in Mukong 
1990: 155. 
2  See Société de Presse et d’Editions du Cameroun (1991), Cameroon. Rights and 
Freedoms: Collection of Recent Texts, Yaoundé: Sopecam. 
3  For reports on the leadership struggle in the LDA, see Cameroon Post, 16-22 April 
1996 and The Rambler, 30 April-6 May 1996. 
4  This was the period from April 1991 to January 1992 when the radical opposition 
issued calls, ultimatums, tracts, etc., asking the public to immobilise the economy by 
staying indoors, blocking streets, refusing to pay taxes and bills, and boycotting 
markets and offices. See Monga 1992; Mbu 1993. 
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West and South West Provinces. It is hardly surprising that Biya’s declared 
victory in October 1992 was a traumatic experience in Anglophone Cameroon, 
with violent protests against his ‘theft of Fru Ndi’s victory’ throughout the 
North West. The president then imposed a state of emergency on the province 
for three months and Fru Ndi was kept under surveillance in his house in 
Bamenda.5 Whereas the United States, Germany, and the European Union 
denounced the fraudulent elections and the state of emergency in the North 
West and threatened to abandon their aid programmes to Cameroon until ‘there 
was a clear advancement in the democratic process’, the French continued to 
support Biya who appeared to be willing to safeguard their interests in 
Cameroon (Konings 1996a). 
Paradoxically, although the SDF and Fru Ndi contributed immensely to 
Anglophone consciousness and action, the party increasingly presented itself as 
a national rather than an Anglophone party. It tried to deny persistent govern-
ment charges that it was championing regional rather than national interests, 
and to attract a Francophone membership. The party actually proved to be so 
successful in its recruitment efforts in Francophone Cameroon, notably in the 
neighbouring West and Littoral Provinces, that Francophones soon outnum-
bered Anglophones in the originally Anglophone party. Most of the party’s 
approximately 60 per cent Francophone membership is Bamileke, who are 
closely related to ethnic groups in the North West Province (Dongmo 1981; 
Warnier 1993; Tabapssi 1999). The Bamileke are inclined to see the SDF as a 
springboard to political power. 
Increasingly presenting itself as a national party, the SDF tended to adopt a 
rather ambivalent attitude towards calls from newly emerging Anglophone 
pressure groups for a return to the federal state (see below). The leadership tried 
to avoid alienating either the Anglophone or Francophone members of the party 
but this was not an easy task. Anglophone members tended to be simultane-
ously supporters of the Anglophone pressure groups and were therefore inclined 
to bring pressures to bear upon the leadership to insert federalism in the party 
programme. Such pressure was usually opposed by the party’s Francophone 
members who, like other Francophones, tended to adhere to the preservation of 
the unitary state, often equating federalism with secession. Given this situation, 
                                                 
5  For a government account of the violence that took place after the presidential 
elections, see Cameroon Tribune, 26 and 29 October 1992, and the Ministry of 
Communication’s white paper on ‘Human Rights in Cameroon’, published in 
November 1993. For a detailed alternative account, see Boh Herbert, Cameroon: 
State of Human Rights Violations following October 11 Presidential Elections, 
Bamenda, 10 November 1992. The US Department of State’s Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices for 1992, Washington, DC, February 1993, pp. 31-40 is 
also relevant. 
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the party leadership, dominated by Anglophones, was eager to reach a com-
promise between the two conflicting groups (see Chapter 6).  
Since the SDF adopted a half-hearted stand towards the Anglophone 
problem, Anglophone interests came to be first and foremost represented and 
defended by associations and pressure groups which were created or reactivated 
by the Anglophone elite upon the introduction of political liberalisation in 1990. 
Some, notably the Free West Cameroon Movement (FWCM)6 and the 
Ambazonian Movement (AM) of Fon Gorji Dinka (see Chapter 3), advanced 
the liberation of the former West Cameroon state from annexation by La 
République du Cameroun and the creation of an independent West Cameroon 
or Ambazonian state, but most initially championed a return to the federal state, 
especially the Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM).7 CAM became by far 
the most important Anglophone pressure group. It is the only all-Anglophone 
association operating legally in the country, having been registered as a socio-
cultural, non-partisan association under law no. 90/053 of 19 December 1990. 
Its roots can be traced back to the South West-North West Elites Association in 
Douala, which in 1985 submitted memoranda to the Biya regime about the 
Anglophone predicament (see Chapter 3). Following the introduction of a larger 
measure of political liberalisation in December 1990, this association revamped 
its activities and changed its name to CAM in response to its expansion outside 
Douala. Several new branches and chapters were established in the country. On 
4 July 1992 CAM held its first conference at Buea, the former capital of 
Southern and West Cameroon. On that occasion, its first chairman, Dr H.N.O. 
Enonchong, a prominent Anglophone lawyer in Douala, was forced to resign, 
having been accused of using the organisation for the advancement of his own 
political career. A new executive was elected headed by (retired) Ambassador 
Martin Epie (chairman), Dr Arnold Yongbang (vice-chairman) and Albert 
Mukong (secretary-general).8  
Besides these associations aimed at representing broad-based Anglophone 
interests, a large number of other associations emerged hoping to represent 
more specific Anglophone interests. These included the Teachers’ Association 
of Cameroon (TAC), the Confederation of Anglophone Parents-Teachers 
Association of Cameroon (CAPTAC), the Cameroon Anglophone Students’ 
Association (CANSA), the Anglophone Common Law Association, the 
                                                 
6  See Free West Cameroon Movement (1991), The Restoration of the State of West 
Cameroon: The Final Solution to the Anglophone Cameroon Question, Bamenda/-
Victoria: WCJ. 
7  CAM was later renamed the Southern Cameroons Restoration Movement 
(SCARM). 
8  See Cameroon Post, 11-18 February 1992, p. 9; and Le Messager, 12 July 1992, pp. 
2 and 8. 
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Association of Anglophone Journalists, the Cameroon Anglophone Public 
Servants’ Union (CAPSU), the Anglophone Youth Council, and the Anglo-
phone Women’s League. Some of these associations scored significant 
successes in their struggle against the Francophone-dominated state and its 
subsidiaries. For example, the TAC and the CAPTAC acting together with 
Anglophone churches and the media forced the government in 1993 to create a 
General Certificate of Education (GCE) Board. This signified an important 
victory for the Anglophones in their ten-year struggle against determined 
government efforts to destroy the GCE (see Chapter 7). 
Anglophone associations and pressure groups, in particular CAM, have 
regularly been engaged in various forms of protest actions including strikes, 
boycotts and demonstrations against the Francophone-dominated state. The 
participation of various strata of the population demonstrates that the Anglo-
phone problem is no longer perceived as solely an elitist concern. And how 
could it be so when marginalisation by the Francophone-dominated state has 
not been exclusively targeted at the Anglophone elite? Interestingly, these 
actions are partly directed against the myths and symbols of the unitary state. 
Anglophone movements have boycotted the celebration of the National Day on 
20 May, the ‘Day of the 1972 Glorious Revolution’, declaring it a ‘Day of 
Mourning’ and a ‘Day of Shame’.9 They have instead called upon Anglophones 
to celebrate the ‘Day of Independence’ on 1 October and the ‘Day of the 
Plebiscite’ on 11 February. On these feast days, the 1992-3 attempts by CAM 
activists to hoist the federation flag were reportedly answered by the security 
forces with ‘extreme brutality’.10 
Significantly, Anglophone associations and pressure groups increasingly 
referred to the Anglophone territory as the Southern Cameroons. Their leaders 
alleged (i) that the proper procedures for the enactment and amendment of the 
federal constitution had not been followed by Ahidjo (see Chapter 2); and (ii) 
that Francophone Cameroon had seceded from the union in 1984 when the Biya 
government unilaterally changed the country’s name from the United Republic 
of Cameroon to the Republic of Cameroon – the name of independent Franco-
phone Cameroon prior to reunification (see Chapter 3). From this perspective, 
they often claimed that the Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons had either 
never really ceased to exist or had been revived.11 The flag of the United 
Nations has therefore often been raised during Anglophone rallies to demon-
                                                 
9  Cameroon Post, 19-26 May 1994. 
10  Cameroon Post, 29 January-4 February 1992, 9 February 1993 and 6-13 October 
1993. 
11  For a Francophone critique on this Anglophone position, see Olinga 1994. 
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strate the Anglophones’ sustained belief in continued United Nations responsi-
bility for the Southern Cameroons.12  
Although the provocative reintroduction of this terminology has had the 
advantage of reminding inhabitants about the spatial and historical foundations 
of their Anglophone identity, Sindjoun (1995) observed that an Anglophone 
identity can only be claimed by inhabitants belonging to one of the territory’s 
autochthonous ethnic groups – a distinction which tends to exclude even 
second- and third-generation Francophone immigrants from Southern 
Cameroonian citizenship. Hence the references made to the imagined ‘Eleventh 
Province’ for those who are seen and treated as ‘Francophones of Anglophone 
culture’.13 It should, however, be added that the Anglophone leadership has 
since tried to bridge the gap between ‘pure’ Southern Cameroonians and 
‘eleventh-province’ members. Eleventh-province members who have shown a 
real commitment to the Anglophone cause have been invited to attend Anglo-
phone conferences and have been given leadership positions within Anglo-
phone organisations. The 1994 Bamenda Proclamation (see below) even 
‘declared that the notion of Eleventh Province is inconsistent with the restora-
tion of the autonomy of Anglophone Cameroon and the governance of society 
within a distinct entity of Anglophone Cameroon and affirmed the necessity of 
all Anglophones to behave, act and be treated as sons and daughters of 
provinces comprised within the territory of Anglophone Cameroon’. Among 
Anglophone students and elites in the diaspora (North America, Europe and 
elsewhere in Africa), such distinctions have simply been dismissed as 
diversionary, and the tendency has been to emphasise a common culture and 
history over territorial boundedness. 
 
 
Anglophone struggles for constitutional reform 
 
A major Anglophone challenge to the Francophone-dominated state occurred in 
the wake of the Tripartite Conference convened by President Biya from 30 
                                                 
12  See ‘Anglophone Independence: SCNC Adopts UN Flag, Calls for Quebec-Style 
referendum’, in The Herald, 6-8 May 1996. 
13  Indeed, in June 1995, the national radio carried an announcement on the creation of 
‘une association des Francophones de culture Anglophone’. Everybody knows that 
there are only ten provinces in Cameroon. By adopting the name of ‘Eleventh 
Province’, these immigrants express their marginalisation, being recognised neither 
as Francophone nor as Anglophone citizens. For a discussion on the ‘eleventh 
province’ association, see Geschiere & Gugler 1998: 313-14; and Geschiere & 
Nyamnjoh 2000. For the relationship between Anglophone identity and autoch-
thony, see Konings & Nyamnjoh 2000. 
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October to 18 November 1991 to try to solve the severe political and economic 
crisis caused by the radical opposition’s protracted ghost-town campaign (see 
above). The conference was attended by representatives of government, 
opposition parties and civil society. Although it was largely controlled by the 
government (Takougang & Krieger 1998; Eboussi Boulaga 1997a), the non-
governmental representatives nevertheless succeeded in forcing constitutional 
reforms onto the agenda. During subsequent deliberations there was a clear 
divide between Anglophones and Francophones about the institutional configu-
ration of a reformed state. Contrary to the majority of Francophone participants, 
who proposed some measure of decentralisation within a unitary state, Anglo-
phone participants advocated the dismantling of the unitary state and the return 
to a federal state. The conference established a technical committee on 
constitutional matters consisting of seven Francophones and four Anglophones 
to determine the outlines of a new constitution. The committee was to be 
chaired by Professor Joseph Owona who at the time was secretary-general at 
the presidency and had an impressive track record of service in the unitary 
government. 
The four Anglophone committee members belonged to different socio-
political backgrounds. Mr Benjamin Itoe was then a minister and a CPDM 
militant; Dr Simon Munzu was a member of the CPDM (he later left the party 
to become secretary-general of the Buea-based LDA); Barrister Sam Ekontang 
Elad was an executive member of the LDA; and Dr Carlson Anyangwe had 
been nominated as an independent candidate even though it was soon to be 
revealed that he was a founding father of the SDF. The first three came from the 
South West Province, Carlson Anyangwe being the only North Westerner in the 
group. What united them was their Anglophoneness and their shared grievances 
about Francophone hegemony (which they could articulate both in French and 
English). They presented a draft proposal on a new federal structure that has 
come to be known as the EMIA Document (an acronym for Elad, Munzu, Itoe 
and Anyangwe). Itoe did not sign the document, ostensibly in a bid to keep his 
ministerial post, but it was not long, however, before he was sacked from the 
cabinet. The committee was suspended – without ever having met – on 14 
February 1992 because of the upcoming parliamentary elections scheduled for 
March. However on 17 May 1993 its chairman, Professor Owona, presented a 
draft constitution to the Anglophone Prime Minister Simon Achidi Achu, which 
preserved the essential features of the unitary state, making no concession to the 
Anglophone members’ federalist demands.14  
                                                 
14  On that occasion, he claimed that the draft constitution had been drawn up by the 
technical committee. See Le Messager, 8 June 1993, p. 5. 
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Shortly after the October 1992 presidential elections, President Biya 
announced that he intended to organise a national forum (un grand ou large 
débat) on constitutional reform. This announcement that was probably aimed at 
mitigating people’s anger over the controversial elections, especially in Anglo-
phone Cameroon, was reiterated in his New Year message to the nation on 31 
December 1992. It was not until 23 March 1993 that Professor Augustin 
Kontchou Kouomegni, the minister of state in charge of communications and 
also a government spokesman, informed the Cameroonian people that the 
national forum on constitutional reform would be held from April to June 1993. 
In response to this announcement, the Anglophone members of the technical 
committee convened an All Anglophone Conference (AAC) from 2-3 April 
1993 in Buea, the former capital of the Southern Cameroons, ‘for the purpose 
of adopting a common Anglophone stand on constitutional reform and of 
examining several other matters relating to the welfare of ourselves, our 
posterity, our territory and the entire Cameroon nation’.15 
The AAC turned out to be a landmark in the history of Anglophone 
Cameroon. It brought together over 5,000 members of the Anglophone elite and 
all the Anglophone associations and organisations were represented. CAM in 
particular played a leading role in the organisation of this conference. After two 
days of deliberations, the conference issued the Buea Declaration which stated 
that: 
the imposition of the unitary state in Southern Cameroons in 1972 was 
unconstitutional, illegal, and a breach of faith; 
the only redress adequate to right the wrongs done to Anglophone Cameroon 
and its people since the imposition of the unitary state was a return to the 
original form of government of the reunified Cameroon; 
to this end, all Cameroonians of Anglophone heritage were committed to 
working for the restoration of a federal constitution and of a federal form of 
government which takes cognisance of the bicultural nature of Cameroon 
and under which citizens will be protected against such violations as have 
here above been enumerated; and 
the survival of Cameroon in peace and harmony depended upon the attain-
ment of this objective towards which all patriotic Cameroonians, Franco-
phones as well as Anglophones, should relentlessly work.16 
 
                                                 
15  All Anglophone Conference (AAC) 1993: 8. For an interesting report on the 
organisation and proceedings of this conference, see ‘The Untold Story of the All 
Anglophone Conference’ in Cameroon Life, Vol. 2, No. 8, May 1993, pp. 8-15. 
16  All Anglophone Conference (AAC) 1993: 29-30. 
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The Buea Declaration listed the multiple Anglophone grievances about 
Francophone domination. Like previous documents written by Anglophone 
pressure groups,17 it tended to blame the ‘wicked’ Francophones as a whole for 
the plight of the ‘poor’ Anglophones, and compared both in rather idealised 
terms: the former, in full solidarity, agree among themselves to oppress the 
latter who, by their very nature, are peace-loving, open to dialogue, and 
committed to freedom.18 Of course, this demagogic approach, which is 
commonplace in ethno-regional discourse, serves to emphasise the insurmount-
able dichotomy that justifies the AAC call for autonomy and return to the 
federal state. This approach may be efficient in mobilising Anglophones but has 
hardly helped the struggle against their real enemy, the Francophone-dominated 
unitary state that has allies and opponents in all parts of the country. In addition, 
it tends towards a frozen and geographically restricted idea of being Anglo-
phone, denies the existence of various ethnic links between Francophones and 
Anglophones, and creates serious obstacles to any Francophone sympathy for 
the Anglophone cause.19 
Henceforth the AAC became the main Anglophone organisation and mouth-
piece, responsible for the defence and representation of general Anglophone 
interests. All the existing and newly emerging Anglophone associations became 
auxiliary organisations of the AAC. Under the AAC umbrella they continued to 
carry out their own specific responsibilities. They were represented in the 65-
member Anglophone Standing Committee created by the AAC. Being the most 
important auxiliary association, CAM was well represented in the Anglophone 
Standing Committee, thus exerting an enormous influence on AAC policies. 
The three convenors of the AAC occupied leading positions in the Anglophone 
Standing Committee: Elad was its chairman, Anyangwe its secretary-general, 
and Munzu was its spokesman. 
                                                 
17  See, for instance, Mukong 1990 and Free West Cameroon Movement, op. cit., 1991. 
18  See Louka (undated): 78-79; Sindjoun 1995: 93-94 and Fardon 1996: 93. 
19  See, for instance, the warning of Professor Maurice Kamto, an eminent Francophone 
legal scholar, that ‘Anglophones should blame the Ahidjo and Biya regimes, not 
Francophones’, in Le Messager, 24 June 1993, p. 12. Indeed, because of such 
collective condemnation the French-language newspapers have been reluctant to 
admit the existence of an Anglophone problem in Cameroon. See, for example, La 
Nouvelle Expression, 13-17 January 1994, pp. 1-3 for the hostile reception 
experienced by Simon Munzu when trying to explain the Anglophone problem to 
Francophone journalists and intellectuals. It is only recently, thanks to the 
trivialisation of the whole idea of minorities in the 1996 constitution, that the 
Francophone press appears to be waking up to the concerns of the Anglophone 
minority. See La Nouvelle Expression. Dossiers et Documents, 23 May 1996, pp. 1-
28, devoted entirely to ‘Minorités, Autochtones, Allogènes et Démocratie’ in 
Cameroon. 
 
86 
One of the major tasks assigned to the Anglophone Standing Committee by 
the AAC was the drafting of a federal constitution as the Anglophone contribu-
tion to the national forum on constitutional reform to be organised by the 
government. The draft constitution eventually produced by the Anglophone 
Standing Committee20 proposed a loose form of federation that was clearly 
inspired by the recommendation of the 1961 Bamenda Conference (see Chapter 
2). It displayed remarkable similarities with the United States federal system, 
including a federal house and senate, a presidential system, and procedures for 
impeachment, as well as with the 1994 Nigerian federal draft constitution, 
which accommodated several power-sharing devices such as a system of 
rotating presidency amongst the federal states and the development of criteria 
for the sharing of federal revenues (Olukoshi & Agbu 1996). 
As to the structure of the federal state, the authors proposed two levels of 
federation: an external federation composed of the erstwhile federated states of 
East and West Cameroon, and an internal federation composed of the provinces 
within each of the two federated states. By introducing an internal federation, 
the authors hoped to solve, or at least to diminish, the persistent problems of 
inter-ethnic and inter-provincial conflicts over the unequal distribution of 
employment, social services and development projects. Undoubtedly, this 
proposal of internal federation served the specific purpose of allaying any South 
West fears of North West domination in a future federal system. The proposed 
federal system would accord a large measure of political, economic, financial 
and fiscal autonomy to the two federated states, the provinces within each of the 
two federated states, and even the municipalities within the provinces. 
The authors further proposed a strict division of powers between the legisla-
tive, executive and judiciary: 
 
 All legislative power was to be vested in the legislatures, which would be 
bicameral at all levels. The federal legislature would be composed of a 
senate and a national assembly; the legislature of each of the federated states 
would be composed of a House of Representatives and a House of Tradi-
tional Chiefs; the legislature of each province would be composed of a 
Provincial Assembly and a Conference of Traditional Chiefs. 
 As for the executive branch, the authors opted for a presidential system at 
the federal level. This choice seems to have been made for the following 
reasons. In the specific Cameroonian context of marked ethnic and regional 
diversities a presidential system was more likely to forestall administrative 
chaos and political instability than any other form of government. Moreover, 
                                                 
20  See Avant-Projet de Constitution de la République Fédéral du Cameroun, Buea: 
AAC Standing Committee, 1993. For a summary, see Konings 1999a: 311-16. 
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it would enable the party in power to assume full responsibility for its 
policies and actions. The president and vice-president were to be elected on 
a single list by direct universal suffrage. The federal draft constitution 
provided some guarantees that citizens of both federated states would have 
access to the highest executive office at the federal level. Like the 1961 
federal constitution, the draft stipulated that the president and vice-president 
could not come from the same federated state but unlike the former, it 
proposed a rotational system. The office of president could not be held by 
the same person for more than two consecutive five-year terms and, more 
significantly, that person had to be succeeded by a citizen of the other 
federated state. A similar rotational system would also apply to the highest 
executive authorities at state and provincial levels. The highest executive 
authorities at the level of the federated states were to be the prime minister 
and vice-prime minister, also elected on a single list by direct universal 
suffrage. The prime minister of a state would be accountable to the state 
legislative assembly and, like the president of the federal republic, could be 
subject to removal from office for serious misconduct or incapacity of 
whatever nature. The highest authority at the provincial level would be the 
governor. While governors were formerly nominated by the head of state, 
the federal draft constitution proposed that they be elected by direct univer-
sal suffrage for a maximum of two four-year terms. 
 For the judiciary, the draft constitution outlined a system of justice that 
closely resembled the one proposed in the 1961 federal constitution. The 
chief justice, presiding over the Federal Supreme Court, would head a 
justice system comprising a federal supreme court, the supreme courts of the 
federated states, the provincial appeal courts and other less-influential and 
customary courts created by law. 
 
Finally, the federal draft constitution provided two ways of revising the 
constitution. Parliament could revise any part of the constitution provided that 
two-thirds of its members voted in favour. However, any proposal for 
amendments which might affect the unity or the federal or republican character 
of the state would require the verdict of the people in a referendum, and would 
be approved only if at least sixty per cent of the electorate of both federated 
states participated in the referendum and endorsed the amendment. 
On 26 May 1993, the Anglophone Standing Committee submitted the 
federal draft constitution to the technical committee, which had been enlarged 
by a recent presidential decree from its original 11 members to 29 members but 
was still chaired by Professor Owona. The national forum on constitutional 
reform which had been given wide publicity by the government turned out to be 
nothing more than an opportunity offered to Cameroonian citizens to forward 
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any comments on the Owona draft constitution to the technical committee by 
mail, telephone or fax (Melone et al. 1996). Owona’s refusal to give an under-
taking that the technical committee would examine and report on the Anglo-
phone federal draft constitution, which he described as a copy of the Nigerian 
constitution, provoked Elad, Munzu and Anyangwe, the three convenors of the 
AAC, to suspend their participation on the committee. On 23 June 1993, 
Owona stated on television that the technical committee had not been able to 
examine the federal draft constitution due to the absence of the AAC convenors 
during the committee’s deliberations. The Anglophone Standing Committee 
then decided to publish the draft in English and French so as to inform the 
general public about the Anglophone problem and federalism. 
Confronted with the government’s persistent refusal to discuss the AAC 
constitutional proposals, CAM, the most important and influential Anglophone 
association affiliated to the AAC, increasingly adopted to a more radical 
position. Having once been a major champion of a return to the federal state, it 
was becoming more and more inclined to advocate secession. CAM, supported 
by other Anglophone associations with a secessionist agenda such as the Free 
West Cameroon Movement (FWCM), then tried to convince the Anglophone 
Standing Committee to take a secessionist stand as well. This gave rise to 
regular conflicts within the Anglophone Standing Committee between 
moderates who continued to adhere to a federalist programme and strategy in 
spite of the government’s apparent unwillingness to enter into any meaningful 
negotiations on the one hand, and radicals who were striving for a secessionist 
programme and strategy, on the other. The moderates proved capable of 
controlling the Anglophone Standing Committee’s activities for some time. 
Given this situation, CAM officially declared itself in favour of ‘zero option’, 
i.e. total independence for the Southern Cameroons.21 However, it stressed its 
pursuit of Southern Cameroons’ independence through peaceful negotiation 
rather than through armed struggle. It thus remained faithful to the motto of the 
AAC: ‘the force of argument and not the argument of force’. On 9 February 
1994, CAM’s National Executive unanimously agreed upon the Buea Peace 
Initiative (BPI), a blueprint for the peaceful and negotiated separation between 
the Southern Cameroons and La République du Cameroun, which was to be 
discussed at the next AAC Conference (AAC II). Interestingly, the BPI was 
inspired by the Czechoslovak experience: Czechoslovak leaders agreed on 20 
June 1992 to amicably dissolve their federation into two separate and independ-
ent states and to engage in negotiations about any possible future cooperation. 
The BPI presented the following proposals: 
                                                 
21  Cameroon Post, 1-8 December 1993, pp. 7-10; and Cameroon Life, Vol. 2, No. 10, 
October 1993, pp. 10-16. 
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 that the Southern Cameroons and La République du Cameroun should agree 
to a formal separation into two independent states; 
 that the territory of Southern Cameroons should reactivate its independence 
in the same way as La République du Cameroun had done in 1984, and 
sever all political and constitutional links with La République du Cameroun; 
 that the two entities should negotiate economic and political protocols in the 
following areas: 
o the exploitation of oil fields located in the territory of Southern 
Cameroons and the sharing of revenues therefrom in a just, fair and 
equitable manner, 
o the joint ownership of the oil refinery at Victoria (Limbe) in the Southern 
Cameroons, 
o the joint use of the electricity generated at Edea in La République du 
Cameroun, 
o the joint ownership and management of Cameroon Airlines and joint 
access to the international airport at Douala in La République du 
Cameroun, 
o a formula for sharing the external debt of Cameroon in a just, fair and 
equitable manner, 
o the sharing of moveable assets belonging to the armed forces in a just, 
fair and equitable manner, 
o the sharing of assets in foreign diplomatic missions, 
o a timetable for the withdrawal of the civil servants of Southern Camer-
oons origin from the territory of La République du Cameroun, and 
o a timetable for the introduction of a separate currency in Southern 
Cameroons. 
 that the armed forces of La République du Cameroun should be withdrawn 
from the Southern Cameroons and that Southern Cameroonians serving in 
the armed forces of La République du Cameroun should be repatriated; 
 that all Southern Cameroonians jailed by La République du Cameroun for 
political reasons should be released; and 
 that the government of La République du Cameroun should renounce the use 
of force, violence, torture and imprisonment of Southern Cameroonians to 
solve political problems.22 
 
The two major Anglophone options emerging in the process of constitutional 
reform – the choice between the demand for a return to the federal state and a 
(negotiated) separation – were also discussed in a lively manner during the 
Second All Anglophone Conference (AAC II) held in Bamenda from 29 April 
                                                 
22  The BPI is reproduced in Today, 29 April 1994, pp. 3-6. 
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to 1 May 1994. The conference sought to consider the implications for Anglo-
phone Cameroon of the Biya government’s arbitrary suspension (for nearly a 
year) of the constitutional reform process, to evaluate the execution by the 
Anglophone Standing Committee of the mandate received from the AAC 
meeting in its first session in Buea in April 1993, and to examine other issues 
concerning the people and the territory of Anglophone Cameroon. 
The conference reviewed all the futile attempts of the Anglophone Standing 
Committee to enter into negotiations with the Biya regime about a return to the 
federal state. It then decided to dissolve the Anglophone Standing Committee 
and replace it with an Anglophone Council. The tasks and strategy assigned to 
the new Anglophone Council were outlined in the so-called Bamenda Procla-
mation adopted by the conference and reflecting the compromise reached 
between moderates and radicals.23  
The Bamenda Proclamation insisted that the Anglophone Council should 
first ‘seek and secure constitutional talks between Anglophone and Franco-
phone Cameroon on the basis of the federal draft constitution which was 
submitted by the Anglophone Standing Committee in May 1993’. It cautioned 
the Anglophone Council against accepting any arrangement that did not 
envisage the restoration of an Anglophone federated state within a Federal 
Republic of Cameroon. But ‘should the government either persist in its refusal 
to engage in meaningful constitutional talks or fail to engage in such talks 
within a reasonable time’, the Anglophone Council should ‘proclaim the 
revival of the independence and sovereignty of the Anglophone territory and 
take all measures necessary to secure, defend and preserve the independence, 
sovereignty and integrity of the said territory’. The Bamenda Proclamation 
added that, upon the declaration of independence, the Anglophone Council 
should ‘without having to convene another session of the All Anglophone 
Conference, transform itself into the Southern Cameroons Constituent Assem-
bly for the purpose of drafting, debating and adopting a constitution for the 
independent and sovereign state of Southern Cameroons’. Subsequently, the 
independent Southern Cameroons should enter into negotiations with La 
République du Cameroun about ‘their peaceful separation on the basis of the 
Buea Peace Initiative and on such other terms as shall be mutually beneficial’. 
On 6 August 1994, shortly after the Bamenda conference, the Anglophone 
Council decided to change the names of the AAC, the Anglophone Council and 
the newly created Anglophone Advisory Committee composed of traditional 
rulers, elder statesmen, senior citizens, leading politicians and religious 
authorities. The AAC was renamed Southern Cameroons People’s Conference 
                                                 
23  For the proceedings of AAC II and the Bamenda Proclamation, see Cameroon Post, 
6-12 May 1994. 
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(SCPC), the Anglophone Council was renamed Southern Cameroons National 
Council (SCNC), and the Anglophone Advisory Committee was renamed the 
Southern Cameroons Advisory Council (SCAC). According to an SCNC press 
release, ‘the change of name makes it clear that the struggle led by the former 
AAC is neither of an essentially linguistic character nor in defence of an alien 
colonial culture, as has often been alleged, in bad faith, by some misguided 
critics of the AAC’. It stressed that the adoption of the name Southern 
Cameroons showed that the aim of the struggle had always been and remained 
‘to restore, within a newly restructured Federal Republic of Cameroon, the 
autonomy of a territory – Southern Cameroons – and of a people – Southern 
Cameroonians – and to put an end to their annexation by La République du 
Cameroun’.24 
Renewed attempts by the SCNC to enter into negotiations with the Biya 
government failed. At the end of the same year, on 14 December 1994, 
President Biya issued a long-expected decree, creating a Consultative Commit-
tee on Constitutional Reform and summoning the said committee to begin work 
in camera in Yaoundé on 15 December 1994 and to submit to the president its 
non-binding advice on constitutional reform by 22 December 1994. The Anglo-
phone Prime Minister, Mr Simon Achidi Achu, would chair the committee. In 
all 58 persons were invited, of whom 44 belonged to the CPDM or its allied 
parties. Fourteen were Anglophones, having been nominated on an individual 
basis. Biya thus simply ignored the list of the Southern Cameroons delegates 
mandated by the SCNC in accordance with AAC I and AAC II resolutions sent 
to him in November 1994. On 18 December 1994, the SCNC strongly 
condemned this exercise as falling short of the expectations of Cameroonians in 
general and Southern Cameroonians in particular for a meaningful constitu-
tional reform. It underlined that Southern Cameroonians would not be bound by 
any decision taken by the Constitutional Consultative Committee since the 
Anglophone delegation had not been mandated by the SCNC.25 Seven of the 14 
Southern Cameroonian participants, including Foncha and Muna, the Anglo-
phone architects of reunification, soon withdrew from the committee’s 
deliberations due to the failure of the government constitutional proposals to 
address the Southern Cameroons question and the committee’s unrepresentative 
nature.26 
                                                 
24  The SCNC press release was reprinted in Cameroon Post, 16-23 August 1994, p. 3. 
For a discussion on the issue of names and renaming in the Anglophone struggles, 
see Nkoum-Me-Ntseny 1996a: 81-89. 
25  See Cameroon Post, 22-29 December 1994, p. 6. 
26  For Foncha’s Statement of Withdrawal from the Constitutional Consultative Com-
mittee, see ibid. 
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In reaction to growing pressures from several auxiliary organisations, 
especially CAM, claiming that the ‘reasonable time’ as prescribed by the May 
1994 Bamenda Proclamation for engagement in meaningful constitutional talks 
on the restoration of federalism had expired, the SCNC sent a delegation to the 
United Nations in May 1995. At the end of that mission the delegation signed 
the so-called London Communiqué that was said ‘to mark the beginning of an 
irrevocable and irreversible process of the implementation of “zero option”: 
total and unconditional independence of the Southern Cameroons’. Any future 
negotiations about independence should take place under the auspices of the 
United Nations and the BPI would form the only basis for any such negotiations 
(see below). 
On 7 October 1995, the SCNC executive unanimously adopted the Inde-
pendence Programme for the Southern Cameroons drawn up by CAM a week 
earlier. This programme scheduled the following main activities: 
September-October 1995: signature referendum in the Southern Cameroons 
on independence. The target was 1.35 million signatures by Southern 
Cameroonian citizens; 
November 1995: creation of a Constituent Assembly charged with the 
drafting of a constitution for the Southern Cameroons; 
February-March 1996: mission to the United Nations to file an application 
for independence and UN membership; and 
June-July 1996: negotiations with La République du Cameroun on the basis 
of the Buea Peace Initiative in the presence of representatives of the United 
Nations and the United Kingdom. 
The first phase of the Independence Programme, the signature referendum, 
was duly organised in spite of the usual intimidation, harassment and brutalities 
by security forces. This referendum aimed to test the support of Southern 
Cameroonian citizens for the independence course taken by the SCNC, 
providing legitimacy for SCNC activities against the government. In April 
1996, the SCNC released the results of the signature referendum. In all, 315,000 
signatures were collected. Comparing this figure with the 472,316 voters who 
took part in the January 1996 municipal elections in the territory, this signified 
a voter participation of 75 per cent. No fewer than 99.97 per cent were reported 
to have voted in favour of independence. A closer look at the participants 
throws some doubts on the representativeness of the referendum. The vast 
majority of the participants appear to be older people, either retired or active in 
agriculture. No reasons are given for the remarkably low participation in the 
referendum of both young people and civil servants. In addition, there also 
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appears to be a regional bias: participation in the Ngokitungia, Bui and Mezam 
Divisions was much higher than in other divisions of the Anglophone territory.27 
Despite repeated declarations on the part of the SCNC that the other phases 
of the Independence Programme – notably the creation of a Constituent Assem-
bly, the drafting of a new constitution and the official proclamation of 
independence – were about to be implemented, nothing actually happened. For 
example, 1 October 1996 was one of the dates set by the SCNC for the declara-
tion of independence for the Southern Cameroons. The date came and went 
with nothing but an ‘Independence Day’ address by the new SCNC chairman, 
Henry Fossung. He called upon Southern Cameroonians to use their National 
Day as a ‘day of prayer’, asking God ‘to save us from political bondage’, and 
reiterating that independence was ‘irreversible and non-negotiable’.28 This is not 
altogether surprising. For a variety of internal and external factors that will be 
explored in this and the next chapter, the activities of the SCPC and its 
affiliated organisations were becoming rare or even dormant after the end of 
1995. 
With the promulgation of a new constitution on 18 January 1996, the 
government closed the process of constitutional reform in Cameroon for the 
time being. As expected, the new constitution ignored Anglophone demands for 
a federal state, opting instead for a ‘decentralised unitary state’. While stressing 
the continuing unitary nature of the state, it allowed for a certain devolution of 
powers to the 10 planned regions corresponding with the current 10 provinces. 
While the preamble of the constitution clearly states that ‘the state shall ensure 
the protection of minorities and shall preserve the rights of autochthonous 
populations in accordance with the law’, one searches in vain for any specific 
reference stating that Anglophones belong among those minorities or 
autochthonous populations.29 Little wonder then that the SCNC was quick to 
reject the imposed constitution ‘in its entirety as having no bearing on the 
territory of the Southern Cameroons’. Anglophones were implored to redouble 
their efforts in the struggle for independence and restoration of the ‘statehood of 
the Southern Cameroons’.30 
 
 
                                                 
27  The results were published in Cameroon Post, 18-24 June 1996, pp. 6-7; and 25 
June-1 July 1996, p. 6. 
28  Cameroon Post, 8-14 October 1994 and The Witness, 12-18 November 1996. 
29  For the 1996 constitution and its relevance to Anglophones, see Melone et al. 1996; 
Eboussi Boulaga 1997a; Olinga 1998; Konings & Nyamnjoh 2000. 
30  The Herald, 23-24 January 1996, p. 3; see also Newsweek Comm., 18-25 January 
1996, p. 1. 
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The Anglophone diplomatic offensive 
 
The Anglophone leadership has made strenuous efforts to gain international 
support for their territory’s autonomy in the form of either a return to the 
federal state or the creation of an independent Southern Cameroons state. 
Following AAC I in April 1993, the Anglophone Standing Committee 
launched a diplomatic offensive to seek international support for the Anglo-
phone pursuit of autonomy. It visited several embassies in Yaoundé. This effort 
was reinforced by a similar action by Dr John Ngu Foncha and Mr Solomon 
Tandeng Muna, the Anglophone architects of the federal state. The Anglophone 
Standing Committee also dispatched missions to selected countries in Africa, 
Europe and North America, entered into correspondence with the United 
Nations Secretariat and the Commonwealth Office, and applied for membership 
of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO) in The 
Hague.31 The UNPO works closely with the United Nations and has been 
primordial in the process that led to the independence of East Timor. Most 
SCNC leaders therefore believed that it could play a similar role in the case of 
the Southern Cameroons.32 
One of the most spectacular activities of the SCNC was the sending of a 
nine-man delegation, including Foncha and Muna, to the United Nations on 19 
May 1995. This delegation led by Barrister Sam Ekontang Elad, chairman of 
the SCNC, followed the example of two renowned Anglophone leaders, Fon 
Gorji Dinka and Albert Mukong, who had already made representations to the 
United Nations on behalf of the Anglophone minority in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. These two Anglophone leaders shared a common experience in 
having been subjected to imprisonment, torture and frequent harassment in the 
Francophone-dominated state.33 But they had developed different views on the 
solution of the Anglophone problem. Fon Gorji Dinka wanted nothing short of 
outright secession for the Southern Cameroons which, for reason of legality, he 
had renamed the Republic of Ambazonia with himself as head of state (see 
Chapter 3).34 Albert Mukong advocated instead a return to the federal state. 
After his single-handed battle to raise international awareness of the issue of 
                                                 
31  See Report of Activity of the AAC since its inception in April 1993, Presented to 
AAC II held in Bamenda from 29 April to 2 May 1994 by Dr Carlson Anyangwe, 
Secretary-General of AAC Standing Committee, in Cameroon Post, 6-12 May 1994, 
pp. 8-9.  
32  See The Post, 7 February 2000, p. 3. 
33  For his own sufferings under the Ahidjo regime, see Mukong 1985. 
34  Fon Gorji Dinka has been living in exile since 1986. He refuses to return to 
Cameroon for this, according to him, would imply living and working under an 
illegal and illegitimate regime.  
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Cameroon’s federation during his exile, Mukong became a leading member of 
CAM. In November 1992 he led an official two-man delegation by CAM to the 
United Nations and the US State Department to continue the battle from the 
point where he had stopped it while in exile.35 
The sending of a mission to the United Nations had been decided upon by 
the SCNC after the expiry of what the 1994 Bamenda Proclamation had called 
‘a reasonable time period’ for entering into negotiations with the Biya regime. 
The purpose of the mission was to file a petition against ‘the annexation of the 
Southern Cameroons by La République du Cameroun and to commit the 
international community to the Southern Cameroons’ search for a peaceful 
solution to head off the dangerous conflict that was brewing between La 
République du Cameroun and the Southern Cameroons.36 In its London 
Communiqué,37 issued after its historic mission to the United Nations, the 
SCNC delegation stated that La République du Cameroun had unilaterally 
seceded from the union in 1984 when the Biya regime changed the country’s 
name from the Federal Republic of Cameroon to the Republic of Cameroon – 
the name of independent Francophone Cameroon prior to reunification. As a 
consequence, the Southern Cameroons question was no longer an internal 
problem of La République du Cameroun since there now existed two de facto 
distinct entities that were no longer bound by any legal or constitutional bond, 
the Southern Cameroons having reverted to its pre-independence situation, i.e. a 
United Nations Trust Territory. Under these circumstances, the Southern 
Cameroons demanded that the United Nations terminate its annexation by La 
République du Cameroun and grant full independence to its Trust Territory in 
accordance with Article 76 of the United Nations Charter. It was only after the 
granting of full independence by the United Nations that the Southern 
Cameroons could enter into negotiations with La République du Cameroun 
about any future constitutional or bilateral links on the basis of the BPI and 
under the auspices of the United Nations. 
On returning home on 28 June 1995, the delegation was given a heroic 
welcome at the international airport in Douala. On its way back to Buea, the 
capital of Southern Cameroons, the delegation stopped at the Mungo River, the 
natural border between Francophone and Anglophone Cameroon. In a symbolic 
ceremony it crossed the Mungo Bridge to celebrate its return home and hoisted 
the UN flag on Southern Cameroons territory as a sign of the Southern 
Cameroons’ current trust-territory status and future full independence. During a 
                                                 
35  See Mukong 1990. 
36  See SCNC, Petition Against the Annexation of the Southern Cameroons, Buea, May 
1995 (mimeo). 
37  SCNC, The London Communiqué, London, 22 June 1995 (mimeo). 
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subsequent SCNC rally held at the Bamenda stadium on 4 July 1995, the Fon of 
Bafut, a SCNC sympathiser, conferred the title of Lord upon Foncha and Muna 
in recognition of their key role in the promotion of Southern Cameroons’ 
independence in the international community.38 
It is beyond any doubt that the various missions of Anglophone leaders to 
the United Nations contributed to a growing awareness in UN circles of the 
Anglophone problem. Soh (1999: 243) claims that Foncha was scheduled to 
address the United Nations General Assembly on the Anglophone problem in 
September 1999 but unfortunately died before then, on 10 April 1999. It is 
difficult to ascertain the truth of this claim. On the one hand, it is rare for 
anyone who is not a head of state to address the United Nations General 
Assembly. On the other hand, there is sufficient evidence that UN leaders had 
become increasingly concerned about the possibility of the outbreak of another 
violent ethno-regional conflict in West-Central Africa. During his visit to 
Cameroon in May 2000, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, pleaded for 
dialogue between Francophone and Anglophone leaders. During a press 
conference shortly before leaving Cameroon, he said: 
 
I leave Cameroon with the impression that there is only one Cameroon, multilingual 
and multi-ethnic. I encourage a dialogue of these stakeholders. In every country 
there are problems of marginalisation. The way it has to be solved is by dialogue 
and not by walking away.39 
 
Whereas the SCNC in conformity with its motto ‘the force of argument’ was 
ready to accept Annan’s proposal, the Biya government simply turned a deaf 
ear. The SCNC implored the UN Secretary-General to convince Biya to accept 
it and ‘to employ the resources and know-how of the United Nations to 
participate in, and oversee the success of, [this] dialogue’.40 
The Anglophone leaders were also engaged in intensive lobbying to forestall 
the Republic of Cameroon’s admission into the Commonwealth and to file 
instead a Southern Cameroons’ application for Commonwealth membership. 
Before reunification it had been agreed between Ahidjo and Foncha that the 
Federal Republic of Cameroon would desist from seeking membership of either 
the French community or the Commonwealth of Nations (see Chapter 2). In 
1989, however, the Biya government reversed Cameroon’s foreign policy, 
applying for membership of both the Francophonie and the Commonwealth. 
                                                 
38  See ‘SCNC Homecoming’ in Cameroon Post, 3-10 July and 10-17 July 1995; see 
also La Nouvelle Expression, 4-7 July 1995, p. 6. 
39  See ‘Annan Ends African Tour, Seeks Cameroon Dialogue’ on scncforum website, 4 
May 2000. 
40  The Post, 11 August 2000, p. 3. 
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While the former promptly granted admission to the Republic of Cameroon, the 
Biya government found it hard to join the Commonwealth. 
During the 1991 Commonwealth Summit in Harare, Cameroon’s application 
was rejected on the grounds that it still failed to meet the criteria for member-
ship stipulated in the Harare Declaration, namely the establishment of a 
democratic system, good governance and respect for human rights. In June 
1993, the Nigerian Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, Chief Emeka 
Anyaoku, visited the country at the government’s request to see whether the 
Republic of Cameroon met the conditions for admission. Chief Anyaoku was 
then virtually hijacked by the Anglophone leadership, which succeeded in 
subverting the tight programme drawn up by the Biya government and in 
familiarising the Commonwealth secretary-general with their plight. Memo-
randa were presented by 19 Anglophone leaders, elderly statesmen and 
traditional rulers in Bamenda as well as by the Anglophone Standing Commit-
tee in Victoria (Limbe).41 In these memoranda, the Anglophone leadership urged 
Chief Anyaoku to keep Cameroon out of the Commonwealth until the govern-
ment had realised significant democratic reforms, improved upon its poor 
human rights record and accepted the Anglophone proposal for a federal 
structure. As an alternative, the Commonwealth should consider granting the 
Southern Cameroons either full membership of the organisation or some form 
of status acceptable to the Commonwealth in recognition of the fact that 
Southern Cameroonians cherished the same values as the Commonwealth and 
that they, in their struggle for the preservation of their Anglophone identity, had 
been exposed to various acts of oppression and assimilation by successive 
Francophone regimes in Cameroon.  
At the October 1993 Commonwealth Summit in Limassol, Cyprus, 
Cameroon’s admission was again postponed. It was then decided that 
Cameroon’s application would be reconsidered at the next Commonwealth 
summit in 1995 provided that ‘the country’s current efforts to establish a 
democratic system consistent with the 1991 Harare Declaration would by then 
have been completed’. There is no doubt that both Chief Anyaoku’s report and 
the intensive lobbying by the uninvited two-man delegation sent by the Anglo-
phone Standing Committee to the Limassol Summit influenced the Common-
wealth’s eventual decision to postpone Cameroon’s admission. 
Barely four months before the next Commonwealth summit in Auckland in 
July 1995, a Commonwealth Eminent Persons Mission led by Dr Kamal 
Hossain, chairman of the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, arrived in 
the country ‘to restudy Cameroon’s application for admission into the 
                                                 
41  See Cameroon Life, July-August 1993, p. 15; and Cameroon Post, 29 June 1993, pp. 
4-5. 
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Commonwealth of Nations’.42 While the Biya government was pressing for 
admission, the SCNC made the mission understand that La République du 
Cameroun, with a continuously notorious record of human rights violations, had 
no mandate to apply for Commonwealth membership on behalf of the Southern 
Cameroons. After the SCNC had requested in its June 1995 London Commu-
niqué that the United Nations grant full independence to its Trust Territory, the 
Southern Cameroons was about to acquire the sovereign status that would 
enable it to qualify for Commonwealth membership directly. Consequently, 
admission of La République du Cameroun into the Commonwealth would be 
considered as an act hostile to the Southern Cameroons because it would be 
tantamount to accepting its annexation by La République du Cameroun. 
To the consternation of Anglophone leaders, it was announced on 16 
October 1995 that Cameroon had been admitted into the Commonwealth. There 
appear to be two main reasons for its admission. First, the Commonwealth 
found it hard to reject Cameroon’s application on the basis of the 1991 Harare 
Declaration as there was ample evidence that the democratic records of some of 
its African member states, like Nigeria and Kenya, were even poorer than that 
of Cameroon. Second, the Commonwealth generally believed that admission 
would be a more effective option than non-admission in terms of the advance-
ment of the democratisation process in Cameroon. Once in, Commonwealth 
members would bring pressure to bear on the Cameroonian government to 
introduce political reforms. The Report of the Eminent Persons Mission and the 
debate in the British House of Lords a few days after the announcement of 
Cameroon’s admission provide some evidence to support this explanation. For 
instance, in her reply to criticisms expressed in the House of Lords about 
British support of Cameroon’s admission, Baroness Lynda Chalker, Minister 
for Overseas Development responsible for Commonwealth Matters, stated: 
 
British support is based on the Report of the Eminent Persons Mission. The report 
holds that sufficient progress has been made in Cameroon consistent with the 
principles of the Harare Declaration, over the past five years. 
The report nevertheless highlights areas that Cameroon would have to address 
still further. These areas include further constitutional reform: local elections, press 
freedom, human rights and the independence of the judiciary. 
There is progress, but we shall continue to keep up pressure on Cameroon, 
together with our Commonwealth partners, to make sure that reforms take place..43 
 
                                                 
42  Cameroon Post, 24-31 July 1995, p. 3. 
43  The debate in the House of Lords is recorded in The Herald, 26-29 October 1995, 
pp. 1 and 3. See also Taku 1996. 
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In reaction, the SCNC strongly condemned the Commonwealth for 
Cameroon’s admission, accusing it of a blatant lack of sensitivity in a complex 
and explosive situation and of frustrating the political aspirations of the 
Southern Cameroonian people. Britain in particular was blamed for its ‘second 
treachery’ towards the Southern Cameroons cause, the first having occurred in 
the pre-reunification period (see Chapter 2).44 The SCNC later sent a two-man 
delegation to the November 1995 Commonwealth Summit in Auckland. The 
delegation pointed out that the previous conditions laid down for Cameroon’s 
admission had not been fulfilled. Simultaneously, it pleaded for a Quebec-style 
independence referendum for the Southern Cameroons and filed an application 
for separate membership. It was told to resubmit its application for separate 
membership at the Glasgow Summit in 1997, if by then the Anglophone 
problem had not been satisfactorily resolved.45 Having lost confidence in the 
Commonwealth leadership, the SCNC did not follow this advice.  
In their diplomatic offensive, the Anglophone leaders have scored some 
success in their relations with France. Generally speaking, France has continued 
to support the Francophone-dominated regime in Cameroon during the current 
economic and political crisis (Konings 1996a). Besides the various agreements 
of cooperation between France and Cameroon, there are other factors to explain 
this French support. First, there was the emergence of the Anglophone factor 
during the political liberalisation process, which appeared to threaten French 
interests in Cameroon. In the first years of the SDF’s existence, its chairman, 
John Fru Ndi, never concealed his resentment of French neo-colonialism and 
his pro-American stance. Fru Ndi’s anti-French rhetoric coupled with his call 
for a boycott of French goods was not well received. Not surprisingly, France 
opposed Fru Ndi’s candidacy in the 1992 presidential elections. The growing 
popularity of the Anglophone movements was regarded as an additional Anglo-
phone threat to France’s superior interests in Cameroon. These movements 
fuelled the existing anti-French sentiments in Anglophone Cameroon, and their 
call for federalism or secession formed a major challenge to French control over 
Cameroon and its stake in the oil industry located in Anglophone Cameroon 
(Ndzana 1987; Jua 1993). Second, there was a widespread belief in French 
circles that American decision-makers in Washington were exerting too great 
an influence on the policies of not only the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
but also of the Anglophone opposition. 
Gradually, however, some changes could be observed in French policy 
towards Anglophone Cameroon. The following factors appear to have been 
                                                 
44  See L'Expression, 20 October 1995, p. 4. 
45  Cameroon Report, 18 October 1995, p. 4; The Herald, 20-22 November 1995 and 
The Herald, 6-8 May 1996. 
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responsible for this remarkable change. Discontent was growing in the French 
administration with the Biya government’s poor economic and political 
performance and its condoning of large-scale corruption. The former French 
Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur, was reported to regard the Cameroonian 
political system as a one-party democracy and the government as no better than 
a bench of incompetent and dishonest men who had run a once-buoyant 
economy into ruin.46 For similar reasons, relations between President Chirac and 
President Biya became strained for a time, allegedly because of political 
miscalculation by the latter of backing the losing candidate in the race for the 
French presidency (Konings & Nyamnjoh 1997: 222-23). Moreover, it was 
becoming manifest that France was seeking to enhance its influence in the 
English-speaking part of Africa, as evidenced by growing French interests in 
Nigeria and South Africa. Above all, the French administration had become 
increasingly convinced that its making of some overtures to the Anglophone 
opposition parties and movements could be of greater benefit to long-term 
French interests in Cameroon than outright hostility. Though remaining 
somewhat suspicious of French intentions, the Anglophone opposition parties 
and movements came equally to recognise that French attempts at rapproche-
ment might be of mutual advantage. 
A few months after arriving as French ambassador to Cameroon in 1993, 
Gilles Vidal did what none of his predecessors had ever previously done: he 
visited Buea and Bamenda and conferred with Anglophone leaders, including 
John Ngu Foncha, and later organised a meeting with members of the Anglo-
phone Standing Committee to familiarise himself with the objectives of the 
AAC. The French simultaneously started funding a number of development 
projects in Anglophone Cameroon. Vidal’s successor, Philippe Selz, was 
equally keen to keep in touch with the opposition, even dining with the SDF 
chairman, John Fru Ndi, on his ambassadorial tour of French-sponsored 
projects in the North West Province in April 1996.47 
As a result of these rapprochement attempts by the French, Fru Ndi stopped 
calling for a boycott of French goods. He had visited France several times to 
request that the French government exert pressure on the Biya government to 
speed up the process of economic and political reform in Cameroon. The 
French authorities, in turn, appear to have not been happy with the fact that the 
SDF, the main opposition party in Cameroon, had been excluded from all 
decision-making bodies in the country for a long time. They were therefore 
pleased that the SDF decided to take part in the 1997 parliamentary elections 
and even to take their seats in parliament despite allegations of widespread 
                                                 
46  Cameroon Post, 16-22 April 1996, pp. 1 and 6. 
47  Cameroon Post, 23-29 April 1996 and The Rambler, 30 April-6 May 1996. 
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rigging of the elections by the ruling CPDM. Undoubtedly, the French were 
also the brains behind the later negotiations between the Biya government and 
the SDF about possible SDF participation in government. These negotiations 
failed, however, mainly because of disagreement over SDF demands for the 
creation of an independent electoral commission.48 
While appreciating an improvement in mutual relations, the Anglophone 
Standing Committee and the SCNC nevertheless remained somewhat cautious 
of French rapprochement attempts. They have often been inclined to interpret 
these attempts as a French strategy to lure Anglophone movements away from 
pressing for a return to federalism or secession. That such caution is not 
completely unjustified became evident when the French presidency addressed a 
correspondence to the SCNC in February 1996 appealing to it to accept the 
decentralisation proposals in the new constitution and to seek dialogue with the 
Biya government, as it might be advantageous to its promotion and defence of 
Anglophone interests.49 The SCNC immediately rejected these recommenda-
tions but it simultaneously tried to allay French fears about an independent 
Southern Cameroons state by pledging protection. The SCNC equally requested 
the Chirac administration use its considerable influence within the UN Security 
Council to get the execution of a Quebec-type referendum in the Southern 
Cameroons approved. 
 
 
The Anglophone leadership’s ‘sensitisation campaign’ 
 
From the start, the Anglophone leadership made considerable efforts to 
transform Anglophone organisations from elitist movements into mass move-
ments. It attempted to raise the consciousness of the Anglophone people about 
their region’s subordinate position within the Francophone-dominated unitary 
state and to mobilise them for action in its pursuit of federalism or secession. 
To this end, it organised frequent meetings and rallies throughout the Anglo-
phone territory to make the population aware of the Anglophone organisations’ 
goals, programmes and strategies. In this endeavour, it was given invaluable 
assistance by the Anglophone media, in particular the press, which constantly 
reported any matter related to the Anglophone cause (see Chapter 5). Of great 
importance to the sensitisation campaign were also the regular strikes, demon-
strations and boycotts organised by the leadership of the various Anglophone 
organisations, notably CAM, to protest against any injustices committed by the 
                                                 
48  See the SDF’s 10-page position statement in The Herald, 6-8 February 1998, pp. 1 
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49  Cameroon Post, 16-22 April 1996, pp. 1 and 6. 
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Francophone-dominated state against the Anglophone minority. A few 
examples will suffice here. On 11 August 1993, CAM organised a Southern 
Cameroons Solidarity Day to protest against the brutal occupation of the South 
West Province by government troops under the pretext of controlling the large-
scale smuggling of Nigerian goods, especially petrol, into the province.50 The 
Anglophone Standing Committee called for a general strike on 14 February 
1994 to protest against ‘the government’s failure to meet the preconditions set 
out by trade unions for the on-going government employees’ strike to be called 
off’.51 
The Anglophone leadership’s sensitisation campaign was quite successful 
during the 1992-1995 period This was particularly apparent during the 
‘sensitisation tour' organised by the SCNC throughout the Anglophone territory 
in July-August 1995 following the return of its delegation to the United 
Nations. Large crowds attended the SCNC rallies, praising the delegation for its 
historic mission to the United Nations and pledging their support for the 
SCNC’s new push for total independence for the Southern Cameroons. When 
security forces tried to prevent the SCNC delegation from entering Kumba in 
the South West Province, thousands of people chased them away, thus securing 
the delegation’s triumphant entry into the town.52 
From 1996 onwards, however, the Anglophone leadership’s sensitisation 
campaign came to a virtual standstill as a direct consequence of the general loss 
of momentum of the Anglophone struggle. Besides the largely successful 
government attempts to contain the Anglophone danger (see Chapter 5), there 
are also internal factors explaining this unfortunate development. One of the 
most important was the resignation of the founding fathers from the SCNC 
leadership. The SCNC chairman, Barrister Sam Ekontang Elad left mainly for 
health reasons.53 Constantly harassed by security forces, Drs Carlson Anyangwe 
and Simon Munzu departed to take up jobs in Zambia and Rwanda respec-
                                                 
50  Cameroon Post, 12-19 July 1993, p. 11; Cameroon Life, Vol. 2, No. 10, October 
1993, pp. 10-26. 
51  Cameroon Post, 14-17 February 1994, p. 3. 
52  For these SCNC rallies, see ‘SCNC Hits Kumba: 75000 Jam Town Green’, in The 
Herald, 3-6 August 1994, p. 1, and ‘As Elites Condemn Military Occupation: SCNC 
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tour in the aftermath of the historic SCNC mission to the United Nations. Although 
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bribed by the government. See The Herald, 24-27 August 1995. 
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tively.54 The new leadership chaired by Henry Fossung, a former ambassador, 
appeared incapable of devising an adequate strategy to counteract the govern-
ment’s divisive and repressive tactics. It clearly failed to further exploit the 
unexpected successes registered between 1992 and 1995. Apart from declara-
tions and proclamations, the new leadership had little to offer the restive 
Anglophone population. Despite the SCNC promises in its New Year message 
that ‘1997 would mark a turning point in our strategy’ and that ‘we are 
determined to culminate the process of our total restoration to its logical 
conclusion’, many Southern Cameroonians were rapidly losing confidence in 
the new SCNC leadership.55 Perhaps this would explain why many Anglophone 
youths, especially in the diaspora, began to create and execute their own agenda 
for reclaiming self-determination in the free spaces of the Internet. Given this 
leadership problem and the government’s persistent reluctance to enter into any 
negotiations, a conflict developed within the Anglophone movement between 
the doves – those who continued to adhere to a negotiated separation from La 
République du Cameroun – and the hawks – those who had come to the 
conclusion that the independence of Southern Cameroons could only be 
achieved through armed struggle. The Southern Cameroons Youth League 
(SCYL) in particular opted for the latter strategy. 
The SCYL emerged in the mid-1990s as one of the many Anglophone 
associations operating under the umbrella of the SCNC. Being composed of 
‘young people who do not see any future for themselves and who would prefer 
to die fighting than continue to submit to the fate imposed on Southern 
Cameroons by La République du Cameroun’,56 the SCYL tried to become the 
militant wing of the SCNC. Its original leadership was largely made up of 
Anglophone members of the former University of Yaoundé students’ union, the 
so-called Parliament, which was engaged in several violent confrontations with 
the university authorities and the Biya government during the 1990-1996 period 
(Konings 2002). The SCYL soon became dissatisfied with the SCNC whose 
leadership continued to cling to a strategy of peaceful dialogue with the 
Francophone-dominated state for either a return to a federal state or outright 
secession, as manifest in its motto ‘the force of argument’, notwithstanding the 
Biya government’s persistent reluctance to enter into negotiations with the 
SCNC and its ruthless repression of SCNC activities. The SCYL leadership 
broke off relations with the SCNC in November 1996 and placed itself under 
the umbrella of CAM, that in the meantime had changed its name to the 
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Southern Cameroons Restoration Movement (SCARM). It now aimed to create 
an independent Southern Cameroons state through armed rebellion.  
 In the process of preparing for action in both Anglophone provinces, the 
SCYL was unexpectedly faced with the detention of its chairman, Mr Ebenezer 
Akwanga, following the failure of its members to steal explosives from the 
Razel Company in Jakiri in the North West Province during the night of 23-24 
March 1997. It immediately reacted by attacking military and civil establish-
ments in the Bui and Mezam Divisions of North West Province between 27 and 
31 March 1997. According to official reports, three gendarmes and seven 
unidentified assailants were killed in these operations. Government repression 
of this ill-planned revolt was out of all proportion. It ruthlessly killed, tortured, 
raped and arrested several local men and women, forcing even more to go into 
exile. Above all, it seized the opportunity to clamp down on the SDF and 
SCNC, accusing both organisations of being responsible for the uprising.57 A 
considerable number of SCNC members were arrested and imprisoned in 
Yaoundé. Some died while in prison and others were not brought to trial until 
1999 when they were not treated as political prisoners but were charged with 
criminal offences.58  
The SCNC chairman, Henry Fossung, who had gone into hiding after the 
revolt, publicly denied any SCNC involvement, insisting ‘that the SCNC motto 
“the force of argument and not the argument of force” has remained today as 
valid as yesterday’.59 He instead claimed that the incident had been orchestrated 
by a desperate government in an attempt to frustrate the legitimate struggles of 
the Southern Cameroonian people to restore their independence. Strikingly, 
following this revolt, the SCNC leadership appeared to be even less inclined to 
sensitise and mobilise the Anglophone population. Dissatisfied with Fossung’s 
leadership, some SCNC leaders staged an internal coup in December 1998 
nominating Prince Ndoki Mukete, the then vice-chairman of the SCARM, as 
the new SCNC chairman. Other SCNC leaders, like Foncha and Muna, 
however, continued to recognise Fossung as the SCNC chairman. Factionalisa-
                                                 
57  In a report that was full of factual errors and based on spurious evidence, Jeune 
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tion within the SCNC became a frequent source of internal conflict and proved 
harmful to the Anglophone cause.  
It was in these circumstances and in a sense of despair that Justice Frederick 
Alobwede Ebong, an SCNC activist with close ties to the SCYL,60 took over the 
Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV) station in Buea on 30 December 
1999, proclaiming the restoration of the independence of the Federal Republic 
of Southern Cameroons (FRSC).61 He was subsequently detained in Yaoundé 
where he applied for FRSC membership of the United Nations, the Organisa-
tion of African Unity (OAU), the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement 
and the Economic Community of West African States.62 During an SCNC 
meeting on 1 April 2000, Ebong was nominated chairman of the SCNC and 
first head of state of the FRSC. Dr Nfor Ngala Nfor, who used to be the 
chairman of the SDF Constitutional and Political Affairs Committee, was 
elevated to the positions of vice-chairman of the SCNC and, in the absence of 
Ebong, acting president of the FRSC. The then second vice-chairman of the 
SDF, Dr Martin Luma, chaired the historic meeting. Fearing that these 
developments would cause a loss of Francophone membership, the SDF leader-
ship decided to purge some leading separatists from the party. 
With a view to endowing the FRSC with all the attributes of statehood as 
well as guaranteeing state continuity, the FRSC Constituent Assembly meeting 
in Bamenda in May 2000 adopted resolutions on the coats of arms, the flag, and 
the national anthem.63 Subsequently, a flag was designed and the national 
anthem, Freedom Land, was released.64 Undoubtedly, these developments gave 
a new impetus to the Anglophone struggle. This is evidenced by the fact that 
after years of vehement conflict about policies and strategies, four of the major 
Anglophone organisations, namely the SCNC, the Ambazonian Movement 
(AM), the SCARM and the SCYL, agreed in 2001 to form an alliance for the 
purpose of achieving the independence of the territory of the Ex-British 
Southern Cameroons. During a summit in Washington in June 2001, represen-
tatives of the territory adopted the so-called Washington Proclamation of the 
Statehood of Ex-British Southern Cameroons, ‘confirming the declaration of 
separate independence of the Southern Cameroons already made by Justice 
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Ebong in Buea on 30 December 1999’, and decided to set up the British South-
ern Cameroons Provisional Administration.65 
A further interesting development is that Anglophones are increasingly turning 
to the Internet as a vehicle for airing their views on various aspects of their 
predicament, centring mostly on their territory and community as victim of gross 
mismanagement by a corrupt and inefficient Francophone-dominated state and 
government. Their main channels on the Internet include web pages, discussion 
and mailing groups such as Scncforum, Camnet, Camnetwork, and SDF Forum. 
These are created and managed by Anglophone youths, mostly Grassfielders of 
the North-West Province, and mainly by those based in the diaspora, principally 
the United States. Because of their influential nature, these mailing and discussion 
groups have attracted even the state, which has normally been indifferent in the 
past. Government departments and individual members of the CPDM with vested 
interests in the status quo now monitor the content and react to what is written or 
discussed on a daily basis. Given the flexible nature of the Internet, real identities 
of users can be hidden under ambiguous user names, making provocative and 
fearless exchanges easier. Those who participate in the discussions are Anglo-
phones both in Cameroon and the diaspora, pro-government or pro-SDF or pro-
Southern Cameroons independence. Among them are the most radical as well as 
the most conciliatory. This clearly highlights the importance of the Internet in 
providing space for Anglophone issues where the Cameroonian state has always 
stifled debate or monopolised the conventional media. Strikingly however, 
discussions even at this level tend to reflect the same tensions and multiple 
divisions that the politics of belonging and autochthony have brought to the fore 
(see Chapter 5). The Internet not only shapes what is discussed in society but also 
reflects the inherent divisions that autochthony brings about.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The current political liberalisation process in Cameroon has offered Anglo-
phones a long-awaited opportunity to organise for the representation and the 
defence of their interests. The newly created organisations, in particular the 
AAC and the SCPC, have managed to reintroduce federalism and secession 
onto the country’s political and constitutional agenda. In the pre-reunification 
period, secession ultimately became a minority option in the Southern 
Cameroons, federalism being the basis of constitutional negotiations between 
                                                 
65  See British Southern Cameroons Summit, Resolutions, Washington, 17 June 2001 
(mimeo) and Washington Proclamation of the Statehood of Ex-British Southern 
Cameroons, Washington, 17 June 2001 (mimeo). 
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La République du Cameroun and the Southern Cameroons. In the current 
political liberalisation period, secession became a majority option in the 
Southern Cameroons only after La République du Cameroun had persistently 
refused, during the national forum on constitutional reform, to enter into any 
negotiations about a return to the federal state. Having been forced by such a 
negative government response to abandon its preferential option of federalism, 
the Anglophone leadership then sought the support of the international commu-
nity and Anglophone population for the proclamation of Southern Cameroons’ 
independence.  
This chapter has shown that leadership problems and growing disagreements 
within the Anglophone movement on the strategy to be employed in the 
achievement of independence for the Southern Cameroons – the choice between 
‘the force of argument’ and ‘the argument of force’ – contributed to the 
apparent loss of momentum of the Anglophone struggle after 1996. Recent 
developments, including the proclamation of Southern Cameroons’ independ-
ence by Justice Ebong on 30 December 1999 and the formation of a British 
Southern Cameroons Provisional Administration in 2001, have given a new 
impetus to the Anglophone struggle. 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Strategies of the Biya government  
to deconstruct the Anglophone  
identity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is hardly surprising that the Biya government has been keen to deconstruct 
the Anglophone identity that has tended to unite people in the Anglophone 
territory across ethnic-regional boundaries based on a common colonial 
heritage and a collective feeling of frustration at Francophone domination in 
the post-colonial state.  
This chapter shows the variety of strategies that the regime has employed to 
neutralise the Anglophone danger. The 1994 Bamenda Proclamation mentions 
that ‘rather than address the issue’, the Biya government has chosen ‘to feign 
ignorance of the Anglophone problem ... to seek by diverse manoeuvres to 
create division within the Anglophone nation with the aim of giving the false 
impression that there is no general consensus within it on constitutional reform 
... and to accuse the All Anglophone Conference and its affiliated organisations 
unjustly and falsely of having adopted a secession of Anglophone Cameroon as 
their goal’.  
The strategies outlined in the Bamenda Proclamation are by no means 
exhaustive. In this chapter we outline the Biya government’s most important 
strategies under the following headings: 
 trivialisation and demonisation of the ‘Anglophone problem’; 
 divide and rule; 
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 the establishment of direct and indirect control over the mass media; and 
 repression. 
While such strategies have undoubtedly posed formidable obstacles to the 
advancement of the Anglophone cause, we provide evidence to show that they 
have never been completely successful. 
 
 
Trivialisation and demonisation of the Anglophone problem 
 
The Biya government has often tried to minimalise the Anglophone-Franco-
phone divide by highlighting the existence of a common identity under German 
colonial rule and the official recognition in all the post-colonial constitutions of 
the bilingual and multicultural nature of the Cameroonian nation. The latter is 
said to guarantee the preservation of the differential linguistic and cultural 
heritage of the post-German colonial era. In a speech in Bamenda on 13 
December 1991, Biya stressed: 
 
Let us not oppose Anglophones and Francophones... The language barrier is not and 
should not be a political problem in our country. Mind you, at the start of this 
century Cameroonians were neither Anglophones nor Francophones. Why should the 
wars of others and the culture of others divide Cameroonians at the dawn of the third 
millennium?1 
 
Meaningful though this argument would be in any country with a clear sense 
of vision, it has failed in the Cameroonian context to convince the Anglophone 
minority in the absence of any institutionalising mechanisms for weakening the 
strong grip on the state by Francophones and the superiority accorded to the 
French language and Francophone cultural values over everything Anglophone 
or English. 
In an attempt to convince his national and international opponents that 
Cameroon’s policy of bilingualism had been successful, Biya claimed in 1999 
that secessionist tendencies were being manifested only by a tiny Anglophone 
minority and that ‘he was ready to even call for a referendum, if it became 
necessary’.2 In reaction, English-speaking Cameroonians in North America 
challenged him to prove his claims. They even pledged to bear the costs of the 
organisation of a referendum if it was organised under United Nations supervi-
sion.3 
                                                 
1  Speech by President Biya in Bamenda on 13 September 1991, in Playdoyer pour une 
Vraie Démocratie, Yaoundé: Imprimerie Saint Paul, 1991, p. 68. 
2  See Jeune Afrique, No. 1990, 2 March 1999. 
3  The Post, 27 September 1999, p. 3. 
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The Biya government has often argued that the unitary state is a more 
suitable form of state in the Cameroonian multi-ethnic context than a federal 
state and, moreover, corresponds with the wish of the vast majority of the 
population. Contrary to Anglophone claims that the unitary state came into 
existence in 1972 as a result of Ahidjo’s illegal, unconstitutional and repressive 
manipulation, Biya has continually insisted that the unitary state was the 
outcome of the massive vote by the Cameroonian people as voluntarily 
expressed in the 1972 referendum. In reply to the Anglophone demand for a 
return to the federal state, Biya has claimed, like Ahidjo, that this tends to be 
costly, weak as far as state power is concerned, and divisive, provoking ethnic 
and regional sentiments rather than a national consciousness. He has apparently 
overlooked the fact that the unitary state’s patrimonial tendencies and its 
politicisation of ethnicity may be even more costly and divisive (Chabal & 
Daloz 1999; Gabriel 1999). While repeatedly declining to discuss the federal or 
so-called ‘two-state option’, he eventually expressed his willingness to concede 
a certain degree of decentralisation within the unitary state based on the present 
ten provinces in Cameroon, the so-called ‘ten-state/region option’.4 On 30 April 
1993, Biya declared: 
 
The unitary state is the result of a referendum ballot, being thus the wish of 
Cameroonians. The unitary state is the form of state that suits Cameroon best. What 
needs still to be done is to ameliorate this management technique ... through reforms 
pertaining to decentralisation.5 
 
His preferential option of a decentralised unitary state was eventually 
reflected in the 1996 constitution. Significantly, Biya has failed to implement 
these constitutional provisions. In his 20 May 2001 address to the nation, he 
told the Cameroonian public that decentralisation was a ‘delicate and complex 
matter’ over which he was still having ‘profound reflections’. Decentralisation, 
he said, touched upon natural equilibrium, national unity and also power-
sharing between the centre and the regions. 
From the very start, the Biya government has also tried to demonise the 
Anglophone call for federalism by equating federalism with secession. Its 
persistent suspicion that secession was the ‘hidden agenda’ of the Anglophone 
strive for federalism led to brutal repression of some Anglophone demonstra-
tions, such as their celebration of Independence Day and attendant hoisting of 
the federation flag on 1 October 1993. The Biya government was in the habit of 
presenting the generally moderate Anglophone leaders, who continued to 
advocate peaceful negotiations rather than armed rebellion, as extremists and 
                                                 
4  See 1996 Constitution, Article 61, Paragraph 1. 
5  Cameroon Tribune, 3 May 1993, p. 3. 
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radicals. The fact that the Anglophone elite has not been united in their quest 
for recognition and/or a return to federalism has only compounded the triviali-
sation and demonisation of Anglophoneness by the Biya regime. 
 
 
Divide and rule 
 
Like his predecessor, Biya has attempted – with considerable success – to 
divide the Anglophones, often capitalising on the existing contradictions 
between the North West and South West. In response to South West complaints 
about North West domination, he appointed members of the South West elite to 
key positions in their province (Konings & Nyamnjoh 1997; Eyoh 1998a and 
b). For example, Peter Mafany Musonge replaced the North Westerner John 
Niba Ngu as general manager of the Cameroon Development Corporation 
(Konings 1993a), Dorothy Njeuma was appointed vice-chancellor of the newly 
created Anglophone University of Buea and Becky Ndive was transferred from 
Yaoundé to head the Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV) station in the 
South West. In addition, Biya has sought to use his allies among the Anglo-
phone ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ elite for the defence of the unitary state in 
exchange for rewards in the form of appointments, sinecures and the turning of 
a blind eye to corruption and/or embezzlement by those in high office. His 
allies, in turn, have tended to blame the leaders of the various Anglophone 
movements for their ‘demagogic and irresponsible’ calls for federalism or 
secession and to dispute their claims of being spokesmen of the Anglophone 
community, blaming them, as did Prime Minister Peter Mafany Musonge in 
November 1996, for leading ‘hostile campaigns at home and abroad to foster 
division and hatred among Cameroonians’.6 They equally challenge claims of 
Anglophone marginalisation, preferring to talk instead of ‘self-marginalisa-
tion’, and they invite Anglophones to consider themselves as fully-fledged 
Cameroonians with the same rights and responsibilities as Francophones 
(Nyamnjoh & Rowlands 1998: 335). This has led to serious confrontations 
between the two camps and to mutual accusations of betrayal. But to most 
ordinary Anglophones it is simply hard to fathom how, just for a few appoint-
ments and sinecures, their elite can be so eager to serve as gatekeepers and 
scavengers for a government that denies them an identity and refuses to recog-
nise their predicaments as a community (Nyamnjoh 1999).  
Following the organisation of the AAC I in April 1993, attempts were made 
by certain members of the South West Chiefs’ Conference (SWECC) and the 
South West Elite Association (SWELA), who were known to be closely allied 
                                                 
6  See The Herald, 2-3 December 1996, p. 1. 
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with the regime in power, to dissociate the South West Province from the 
deliberations and resolutions of the AAC I and from the Buea Declaration. A 
meeting was held of a previously little-known North West Cultural and 
Development Association (NOCUDA) in Bamenda on 14 May 1993 to 
dissociate the North West Province from the AAC I by branding the latter as a 
South West concern. This meeting seems to have been organised by north-
western members of the CPDM, who again in 1994 would actively work 
against the holding of the AAC II in Bamenda in a bid ‘to kill the Anglophone 
dream’.7 
In September 1993, nine representatives of the SWECC undertook a mission 
to Yaoundé to pledge their unswerving allegiance to President Biya. They told 
him that ‘they were alarmed at the numerous demonstrations, blackmail, civil 
disobedience, rebellious attitudes and recurrent activities designed to 
destabilise the state and the government’, and strongly condemned any attempt 
to partition Cameroon on the basis of Anglophone and Francophone cultures. 
They asked the head of state to transform the present ten provinces into ten 
autonomous provinces, and drew his attention to the fact that, after reunifica-
tion, the South West Province had been discriminated against in the distribu-
tion of strategic posts, such as prime minister, vice-president and speaker of the 
national assembly all of which had been regularly occupied by North Western-
ers.8 
Following the military brutalities in the South West during the 1993 govern-
ment anti-smuggling campaign,9 a split occurred in SWELA, which had been 
founded in 1991 to promote the socio-economic and cultural development of 
the province and combat its domination by the North West.10 The split gave 
birth to a pro-CPDM faction keen on maintaining close links with the Biya 
                                                 
7  See Cameroon Post, 20-27 April 1994, pp. 2-3; Cameroon Post (Special), 29 April - 
1 May, 1994, pp. 1-12; Cameroon Post, 29 June - 6 July 1994, pp. 6-7; The Herald, 
29 April-1 May 1994, pp. 1-2; Cameroon Post, 29 June-6 July 1994, pp. 6-7; and 
The Messenger, 2 May 1994, pp. 1-2.  
8  The Herald, 3-10 November 1993, p. 6. For the role of chieftaincy in the Anglo-
phone struggles, see Konings 1999b. 
9  Because of its proximity to the southeastern region of Nigeria, and because of the 
easy access offered by its sea and river ports to and from Nigeria, the South West 
Province has traditionally attracted informal, often illegal, commerce between 
Cameroonian and Nigerian traders (Niger-Thomas 2000). A significant amount of 
basic consumer items sold in Cameroon are smuggled from Nigeria, often with the 
complicity of customs at the borders. Prior to the anti-smuggling campaign, most car 
users in the South West Province had turned to much cheaper fuel smuggled from 
Nigeria, a development the Cameroonian authorities, in dire need of liquidity from 
the sales of its own oil especially following the crippling effect of the ‘ghost town’, 
could not condone.  
10  For SWELA, see Nyamnjoh & Rowlands 1998. 
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regime and on showing strong anti-North West sentiments. The members of 
this group include older and younger CPDM barons, like Emmanuel Tabi Egbe, 
Peter Agbor Tabi, John Ebong Ngolle, Ephraim Inoni and Caven Nnoko Mbele 
(secretary-general), as well as important South West chiefs such as Mola 
Samuel Endeley and Nfon Victor Mukete. They are all opposed to a return to 
the federal state and champion the ten-state option, which would retain the 
present separation between the South West and North West Provinces, and thus 
safeguard the former’s autonomy.11 By way of contrast, another faction of 
SWELA, with Martin Nkemngu of Lebialem Division as secretary-general, was 
more critical of government policies and tended to be allied to the opposition, 
notably the SDF.12 It advocated closer cooperation between the South West and 
North West elites as a necessary precondition for an effective representation of 
Anglophone interests. It strongly supported the Anglophone demand for a 
return to the federal state13 – a stance heavily criticised by the pro-CPDM 
faction that saw Nkemngu and the entire Lebialem Division as Grassfielders 
and therefore North Westerners in disguise. But in order to show the powerful 
nature of the pro-CPDM SWELA, Secretary-General Caven Nnoko Mbelle was 
appointed as government delegate for the Kumba Urban Council following the 
January 1996 municipal elections, while Martin Nkemngu, secretary-general of 
the pro-SCNC SWELA, was transferred from Buea where he was provincial 
head of the news agency known as CAMNEWS to Yaoundé as an ordinary 
member of staff with the official publisher, SOPECAM.14 
Since 1994 a number of southwestern and northwestern chiefs and members 
of the CPDM have repeatedly condemned the call for an independent Southern 
Cameroons state, appealing to the head of state to employ every available 
means to defend the unitary state.15 For example, when the SCNC was engaged 
                                                 
11  See Weekly Post, No. 0069 and No. 0070 of November 1994 for a comprehensive 
account of the pro-CPDM SWELA’s ten-state option.  
12  Martin Nkemngu, for instance, publicly declared to be an active member of the SDF. 
He later served as SDF communication secretary  and presenter of its weekly party 
political broadcast on state television.  See Cameroon Post, 29 October-4 November 
1996, pp. 1 and 9. 
13  See Final Communiqué of the SWELA Annual General Assembly held in Menji in 
Lebialem division on 18 December 1993 which states: ‘The General Assembly 
accordingly declares that the South West Elite Association is in favour of a 
constitution that guarantees provincial autonomy in a bi-cultural federation’. This 
declaration comes close to the position held by the Anglophone Standing Committee 
in its 1993 federal draft constitution. See The Messenger, 30 December 1993, p. 10. 
14  For an idea on the ‘war’ of the SWELAs, see Weekly Post, 26 January-2 February 
1995, pp. 1-2. 
15  See Cameroon Post, 17-24 July 1995, pp. 1 and 3, for the case of the South West 
Province where ‘Pro-CPDM Chiefs Bargain Destruction of SCNC’ at a chiefs’ 
conference. For a detailed report, see Konings 1999b. 
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in a sensitisation tour throughout the Anglophone territory after its historic 
May-June 1995 mission to the United Nations (see Chapter 4), it was reported 
that: 
 
The latest SCNC-CPDM clash of principles and ideas cropped up in Kumba in July 
1995 when more than 400 chiefs met to condemn the ‘secessionist’ moves of the 
SCNC leaders accusing them of playing off divisive politics. Before the Kumba 
meeting, the president (Tatah Nganga Obie III) and the secretary-general (Dr Atem 
Ebako) of the South West Chiefs Conference signed a communiqué condemning the 
SCNC delegation. The Kumba meeting was therefore meant to reinforce that first 
communiqué. Earlier Prime Minister Simon Achidi Achu, who hails from the North 
West Province, had quickly organised a meeting in Bamenda to tell President Paul 
Biya that rumours circulating in government circles that he had sponsored the SCNC 
delegation to the United Nations were totally unfounded. Interestingly enough, all 
the anti-CPDM participants in the meeting were driven away from the Conference 
Centre, prompting them to sign a counter communiqué in which they called for a 
referendum as the only solution to the crisis. 
 Other interesting facts about the CPDM-organised anti-SCNC conferences are 
that while the South West chiefs, afraid of being dominated by North Westerners, 
reiterated their preferred ten-state option, the Achidi conference members merely 
condemned the SCNC ‘secessionist’ moves, falling short of proposing an alterna-
tive.16 
 
The SCNC, in turn, has repeatedly reacted in strong terms to the ‘evil 
machinations’ of Biya’s allies among the Anglophone traditional and modern 
elite. For instance, on 28 January 1995, the SCNC reacted as follows: 
 
The Council vehemently condemns the evil machinations concocted by the so-called 
South West Chiefs Conference and Nnoko Mbelle posing for SWELA, on the one 
hand, and by the North West CPDM barons and chiefs led by Minister Chongwain 
Nkwain, on the other, to create divisions among the peoples of Southern Cameroons. 
By engaging in such activities, they attempt to enhance their own selfish interests 
and to perpetuate the hegemony of La République du Cameroun over the Southern 
Cameroons. The Council calls upon the peoples of Southern Cameroons to ignore 
these charlatans and not to deviate from the ultimate goal of their struggle, which is 
the restoration of Southern Cameroons’ autonomy.17  
 
Paradoxically, the Anglophone problem has considerably enhanced the 
chances of Biya loyalists being appointed to government posts that used to be 
reserved for Francophones. Obviously, the decision to enhance the position of 
Anglophones in the state apparatus is designed to belie charges that they only 
                                                 
16  The Star Headlines, 21-28 July 1995, pp. 1 and 4. 
17  Cameroon Post, 7-14 February 1995, p. 4. 
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play second fiddle in the Francophone-dominated unitary state,18 and simultane-
ously to attract new members of the Anglophone elite into the ‘hegemonic 
alliance’ (Bayart 1979). But Anglophones generally are not deceived by such 
cosmetic gestures at inclusion. They have always laughed sardonically at them 
when government officials and praise-singer journalists have bent over 
backwards to refer to the Anglophone prime minister as ‘Premier Ministre et 
Chef du Gouvernement’, precisely because everyone knows, the prime minister 
included, that in reality he is not the head of government and can take no major 
decisions. 
In 1992 Simon Achidi Achu, a North Westerner, and Ephraim Inoni, a South 
Westerner, were appointed respectively as prime minister and deputy secretary-
general in the Presidency of the Republic. Other highly-placed Anglophones, 
including Peter Abety, John Ebong Ngolle, John Niba Ngu, Francis Chongwain 
Nkwain, Peter Agbor Tabi and Samuel Ngeh Tamfu, may also expect to be 
members of the delegations that are regularly sent from Yaoundé to contest the 
claims of the leadership of the Anglophone movements and to defend the 
unitary state. It should, however, be noted that Biya’s policy of allocating 
prestigious positions within the state apparatus to Anglophones has encouraged 
competition among these privileged allies (Nyamnjoh 1999), leading to debates 
as to who the real enemy of the Anglophone people is – Biya or the Anglo-
phone elite? Hence, Churchill Monono’s argument that:  
 
No matter the prevailing goodwill, Biya’s Anglophonisation strategy can only be 
effective if his Anglophone appointees understand their roles in helping him to solve 
the Anglophone problem within a national context. It is rather unfortunate that most 
of Biya’s Anglophone appointees perceive their positions as rewards for their 
technocratic or managerial ‘competence’, ‘skills’, and hard work, or as marks of 
‘personal confidence’ from the Head of State. Few of them perceive themselves as 
political agents of the President to help him redress the Anglophone problem within 
a national context (Monono 2000). 
 
For the first six years of the democratisation process in the 1990s, the South 
West elite still felt they were underrepresented in the highest government 
                                                 
18  That he succeeds can be seen from the dramatic change in the discourse of every 
Anglophone appointed to high office. Thus for example, shortly after his appoint-
ment as prime minister in September 1996, Peter Musonge told the Anglophone 
community in Yaoundé to desist from self-marginalisation and to consider them-
selves fully-fledged Cameroonians with the same rights and responsibilities as 
Francophones. He urged them ‘to do everything possible to overcome the feeling of 
marginalisation and built-in complexes’, and to see in Biya’s appointment of an 
Anglophone prime minister proof that ‘the Anglophone community is part and parcel 
of the whole nation’. See Cameroon Tribune, 2 December 1996, p. 16; and The 
Herald, 2-3 December 1996, pp. 1 and 3. 
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offices and constantly requested that a politician from their province succeed 
Achidi Achu as prime minister.19 So when a South Westerner, Peter Mafany 
Musonge, was appointed in September 1996 to take over from Achidi Achu as 
prime minister and more South Westerners were kept in key cabinet positions 
than North Westerners,20 the South West people reportedly ‘went wild with 
excitement and jubilation and loudly praised the head of state’ for having at last 
listened to the cry of despair of South Westerners who for over 36 years had 
been ‘confined to the periphery of national politics and socio-economic 
development’.21 In the words of Musonge himself, this being ‘the first time in 
our history as a united nation that a South Westerner has been appointed Prime 
Minister’, South Westerners had ‘to come together to galvanise the second 
political awakening in the South West Province’, and to ‘strengthen our 
position and bargaining power’.22 At his CPDM congress in December 1996, 
Paul Biya further strengthened the position of South Westerners by admitting 
more of them into the central committee of the party than North Westerners; 
and the 22-member political bureau formed after the congress included two 
South Westerners, John Ebong Ngolle and Dorothy Njeuma, and only one 
North Westerner, Samuel Ngeh Tamfu.23 
                                                 
19  For example, following the January 1996 municipal elections which, according to 
official results, Prime Minister Achidi Achu (North Westerner) lost in his home 
constituency of Santa, while Minister of Higher Education Peter Agbor Tabi (South 
Westerner) won in Mamfe, the latter did not conceal his ambition to take over from 
Achidi Achu as prime minister. See The Herald, 1-3 April 1996, pp. 1 and 3; The 
Herald, 11-14 April 1996, pp. 1 and 2 and Weekly Post, 5-11 June 1996, pp. 1 and 4. 
In March 1995 Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, a southwestern political analyst and 
journalist, not only predicted that the next prime minister would be an Anglophone 
and South Westerner, but even had the prescience to name Peter Mafany Musonge as 
the most likely successor: ‘like Achidi Achu who left Bamenda to become Prime 
Minister, Musonge could also leave Limbe to the Star House’. See Cameroon Post, 
24-30 September 1996, pp. 1 and 3. 
20  See Cameroon Tribune, 20 September 1996, pp. 1-4 and 2 October 1996, pp. 8-9. 
21  See ‘Significance of P.M. Musonge’s Appointment’ by Kome Epule, a member of 
the South West elite, in The Star Headlines, 20 November 1996, p. 5. 
22  For reports on the reaction by South Westerners to the appointment of ‘a son of the 
soil’ as prime minister and how, thanks to Paul Biya, ‘the South West Smiles ... 
Again’, and on the grandiose reception they offered Pater Mafany Musonge in Buea, 
Limbe and Yaoundé, see The Herald, 2-3 October 1996, pp. 1 and 3; 11-12 
November 1996, pp. 1 and 3; 13-14 November 1996, pp. 1 and 3; 2-3 December 
1996, pp. 1 and 3; The Star Headlines, 20 November 1996, pp. 1 and 3; Cameroon 
Tribune, 12 November 1996, pp. 1 and 7-10; 2 December 1996, p. 16 and 
Cameroon Post, 12-18 November 1996, pp. 1 and 3. 
23  See Cameroon Tribune, 20 December 1996, pp. 4-5; and The Herald, 22-24 Decem-
ber 1996, p. 2. 
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These developments were interpreted by the North West CPDM barons as 
evidence that they were indicted by the head of state for their failure to contain 
the SDF and radical Anglophones amongst them. The subsequent creation of a 
North West Development Association (NOWEDA) by Peter Abety, minister 
for special duties at the presidency, and of two chiefs’ organisations, the North 
West Fons’ Association (NOWEFA) and North West Fons’ Conference 
(NOWEFCO), may be seen as attempts by these barons to retrieve lost advan-
tages. 
South West ascendancy in the state apparatus followed in the wake of the 
January 1996 constitution,24 which promised state protection for autochthonous 
minorities, and boosted South West identity. In the ongoing struggle for 
economic and political power, the southwestern allies of the Biya regime 
started demanding state protection for the ‘autochthonous’ South Westerners 
against the ‘dominant’ and ‘exploitative’ Grassfields ‘settlers’, ‘strangers’ or – 
to use the Pidgin-English expression – cam-no-goes in their region.25 The South 
West pro-CPDM elite became alarmed when the North West-based opposition 
party, the SDF, won most key urban constituencies in their region during the 
municipal elections which, by no means accidentally, were held only a few 
days after the adoption of the new constitution. The South West governor, 
Oben Peter Ashu, blamed the settler population, which outnumbered the 
indigenes in most urban areas of the province, for the CPDM’s poor 
performance in urban areas.26 Before the elections, Nfon Victor Mukete, the 
Bafaw paramount chief, who had in earlier elections insisted that North 
Westerners acquire and present resident permits before they could vote, was 
reported to have organised a gang of thugs to deny victory to an SDF 
opposition candidate, and to punish North Westerners for having supported the 
latter. His tendency to single out Grassfielders among the ‘ethnic strangers’ 
was due to the fact that he, like other members of the pro-CPDM South West 
elite and the administration, were inclined to perceive Grassfielders as the 
greatest threat among ethnic strangers to the CPDM’s grip on power and South 
West interests, and had to be contained accordingly. And to do so effectively, 
even the issuance of residence permits had to be limited to CPDM militants 
                                                 
24  For a more elaborate discussion of the 1996 constitution, see Melone et al. 1996; 
Konings & Nyamnjoh 2000 and Geschiere & Nyamnjoh 2000. 
25  This appeal to the state was often accompanied by threats of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and 
‘removal of strangers’ who in many cases were second or third-generation descend-
ants of migrants. See Konings 2001b. ‘Cam-no-go’ literally means a visitor who 
refuses to leave even when he or she is no longer wanted. But it also refers to a 
persistent skin affliction that makes the body constantly itch. So the Grassfielders are 
not only unwanted visitors, they also cause great discomfort.  
26  The Herald, 29-30 January 1996, p. 3. 
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among Grassfields migrants.27 This move provoked protests and vehement 
condemnation in Kumba, Buea, Limbe and all over the South West by 
Grassfielders who felt stripped of their citizenship  
The above sentiments were subsequently hailed by N.N. Mbile, one of the 
oldest and most experienced politicians in the South West Province (see 
Chapter 2) who had been appointed chairman of the CDC in the 1990s for his 
services to the regime in power, at a joint conference of the South West chiefs 
and elites in July 1999, and other traditional leaders were urged to emulate 
Chief Mukete in particular.28 
Immediately after the January 1996 elections, the government provided the 
requested protection by appointing indigenous CPDM leaders as urban 
delegates in the municipalities won by the SDF. Undoubtedly, the regime 
rendered assistance after the municipal elections to the emerging Grand SAWA 
Movement,29 an alignment of the ethnically-related coastal elite in the South 
West Province and neighbouring Francophone Littoral Province on the basis of 
common feelings of exploitation and domination by Grassfields settlers (Tatah 
Mentan 1996; Wang Sonnè 1997; Yenshu 1998; Geschiere & Nyamnjoh 2000; 
Konings 2001b). This alignment came into being after the indigenous SAWA 
elite in Douala had staged government-condoned demonstrations against the 
Francophone Grassfielders, the Bamileke, who alone accounted for 70 per cent 
of the Douala population, and who had provided for only one indigenous mayor 
in the five municipal councils where the SDF had won.30 The emergence of the 
Grand SAWA Movement signified an important victory for the government in 
its persistent efforts to tempt the South West elite away from Anglophone 
solidarity. Evidently, this new movement had a devastating effect on Anglo-
phone identity with the Francophone-Anglophone divide becoming cross-cut by 
alliances that opposed the coastal people, the Grand SAWA, to the Grassfields 
                                                 
27  Another Kumba-based elite who tended to blame settlers for most of the economic, 
political and social problems in the South West Province was Chief Dr Atem Ebako, 
the then secretary-general of the SWECC. See The Herald, 19-20 March 1997, p. 1 
and Geschiere & Nyamnjoh 2000. 
28  For a detailed report on the conference which was held at the University of Buea on 
17 July 1999, see The Herald, 21 July 1999, pp. 1 and 3-4. See also Mbile 2000. 
29  The term Sawa was originally employed by the native Douala to refer to themselves 
as coastal people. It has subsequently been extended to embrace related ethnic 
groups in the coastal areas of the Littoral and South West Provinces. Of late, even 
ethnic groups in the forest areas of the Littoral and South West Provinces have come 
to identify with the SAWA. See Yenshu 1998. 
30  The SAWA demonstrators displayed placards with the following among other 
messages: ‘Yes to Democracy, No to Hegemony’, ‘No Democracy without Protec-
tion for Minorities and Indigenes’, ‘A Majority based on Ethnic Votes is not a Sign 
of Democracy but that of Expansionism’. See Wang Sonnè 1997. 
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people, the so-called Grand West. The alliance between the Francophone and 
Anglophone Grassfielders constituted the backbone of the major opposition 
party, the SDF. 
To those who sought protection as minorities, the price to pay would 
increasingly be stated in no uncertain terms: ‘Vote CPDM’. That is exactly 
what the SAWA elite has been telling the local population. In return, they have 
been highly rewarded for their efforts, gaining access to key positions in the 
state apparatus that were previously occupied by North Westerners. In fact, 
following his appointment as prime minister in September 1996, Peter Mafany 
Musonge and the pro-CPDM SAWA elite did not relent in their invitation to all 
coastal people to throw their weight behind President Biya and the CPDM. As 
Musonge put it during a reception in Buea following his appointment: 
‘President Biya has scratched our back, and we shall certainly scratch the Head 
of State’s back thoroughly when the time comes’, meaning that the SAWA 
should, together with him, resolve to manifest their total support and allegiance 
to the president who appointed him.31 
Like Musonge, other members of the South West elite have regularly 
appealed to the local population to support Biya and the CPDM. According to 
the South West Governor Oben Peter Ashu, the South West was ready to go to 
war to keep Biya, Musonge and the CPDM in power. On the eve of the 1997 
parliamentary elections, he issued a war cry that The Herald captured as 
follows:  
 
We are ready to fight to the last man to maintain our son as prime minister. This is 
the time for all South-Westerners to be ready to die or survive [...] We have the 
Prime Minister and what we need now is only satisfaction and social amenities [...] 
Referring to North-Westerners resident in the South West, ... the governor said the 
South West was satisfied with what it had and ‘anyone who is not here to safeguard 
the interests of the province should immediately pack back to his home’.32   
 
On 21 March 1997, the Secretary-General of the South West Chiefs’ 
Conference (SWECC), Chief Dr Atem Ebako, equally called upon South 
Westerners to support the ruling party in the forthcoming parliamentary 
elections: 
 
                                                 
31  See Cameroon Post, 12-18 November 1996, pp. 1 and 3; The Herald, 11-12 Novem-
ber 1996, pp. 1 and 3; and The Star Headlines, 20 November 1996, pp. 1-7. For a 
critical commentary on the ‘politics of back scratching’ which former Prime Minister 
Simon Achidi Achu and his successor, Prime Minister Peter Mafany Musonge, 
sought to promote in their regions and elsewhere in appreciation of appointments by 
Biya, see Rotcod Gobata in Cameroon Post, 26 November-2 December 1996, p. 7. 
32  The Herald, 6-8 June 1997, p. 1. 
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Our communities, especially those in Fako and Meme Divisions, are swarmed by 
Cameroonians from other places and provinces ... It is possible to have Cameroo-
nians who are not indigenous in the South West Province to become representatives 
of South Westerners ... at local councils, parliament, and government. This aspect of 
the evolution of the political life of the South West Province, which became very 
obvious after the 21 January 1996 municipal elections, is most repulsive, resentful, 
indignant, and pre-occupying. 
Our choice is clear as we stated in the General Assembly Meeting in Kumba on 8 
March 1997. We called on all South Westerners and all their friends of voting age 
without exception to register and vote massively for the candidates of the CPDM 
party of President Paul Biya at the forthcoming parliamentary elections.33 
 
Like Nfon Victor Mukete during the 1996 municipal elections, Governor 
Oben Peter Ashu was reported to be issuing residence permits to settlers before 
they could vote during the 1997 parliamentary elections, a move that was 
clearly intended to favour the party in power.34 Following the overwhelming 
South West support for his candidacy during the 1997 presidential elections, 
Biya reappointed Musonge as prime minister in a subsequent cabinet reshuffle.  
One has to be extremely careful, however, in asserting that Biya’s divisive 
tactics have been successful in deconstructing the Anglophone identity. After 
Fon Njifua of Fontem declared at the joint conference of chiefs and elites in 
Buea in July 1999 that no true South Westerner sympathised with the SCNC,35 
his declaration was immediately contested by one of his colleagues, Chief 
Esong Joseph Ntongwe, the new secretary-general of the SWECC. The latter 
cautioned that the Anglophone problem was a time-bomb that could only be 
defused if handed diligently, that is, by granting ‘equal opportunities to all 
Cameroonians without any form of discrimination to participate and benefit of 
the proceeds of the state’.36 In a story headlined ‘South West CPDM Member of 
Parliament Embarrasses Government on the Anglophone Problem’, The Herald 
reported that Hon. Nzoubotame, a CPDM parliamentarian from Kupe 
Muanenguba, shocked his ‘stalemates of the New Deal regime’ by stating: 
 
It is sheer dishonesty for anybody not to recognise the existence of an Anglophone 
problem in this country…. Time has come to leave party loyalty and discipline aside 
and honestly and effectively solve the problem once and for all.37 
 
                                                 
33  See ‘South West Chiefs’ Conference on the Plight of South West Province’ in The 
Pilot Magazine, May 1997, p. 8. 
34  Little wonder that settlers felt disenfranchised by this move. See Yenshu 1998. 
35  The Herald, 21 July 1999, p. 3. 
36  The Post, 18 August 2000, p. 2. 
37  The Herald, 22 April 2000, p. 1. 
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Following his presentation of a memorandum to the UN General-Secretary 
Kofi Annan during the latter’s visit to Cameroon in May 2000 (see Chapter 4), 
the newly elected Secretary-General Emmanuel Efase Lyonga of the revived 
SWELA was attacked by some members. They strongly contested his claim to 
have spoken on their behalf when he stated in the memorandum that the rights 
of minorities and autochthonous people were being catered for in Cameroon 
and that the decentralisation of the country into ten autonomous provinces as 
laid down in the 1996 constitution was ‘in line with the aspirations of our 
people’.38 
Remarkably, persistent security reports have attested to the presence of pro-
SCNC Anglophone officials within the CPDM. One SCNC activist argued that 
the Anglophone gatekeepers of the regime ‘support the SCNC with their hearts 
in private, but pretend to speak against it in public in order to protect their 
positions’.39 There is empirical evidence to back this argument. In 1995 an 
SCNC appeal was made to the Southern Cameroonian population to help 
defray the costs of an Elad-led delegation to the United Nations. At an SCNC 
meeting in Bamenda, Foncha, who had been assigned to contact the Anglo-
phone cabinet members, informed those present that these ministers had agreed 
in principle to contribute, their only quarrel being the amount of money 
imposed upon them. Similarly, when the Biya government decided to send a 
high-powered delegation to the South West Province to convince the local 
population of the need to privatise the Cameroon Development Corporation 
(CDC), a huge agro-industrial parastatal in the area (see Chapter 7), Anglo-
phone ministers informed the SCNC of this mission and urged it to put up 
fierce resistance (Jua 2001). 
 
 
The establishment of direct and indirect control  
over the mass media  
 
One of the instruments that the Francophone-dominated state has relied on to 
implement its various strategies to disempower Anglophones has been the 
media. By seeking total ownership and control of the broadcast media while 
using draconian laws to stifle the private press, the state has over the years 
stunted Anglophone freedom, weakened solidarity among Anglophones and 
dealt their sense of identity a crippling blow. Government media policies and 
practices and their effect on Anglophones prior to 1990 have been well 
documented (cf. Nyamnjoh 1989 and 1990), so too has the particularly difficult 
                                                 
38  The Post, 26 June 2000, p. 2. 
39  The Post, 7 February 2000, p. 3. 
 
122 
legal environment in which the private press has operated since 1990 (cf. 
Nyamnjoh 1996b and c). In this section, we focus on how the Biya government 
has employed the state media, and broadcasting in particular, to deny Anglo-
phone identity and solidarity, while tacitly encouraging the rise and prolifera-
tion of the ethnic and regional print media. 
 
Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV) and Anglophone identity 
With the launching of the SDF in 1990, Anglophone journalists in the official 
media, in general, tended to distance themselves from the sort of pro-
establishment journalism defined by government and largely taken for granted 
by their Francophone colleagues. The history of turbulence in the official 
media was principally the history of government attempts to streamline Anglo-
phone journalists. The launching of the SDF led to a witch-hunt amongst 
Anglophone journalists in CRTV, whom management identified with the new 
illegal party. The witch-hunt was understandable, for while Zacharie Ngniman, 
Antoine-Marie Ngono and other Francophone journalists presented an unsigned 
and undated communiqué from Minister Henri Bandolo about the killing of six 
Anglophones during the launch of the SDF in Bamenda in May 1990 as if it 
were verified information, Julius Wamey, on his part, insisted that his broad-
cast was the government’s version of events.40 Relations between CRTV 
authorities and critical Anglophone journalists only worsened following the 
introduction of multipartyism, leading to claims in the private press of an anti-
Anglophone campaign mounted by the government and CRTV management. 
Much of this has been well documented (cf. Nyamnjoh 1996b) but here are a 
few examples. 
The Cameroon Post41 reported a meeting held by the minister of information 
and culture in the first week of June 1991 with CRTV journalists during which 
he implicitly accused English-language programmes of being sympathetic to 
the opposition. Specifically cited were ‘Luncheon Date’ – later on modified 
drastically on the minister’s orders, ‘News Focus’, the ‘7.30 p.m. News’ and 
‘Cameroon Calling’ from which Anembom Munjo, Wain Paul Ngam, 
Asonglefac Nkemleke and Julius Wamey were subsequently suspended. The 
minister also attacked TV news Editor-in-Chief Eric Chinje ‘for reporting the 
resignation of CPDM Wouri Section President Jean Jacques Ekindi without 
                                                 
40  Until CRTV management transferred critical Anglophone journalists away from the 
newsroom or increasingly sanctioned them for not following ‘handed-down’ instruc-
tions on what to report and how, CRTV newscasts in English were more appreciated 
even by Francophones. Some evidence can be found in a survey that a Francophone 
journal, Challenge Hebdo, carried out among its readers in 1991. See Challenge 
Hebdo, 26 December 1991, pp. 7-10. 
41  Cameroon Post, 6-13 June 1991, p. 1. 
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announcing the non-resignation of Mifi Section President Joseph K. Tanyi’. 
The minister implied that this was part of the Anglophone journalists’ attempt 
to sabotage the CPDM government. The suspensions were interpreted by the 
journalists as ‘part of a campaign launched by the Information and Culture 
Minister and CRTV General Manager Mendo Ze to stem the tide of Anglo-
phone journalists’ objectivity on CRTV’.42 The minister insisted on the need for 
CRTV journalists to respect the corporation’s editorial policy, a euphemism for 
asking all journalists to see things the government’s way. Julius Wamey was 
accused of having falsely claimed during a CRTV news flash that the South 
West chiefs’ meeting in Kumba had called for a national conference, and that 
students marching in Bamenda had done the same. The governor of the North 
West Province, in a telex to the Ministry of Territorial Administration 
(MINAT), was reported to have wondered ‘why government media organs are 
being used by journalists who are partisan to the SDF’.43 
In a confidential letter to the general manager of CRTV, Prime Minister 
Sadou Hayatou was said44 to have called for sanctions against Anglophone 
journalists who were using the official media to ‘try the government’. The 
prime minister was reported to have accused among others, ‘Cameroon Calling’ 
and the English news, of having ‘more and more exhibited reckless abandon ... 
in their analysis which have of late seemed like an arraignment of government 
action’. In his letter he complained that ‘newscasters on radio and television 
have tended to express their personal standpoints as if they were those of 
government’. He concluded by instructing the general manager to ‘verify this 
situation and where necessary address a severe warning to such personnel who 
should not turn a public service into a private media with a tendency to 
teleguide government action’. 
While some Anglophone journalists in the public media – their disillusion-
ment notwithstanding – identified with the PR role expected of them by 
government, others opted either to leave the system entirely (e.g. Boh Herbert,45 
Charlie Ndichia,46 Eric Chinje,47 Victor Epie Ngome, Orlando Bama, Larry 
Eyong-Echaw, Ben Bongang and Julius Wamey) or to distance themselves 
                                                 
42  Ibid. 
43  Ibid. 
44  See Cameroon Post, 30 July - 6 August 1991, p. 3. 
45  In an interview with Challenge Hebdo, he stated his reasons for leaving CRTV and 
resigning from the civil service. See Challenge Hebdo, 31 October-6 November 
1991, pp. 14-15.  
46  For more on Charlie Ndichia and his problems as a journalist in Cameroon and in 
CRTV, see Le Messager (Special Edition), 25 April 1991. p. 12 and 23 January 
1991, p. 11.  
47  For Eric Chinje’s account of why and how he left CRTV, see Fondation Friedrich-
Ebert 1993. 
 
124 
from official rhetoric whenever they could (e.g. Ebssiy Ngum, Wain Paul 
Ngam and Asonglefac Nkemleke). According to The Diasporan, of the nearly 
50 reporters and announcers who started or joined television in its first three 
years of existence, 27 (21 of whom were Anglophones) had, by April 1994, 
‘departed in bitterness and disillusionment to seek better climes’.48 Those who 
opted for government PR journalism, claimed that all the government and its 
acolytes did was in the best interests of Anglophones and Cameroon in general, 
and that the SDF and Anglophone movements were void of true patriots and 
motivated only by selfish, regional or ethnic self-interests. The CRTV 
management would encourage such pro-government journalists with appoint-
ments to key positions, and eventually, the impression would be created that 
the critical journalists were from the North West Province while their pro-
establishment counterparts were from the South West Province. Selective 
appointments of South West journalists to strategic positions would further 
drive this message home. 
However, the critical journalists were convinced that the ‘radical’ opposi-
tion and ‘extremist’ pressure groups they supported stood for ‘the truth’ and the 
best interests of Anglophones and of Cameroon, and that the government and 
its acolytes were dissemblers motivated by selfish ambition, greed for power 
and other self-centred pursuits. Many Anglophone journalists in CRTV who 
rapidly distanced themselves from their role as government spokesmen or 
mouthpieces following the launching of the SDF thus rechannelled their 
energies into the service of the marginalised Anglophone community. But using 
the official media to articulate societal problems and aspirations met with stiff 
resistance from the authorities. The turbulent history of critical English 
language CRTV programmes such as ‘Cameroon Calling’ (formally ‘Cameroon 
Report’), ‘Minute by Minute’ and ‘Luncheon Date’ are sufficient testimony of 
government discomfort with Anglophone critical-mindedness and a purportedly 
heightened sense of public accountability (Nyamnjoh 1996b). 
In June 1992, members of the ‘Cameroon Calling’ production team (Benn 
Bongang, Zac Angafor and Akwanka Joe Ndifor) amongst others, were 
appointed and transferred in various capacities to provincial CRTV stations. 
This move was seen by those concerned as a calculated attempt by government 
to kill a programme that had never ceased to embarrass it, especially following 
the decision by CRTV Deputy General Manager Emmanuel Nguiamba 
                                                 
48  See The Diasporan, 14 April 1995, which devotes its front and centre pages to 
television in Cameroon, ‘a revolution that ate its children’. The articles or testi-
monies are by Eric Chinje, Julius Wamey, Melissa Nambangi and Orlando Bama, all 
of whom are former CRTV journalists living and/or studying in the United States. 
The Diasporan is based in the United States and has Julius Wamey as editor-in-
chief. 
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Nloutsiri to subject ‘Cameroon Calling’ to unprecedented administrative 
censorship.49 The latter blamed the crew of ‘Cameroon Calling’ for disrespect-
ing numerous warnings from the hierarchy and for continuing to use the 
programme ‘to put the government on trial’. He accused some of the journalists 
of not hesitating to question the integrity of the highest authorities in the state, 
but often without any proof to back their allegations. Others, he said, did not 
hesitate to incite the population to revolt and by so doing, were endangering 
national unity. He called on them to understand that the CRTV was a public 
utility and a privileged instrument for the propagation of government activities. 
To put an end to ‘ce laisser-aller préjudiciable à l’action des pouvoirs 
publics et à la stabilité des institutions’, the deputy general manager 
prescribed, inter alia, that ‘Cameroon Calling’ be henceforth taped and no 
longer transmitted live as was the case before. The pre-recorded programme 
was to be submitted for the critical appreciation of either the director of 
information, his deputy or the editor-in-chief for features. ‘The certified 
approval of one of these authorities is necessary before the programme can be 
broadcast’. Finally, the above-named gatekeepers were expected to issue a 
weekly report on the effective implementation of this prescription. 
On February 2 1994, the general manager of CRTV took decision No. 
00012 following ‘instructions from above’ to send Tamfu Hanson Ghandi, 
Metuge Alfred Sone and Viban Napoleon Bongadzem to the Ministry of 
Communication. The crime of these journalists was the non-respect of CRTV 
editorial policy.50  
Also in February 1994, Angèle Tabe Ndie was sent to the ministry because 
of ‘indiscipline et légèreté dans le traitement de l’information’.51 She had been 
accused, in October 1992, of having ‘attended the press conference of the 
Minister of Communication on the 26th of October 1992, without having been 
assigned by CRTV Editorial Desk’ and for having 'asked questions on behalf of 
the corporation, questions that seemed to placed [sic] the corporation on a 
defence’.52 Also queried in connection with that same press conference were 
                                                 
49  See Note of Service, No. 00060 of 8 June 1992, reproduced in Le Messager, 18 June 
1992. 
50  See, for example, the letter from Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Information (radio) Chris 
Enoh Oben, dated 31 January 1994, to the CRTV general manager, accusing Tamfu 
Hanson Ghandi of clandestine publicity for Cameroon Post, a newspaper ‘which is 
not only notoriously anti-government, but also an officious propaganda organ of the 
SDF party’. Tamfu Hanson Ghandi, he claimed, ‘has the habit of selling newsroom 
material (e.g. GCE results) to private newspapers’ for which he writes regularly 
using a pen-name. 
51  See decision no. 00027/CRTV/DG/DAF/SDPel, 25 February 1994. 
52  See confidential query no. 00011/CRTV/DG/DPACRA of 28 October 1992, signed 
for the general manager by Peter Essoka. 
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Wain Paul Ngam and Orlando Bama. Wain Paul Ngam was accused of 
tarnishing the image of CRTV after he suggested in his question that the 
minister’s report on the burning to death of Mr Gideon Manko Ngum, the 
district officer of Muyuka, and Alhadji Tita Fomukong, the leader of the 
Cameroon National Party (CNP), by opposition partisans was biased. Orlando 
Bama, on his part, was guilty of wanting to know why Biya had been shown 
‘unkempt’ on television despite the presence of competent image-makers. On 
12 October 1992, James Achanyi Fontem was suspended for broadcasting 
election results that had not been issued by MINAT. Other victims of similar 
decisions included Victor Epie Ngome who left Cameroon to join the BBC for 
six months, and Francis Niba who was recalled to the ministry from Bertoua 
for professional indiscretion. 
In general, Anglophones feel CRTV does not cater to their interests. 
According to Philip Ndi,53 this is because ‘there is nobody who actually repre-
sents the Anglophones at CRTV’, and ‘decisions are taken arbitrarily and 
nobody raises an eye brow’. He argues that ‘many decisions are taken not only 
to frustrate Anglophone journalists but to minimise and discredit their efforts’. 
Even those Anglophones who appear to hold high positions and have become 
slaves in the service of the institution and the state are rarely treated with 
dignity or given the recognition they deserve. The following excerpts from a 
eulogy by Victor Epie Ngome on the death in May 2000 of Luke Ananga, one 
of the pillars of pro-establishment Anglophone journalism at CRTV, illustrates 
this adequately:  
 
…When he [Luke Ananga] analysed the President’s speeches, he left you in no 
doubt that he had been privy to their drafting. He bubbled with conviction whenever 
he appeared on TV to pontificate about some new bridge the government had built 
where there was no stream. He talked big and looked it. And why not? He held what 
should be the most powerful post in any news organisation. So how could Ananga be 
a stress case? [….] 
 As Director of Information he reigned while his subjects ruled. According to 
inside sources, he was hardly ever part of the teams that accompanied the GM on 
long trips to Europe to reflect on news policy. It was his subordinates that went. 
Their opinions, not his, were sought, and they knew the inner workings of things far 
better than he. And so a swaggering Director chairing a meeting of more informed 
and more powerful subs cut a rather piteous and ludicrous picture. He was cordoned 
by a ring of young, junior collaborators who, because of their privileged ethnic and 
other extra-professional relations with the boss, could laugh him off when he spoke 
with a lot of ardour about the shadow while they knew the substance. In a word Luke 
lived and worked in emasculating circumstances and died betrayed by a system for 
which he had sacrificed everything including his principles and his personality.  
                                                 
53  The Herald, 13-20 January 1993, p. 4. 
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 Someone said what finished Luke off was the fact that CRTV’s GM, Mendo Ze, 
could not be bothered to visit him even once during all the time he spent in the clinic 
a bare five hundred meters from Mendo Ze’s residence. Strange that a corporation 
whose management has so often flaunted its overflowing charity let its own Inspec-
tor-General die virtually unattended in an obscure clinic. What would it have taken 
for him to be flown abroad for treatment? Should he have changed his initials to CN, 
AMN, SNN, ET, JLN etc. to qualify? 
 A death, even that of a politically vocal person like Luke, should not be politi-
cised gratuitously. Still, one cannot discount the probability that his physical death 
had a not-too-remote political component. I remember Luke’s overflowing enthusi-
asm in a chat during AAC I in Buea. ‘This is the winning ticket, doc’, he said. ‘This 
is where I belong’. Ananga certainly knew on which side his political bread was 
buttered but he also knew where his navel was buried. There was enough around him 
to keep him reminded that, however hard he tried, he did not, could not, belong to a 
family which even segregates the dogs that would eat of the crumbs falling off its 
children’s table. Luke was unmistakably caught in the grip of the Anglophone love-
hate predicament. They keep you forcibly in the nation but kill the nation in you. 
And you are not allowed even to mourn. So Ananga never sang dirges like Peter 
Essoka or (you name the rest) …, but Cameroon had died in him, as indeed in most 
others.  
 Close acquaintances say Luke, in his last days, was not only bitter but desperate 
to ‘prove to them’ (whoever he meant) that he had some professional mettle. He 
started this talking-heads show on TV, for which he virtually went cap-in-hand 
before a secretary could deign to give him so much as a recording tape. As Inspec-
tor-General, he whined and rattled around in an old jalopy he inherited from Eric 
Chinje about a decade ago, and ran it thanks to fuel ‘chipped in’ by friends. ‘They’ll 
use you, and then kick you in the teeth’, we often said of the system. Luke had cer-
tainly not expected it to get to him, but it did in most telling way.54
 
 
 
As an institution, CRTV has seldom been comfortable reporting the truth 
about any Anglophone movement, initiative or programme of action. An 
example of CRTV’s unprofessional journalism in this connection is that of the 
3 p.m. radio news on 27 April 1994 concerning AAC II. An announcement was 
made to the effect that the AAC II scheduled to be held in Bamenda from 29 
April to 1 May had been postponed by the convenors. It was purported to have 
been signed by Dr Simon Munzu, Dr Carlson Anyangwe and Barrister Sam 
Ekontang Elad, a claim the three refuted. AAC spokesman, Dr Simon Munzu, 
prepared a disclaimer for broadcast by CRTV but this was rejected. CRTV was 
even unable to provide Dr Munzu with a copy of the announcement alleged to 
have been signed by him and his colleagues.55 
Anglophones are of the impression that CRTV is there not so much to 
respond to their aspirations as to stifle initiative and any sense of identity in 
them. The decision to construct the FM transmitter for the South West Province 
                                                 
54  Victor Epie Ngome’s eulogy for Luke Ananga, Scncforum, 9 May 2001. 
55  For more details, see Cameroon Post, 29 April-1 May 1994, p. 2. 
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in Douala was criticised by Anglophone interest groups (e.g. SWELA) and by 
the media, and taken as further proof of the government’s negative position 
towards Anglophones. To some Anglophones, the Francophone authorities 
were so concerned with the possibility of oil in Victoria (Limbe) that they 
feared what might happen if Buea, given the prevailing trend of sentiments 
among critical Anglophone leaders and the public, were to be cut off from the 
rest of Cameroon and made capital of a seceding Southern Cameroons. Many 
people thought that the government wanted to be in control of access to radio 
technology and to be able to cut transmission should the need arise.56 This 
sentiment was later confirmed in December 1999 when the government swiftly 
arrested and detained Anglophone activists who raided and took over Radio 
Buea to declare independence for Southern Cameroons. Indeed, Anglophones 
are so suspicious of government and its designs that their first instinct is always 
to disbelieve that the government – which one of them describes as ‘tradition-
ally cocky, arrogant, lethargic and extremely callous’57 – could be acting in 
good faith. 
To Anglophones, it is clear from the content and language of programmes 
that television is predominantly for Francophones. French is the dominant 
language58 and French interests seem not only more important than those of the 
English-speaking community but are even more relevant than Cameroonian 
concerns and priorities.59 Quite regularly newscasts on CRTV are moved from 
their normal time slots to make way for the transmission of French football 
encounters. Rarely if ever has an English league match forced the rescheduling 
                                                 
56  For the FM affair, see The Herald, 3-5 January 1994, p. 3 and Cameroon Post, 24 
November-1 December 1993, p. 13. 
57  See Cameroon Post, 27-30 May 1991, p. 6. 
58  Complaints like the following by Dr Zama Kimbi Ndefru III are frequent in the 
Anglophone press and are shared by the entire Anglophone community: 
The English-speaking viewers seem to be placed on a disadvantage even though 
entertainment programmes like Starcky and Hutch, Arnold and Willie, Colombo, 
Santa Barbara and Lucky Luke were originally in English. Taxes aside if the rights 
of all Cameroonians as citizens of this country mean anything, a second channel 
should be an unquestionable right. The two cultures have to co-exist on equal basis.  
See Cameroon Post, 14-21 April 1990, p. 2. 
59  Eric Chinje recalls that during his years as editor-in-chief for TV news, there was a 
strong Francophone lobby, the membership of which ranged from a team of police 
investigators ‘demanding to know why there was so much English on television’ to 
the French ambassador who claimed that Eric Chinje was not a friend of France 
because Anglophones on TV ‘were outperforming the Francophones’. See The 
Diasporan, 14 April 1995, p. 10. 
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of a French news programme, and it is not even often that local matches or 
Cameroon’s own international encounters are televised.60 
Faced with such resistance, critical Anglophone journalists in the official 
media, some of them under pseudonyms, were able – thanks to the December 
1990 communications law – to use the private English-language newspapers to 
highlight Anglophone problems, concerns and aspirations on the national 
political, cultural and economic agendas. Together with their counterparts in 
the critical English-language press, the liberation journalists of the official 
media were eager to expose the contradictions and inconsistencies in the 
policies and actions of the Cameroonian leadership. They argued that until the 
government started addressing the problems of the Anglophone minority in 
Cameroon, it would remain an obstacle to the country’s economic progress and 
social justice. They criticised the rigid government suppression of contending 
social forces, especially those of Anglophone origin. They blame most of 
Cameroon’s current socio-political and economic crises on the lack of account-
ability of successive Francophone-dominated governments, and present the 
Anglophone and the selflessness in public service in ‘the good old days’ of 
Southern Cameroons as the model. They identified with and were proud of the 
achievements of the Anglo-Saxon culture worldwide. Theirs, the Anglo-Saxon 
culture, ‘has been tested and its validity adequately proved’, and all Anglo-
phones must take advantage of this identity ‘rather than seeking to be Franco-
phones only to wind up ridiculous cultural mulattos to be jeered at and 
patronised’.61 And in this endeavour, their heroics received commendation from 
the Cameroon Association of English-Speaking Journalists (CAMASEJ).62  
However, the rising tide of the politics of belonging, the failure of the 
opposition to make a marked difference and the weakening of the SCNC 
leadership have combined with the arrogance and confidence of those in power 
to silence many a once-critical CRTV journalist. Many have left and of those 
who have stayed on, most have chosen to conform. Once again, the policy of 
divide-and-rule has largely triumphed, and ‘Anglophoneness’ has ended up as 
the loser, even if only in the short term. 
 
The print media and Anglophone identity 
If in the first three years of the current democratic process a consensus on the 
Anglophone problem in the Anglophone press could be seen, this is much less 
the case today. The increased importance of regional and ethnic politics has 
indeed been matched by a redefinition of editorial policy on the part of some 
                                                 
60 See La Nouvelle Expression, No. 15, March 1993, p. 14 
61  Cameroon Post, 27-30 May 1991, p. 6. 
62  See Le Messager, 28 February 1992, p. 10. 
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existing papers and by the creation of new mouthpieces concerned with ethnic 
interests. Papers such as The Weekly Post, The Star Headlines and The Oracle 
have been created to focus on regional issues of interest to the South West 
Province and SWELA, and to highlight opposition to the Grassfielders (both 
the ‘settlers’ in the diaspora and those still in their North West and Western 
Provinces of origin). With the advent of the Grand SAWA Movement, they 
have now extended their interests to include what the movement stands for in 
general. Newer papers such as Elimbi, Muendi, The Beacon and Fako Interna-
tional (Mendi me Fako) have been created to focus more specifically on the 
political ambitions of the SAWA elite in the Littoral and South West 
Provinces, and to oppose Grassfields hegemony as a matter of policy. Since 
1996, little has escaped criticism or comment by this press, including inter-
tribal wars in the North West,63 using them as an opportunity to deride the war-
mongering nature of Grassfielders and their penchant for fighting over land. 
During elections, the press sought through the rhetoric of ethnic cleansing to 
solve problems of political representation, and to encourage a widespread 
antagonism towards ‘strangers’, denouncing them as parasites and ‘traitors in 
the house’ (Collectif ‘Changer le Cameroun’ 1992; Eboussi Boulaga 1997b; 
Jua 1997). They sought to achieve, through a language of ethnicity and 
difference, the necessary level of fear that any kind of mixing with ‘dubious 
settlers’ would in the end be damaging to the minority interests. 
As Wang Sonnè notes, the first issue of Elimbi on 26 March 1996 coincided 
with the launching of the SAWA Movement. Initially a bi-monthly, Elimbi 
became a weekly in November 1996 as the politics of belonging heated up. It 
described itself as a regional newspaper that targeted the people of the coast, 
paying attention in particular to the activities and news of the coastal elite. But 
Elimbi’s most striking feature was ‘the production and dissemination of ideas 
hostile to the Francophone Grassfielders, the Bamileke’. In this connection, 
Elimbi presented the Bamileke as a catalogue of weaknesses (porteur de tous 
les défauts), among which were stereotypes of the Bamileke as: ‘sale, voleur, 
malin, rusé, trompeur, désordonné, sectariste, hégémonique’. In February 1997 
on the eve of the March legislative elections, the proprietor of Elimbi, John 
Mandengué Epée, a native Douala businessman who a couple of years 
previously had initiated a libel case that ended in the imprisonment of Paddy 
Mbawa of Cameroon Post, launched a monthly publication entitled Muendi, 
with the mission of further defending SAWA identity and intensifying the anti-
Bamileke feeling in Douala (Wang Sonnè 1997: 188-89). 
The Grassfielders used the private press to fight back. In a similar manner, 
existing papers redefined their editorial focus, while new ethnic or regional 
                                                 
63  For these inter-tribal wars in the North West, see, for instance, Simo 1997. 
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papers sprung up. The Bamileke and North West elite used established papers, 
most of which they owned and/or controlled, to riposte the attack by the 
SAWA press, interpreting the January 1996 constitutional changes as an 
impediment to the democratic process. The sheer volume of diatribes, 
commentaries, opinion and reports related to autochthony and allochthony in 
Grassfields newspapers such as La Nouvelle Expression, Le Messager, The 
Post and The Herald were an indication of how absorbing the politics of 
belonging had become since 1996, with equally blatantly ethnic papers like 
Ouest Echo and Nde Echo leading the way. Paradoxically, although about 
belonging, the Anglophone problem in Cameroon is being drowned by a press 
and government obsessed with a different kind of belonging. 
In this connection, it would appear that even the South West would find it 
hard to remain united if the settlers from the Grassfields were to be chased out 
for good. For Governor Oben Peter Ashu to defend Prime Minister Musonge, 
as we have noted above, does not imply that the governor, as a Banyang from 
Manyu Division, is in total agreement with the Bakweri ethnic group of the 
prime minister. The politics of autochthony allows for multiple differences 
along regional, ethnic, tribal and clan lines such that one could agree and act 
together with others at a macro level but still be violently different at the micro 
level. Thus the very Oben Peter Ashu who defends Musonge at the macro level 
complains at the micro level of inter-ethnic or inter-divisional relations that the 
Bayang lost out to the Bakweri when the prime minister was appointed from 
among the Bakweri instead of from the Bayang. This is how The Herald 
reported his reaction to Musonge’s appointment as prime minister in 1996: 
 
South West Governor, Peter Oben Ashu, has lashed out at some Bakweri for making 
the appointment of Prime Minister Peter Mafany Musonge look like a ‘Bakweri 
affair’. The Bayang, the governor said, were ‘still licking their wounds after they lost 
out to the Bakweri, while Ndian, Lebialem, etc are grumbling’. 
 The governor warned at a second preparatory meeting for the Prime Minister’s 
reception in Buea on October 9, that he was going to give the reception a 
‘provincial’ rather than tribal dimension. He warned that all motions of support 
should be void of any tribal connotations and ‘no such things as the roads to Mamfe 
or Buea are bad’. ‘We should be very careful not to give the impression that the 
Prime Minister is a Bakweri Prime Minister’, he warned. [....] 
 It would be recalled that Peter Agbor Tabi, Higher Education Minister, a Bayang 
like Oben Ashu, made his lobby for the post of prime minister public knowledge.64  
  
In fact, the Bayang, whose division is less developed and who have had to 
migrate to Meme and Fako Divisions, see themselves as marginalised and 
despised by the indigenes of these other divisions. According to a report in the 
                                                 
64  The Herald, 18-20 October 1996, p. 1. 
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Weekly Post,65 a paper owned and managed by a Bayang, some Bayang 
complained of being ‘put in the cold’ when it came to awarding contracts in 
Meme and Fako Divisions. ‘It is an open secret that contracts are not awarded 
to people of Manyu origin’, the report claimed. ‘We are told bluntly that we 
should go to councils in our own division and tender for contracts even though 
we live in these divisions (Fako and Meme) and pay our taxes here’, one 
contractor revealed. ‘In the Limbe Urban Council, the situation has always 
been one of hostility towards us. At a time when a Metta man [a migrant from 
the North West Province] was one of the Mayors, the natives were so vocal in 
calling only for the removal of three Manyu people holding the offices of 
Stores Accountant, Chief Clerk and Market Master. Today all the three have 
been removed and the office of Market Master handed to a Metta man. And we 
all know where the Metta votes would go to during elections’, a leader of the 
Manyu community in Limbe told the newspaper. ‘It seems whenever something 
goes wrong within the native population, the people are worked into believing 
that it is caused by Manyu people’, the man added. Others have complained 
about bad and untarred roads, and blame local and national politicians for 
taking them for granted. Like the people of Donga-Mantung Division in the 
North West Province who have asked for the creation of a Far North West 
Province with a headquarters in Nkambe, some in Manyu Division have asked 
for their own province as a way of ending marginalisation and attracting 
administrative attention and resources.66 With the politics of autochthony, 
people have come to believe that it is only by having one’s own administrative 
unit (subdivision, division or province), that one stands a good chance of 
benefiting from the national cake which different groups wish to appropriate to 
the detriment of others. The sheer increase in the number of requests for such 
administrative units tells the whole story. Each request is made in exchange for 
promises of support for the CPDM at elections. In the South West, the Bayang 
of Manyu are not alone in feeling that the Bakweri are receiving more than 
their fair share of representation in government and high office. The Bakossi 
elite of Kupe Muanenguba Division have also pondered why the Bakweri 
whose constituency is dominated by the opposition and whose numerical 
strength ‘is negligible should occupy several key positions in government and 
the CPDM’. They claim not to have been adequately compensated for voting 
for the CPDM.67 
 
 
                                                 
65  Weekly Post, 8 April 1997, p. 1. 
66  The Herald, 4-5 November 1996, pp. 1 and 3 and 2-4 May 1997, p. 3. 
67  The Herald, 29-31 January 1997, p. 1. 
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Repression 
 
Most of the strategies employed by the government to deconstruct Anglophone 
identity tended to be accompanied by ruthless repression of the Anglophone 
population and Anglophone activities.68 The South West Provincial Governor 
Oben Peter Ashu became so unpopular following his decision in 1993 to 
brutalise the local population with the military in a bid to forcibly recover 
unpaid taxes and to stop smuggling that his name was corrupted to ‘Obey Peter 
Shoot’. The North West Provincial Governor Bell Luc René a Francophone 
hailing from Douala, was nicknamed ‘Bend Look Grenade’ as a result of the 
security forces’ excessive use of tear-gas grenades to disperse opposition rallies 
and demonstrations in the North West during the 1991 ghost town campaign 
and the 1992 state of emergency in Bamenda following ‘Biya's theft of Fru 
Ndi’s victory’ in the presidential elections (Nyamnjoh 1996d: 110, footnote 
129). 
Major Anglophone opposition parties, like the North West-based SDF and 
the South West-based LDA, continued to be exposed to state intimidation and 
violence. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the launching of the SDF in May 1990 
led to the killing by security forces of six demonstrators, the so-called Bamenda 
martyrs. The launching of the LDA in Buea on 19 September 1993 prompted 
the security forces to launch a tear-gas attack on the approximately 400 party 
sympathisers gathered at the premises of the party chairman, Njoh Litumbe. 
This act can probably be explained by the fact that the LDA executive was 
composed of some of the principal SCNC leaders, notably Sam Ekontang Elad, 
Simon Munzu, Henry Fossung and Njoh Litumbe. The government regularly 
prohibited the Anglophone opposition parties from holding rallies and the 
security forces often broke up those that did take place.  
A well-publicised example occurred on Wednesday 3 November 1993 – the 
day set aside by the government to celebrate Liberty Week or 11 years of 
Biya’s presidency – and involved a confrontation between a convoy led by 
John Fru Ndi of the SDF and the police in Yaoundé. CRTV mentioned the 
incident only on the Friday, after foreign broadcasters had made much of the 
event. The story went thus. The Mfoundi prefect had issued an order banning 
all political demonstrations and forbidding John Fru Ndi’s scheduled news 
conference. The latter then organised a convoy from Tsinga towards his party 
secretariat behind the former Imperial Hotel (now the Prestige Hotel). The 
police attacked them with water canons. Fru Ndi was claimed to be injured and 
his car damaged. He escaped and took refuge in the residence of the Dutch 
                                                 
68  For an extensive report on the government’s violation of human rights in the 
Southern Cameroons, see Ayamba 2001. 
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ambassador in Mvolye, and gave an ultimatum for the release of the thirty SDF 
militants arrested. The police were rumoured to have been intending to kill 
him. The notorious head of Cameroon’s internal security, Jean Fochive,69 gave 
a press conference claiming that all those arrested had been released but for a 
certain Shey Philip who had been found with ammunition and two walkie-
talkies. But even he was eventually released. He then proceeded to accuse Fru 
Ndi of seeking cheap publicity and of always deliberately disrespecting the law 
of the land. He offered to give Fru Ndi a police escort to Bamenda if the latter 
was afraid, as he claimed, that his life was in danger. 
According to Augustine Tegomoh (interviewed by Nyamnjoh shortly after 
the incident) who participated in the incident and was quite close to the 
chairman, no stones were thrown by the crowd, contrary to claims by the 
official media. The chairman gave a scheduled press conference in Tsinga. On 
his arrival, he saw the place crowded with policemen who were molesting and 
arresting those who had come to attend. When they saw the chairman, the 
crowd started chanting ‘papa ley, Yaya you’ (Papa welcome! We are pleased to 
see you again). Having been told that he was not allowed to hold his press 
conference, the chairman decided to go to his party’s (SDF) provincial head 
office situated behind the Imperial Hotel. The crowd that followed him 
continued to swell as he drove along. It was a real test of his popularity, 
Augustine claimed. Everyone who saw him followed him, shouting ‘you are the 
man we want’. Around the prime minister’s office the police, backed by lots of 
four- and five-star commissioners, blocked the way. The chairman told the 
crowd to be calm and no one threw any stones at the police. Diplomatic 
representatives, Vincent T’sas of Reuters and others who were there can attest 
to this. The police focused their water canon on the chairman’s Pajero car. The 
chairman stayed calm but was wounded on his arm and hip by broken glass.  
Minister of Communication and Government Spokesman Augustin 
Kontchou made it sound as if the Dutch ambassador was Fru Ndi’s friend 
because Fru Ndi had taken refuge in the Dutch embassy but the latter had 
simply gone to pay him a visit. ‘Monsieur Fru Ndi est allé rendre visite à son 
ami diplomate’, and stayed there for as long as he wanted, and when he was 
satisfied, they shook hands and he departed. Kontchou apparently contradicted 
the CRTV announcement that Fru Ndi had left the Dutch embassy following 
the diplomatic intervention of the French ambassador. No such intervention 
actually occurred as there was no need for it. People are allowed to have 
friends among diplomats. Why the fuss? 
                                                 
69  For a concise description of his internal security career, see Takougang & Krieger 
1998: 93 and 227-28. 
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The Anglophone movements were also frequent victims of government 
repression. In 1993, the government did not allow the convenors to hold AAC I 
in public buildings in Buea such as at the University of Buea, which would 
have been the most appropriate location for the occasion. The government 
refusal did not have the desired effect of cancelling the AAC I, since the 
Catholic authorities eventually gave their agreement to the use of a hall in the 
Mount Mary Clinic in Buea.70 In 1994, the government attempted to obstruct 
the organisation of AAC II in Bamenda by claiming that ‘Anglophones had 
come together in Bamenda to declare secession’ as an excuse for repression.71 
On that occasion, Chairman Sam Ekontang Elad had to be smuggled out of the 
Mondial Hotel disguised as a steward, the hotel having been surrounded by 
government troops.72 Demonstrations and strikes organised by the various 
Anglophone associations and pressure groups were quelled by government 
troops. For example, ‘Independence Day’ celebrations on 1 October 1993 were 
violently disrupted by the security forces, the government again suspecting that 
on that day secession and independence would be declared. Leaders of 
Anglophone movements were harassed by the security forces, threatened with 
arrest, and subjected to travel restrictions, forcing some to go into exile.73 
Repression increased with mounting threats of the proclamation of an 
independent Southern Cameroons state after 1995. SCNC rallies and demon-
strations were then officially banned in Anglophone provinces.74 Repression 
became even more severe in the aftermath of the SCYL attack on military and 
civil establishments in the North West Province in March 1997 and the actual 
proclamation of Southern Cameroons’ independence by Justice Ebong on 30 
December 1999 (see Chapter 4). Press censorship by the administrative 
authorities, the seizure of newspapers, intimidation and imprisonment of 
Anglophone journalists have all continued unabated. 
The government also intensified its crackdown on any event organised by 
scholars and activists to foster a feeling of community or to celebrate Anglo-
                                                 
70  See ‘The Untold Story of the All Anglophone Conference’, in Cameroon Life, Vol. 
2, No. 8, May 1993, pp. 11-12. 
71  See Cameroon Post, 20-27 April 1994, pp. 2-3; The Herald, 28 April-1 May 1994, 
pp. 1-2 and Cameroon Post, 29 June-6 July 1994, pp. 6-7. 
72  See Cameroon Post, 6-12 May 1994 and 12-19 May 1994. 
73  See Cameroon Post, 10-17 July 1995, pp. 1 and 3 for an example in Governor Oben 
Peter Ashu’s declaration that ‘SCNC is ... an illegal pressure group which wants to 
turn Buea into a battle ground’ and that ‘we must chase the leaders of that group out 
of this province’. See also Cameroon Post, 25 June-1 July 1996, pp. 1, 7 and 11, for 
the article ‘Arrest of SCNC Leaders Imminent’ and for SCNC Chairman Henry 
Fossung’s interview on this and other issues. 
74  See Cameroon Post, 24-31 July 1995, pp. 1 and 3 and The Herald, 31 July-2 
August, 1995, pp. 1-2. 
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phone achievements and identity. A scheduled launching of Nyamnjoh’s book 
The Cameroon GCE Crisis: A Test of Anglophone Solidarity (1996a) was 
banned at the last minute, and the author, Asong Wara (organiser) and 
Christian Cardinal Tumi (chief launcher) threatened with 15 days renewable 
detention should they proceed despite the ban. Subsequent bans were brought 
to bear on the launching of a booklet by lawyer and activist Charles Taku 
entitled For Dame Lynda Chalker and Other Anglophone Cameroonian Notes 
(1996), and of Ambassador Nsahlai’s book Up to the Mountain Top: Beyond 
Party Politics (1996). At the University of Buea, any academic or student even 
remotely sympathetic with or politically involved in the Anglophone cause has 
been victimised in one way or another by a vice-chancellor and collaborators 
who have been bought into the regime’s programme of trivialisation and 
demonisation of Anglophoneness in Cameroon. The University of Buea, 
although created as an Anglo-Saxon university to satisfy the Anglophones as a 
whole, has increasingly been identified first as a CPDM South West university, 
and then as a CPDM Bakweri university. The vice-chancellor (who is a 
member of the political bureau of the CDPM) and the registrar of the university 
are active local CPDM militants. They are both Bakweri and come from the 
same village in Buea. The Fako Elite Development Organisation (FEDO) 
frequently influences decision-making at the university, and despite complaints 
by other staff that neither this nor the appointment of top management from the 
same village and ethnic group is good for the institution, the state has allowed 
the situation to prevail. Dr Dorothy Njeuma, the vice-chancellor, Registrar 
Herbert Endeley and other Bakweri members of staff as Bakweri ‘sons and 
daughters’ treat the university as ‘our university’.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter it has been shown that the Biya government has made a deter-
mined effort to deconstruct Anglophone identity and to contain the threat of 
Anglophone organisations. It has employed several strategies that have dealt a 
heavy blow to the initially powerful Anglophone opposition parties and 
movements. These strategies have included the trivialisation and demonisation 
of the Anglophone problem, the establishment of control over the state media, 
the punishing of any journalist and/or public intellectual who has dared to 
propagate Anglophone identity and solidarity, and encouragement of the 
ethnic-regional print media, as well as outright repression. 
The most important strategy, however, has been divide and rule, capitalising 
on the existing contradictions between the South West and North West. Seeing 
themselves as having suffered greater disadvantage than North Westerners in 
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the distribution of state power, the South West elite were inclined to see more 
political capital in the promotion of regional identity and organisation than in 
working to consolidate an Anglophone identity and organisation. The govern-
ment, therefore, found it increasingly lucrative and politically expedient to 
tempt the South West elite away from Anglophone solidarity with strategic 
appointments and the idea that their real enemy was the North West elite and 
not the Francophone-dominated state.  
Government divide-and-rule tactics culminated in the 1996 constitution. 
This constitution stretched the conventional notion of autochthonous minorities 
to such ambiguous proportions that historical minorities like the Anglophones 
had themselves denied the status of minority, while ethnic-regional minority 
groups like the South West ethnic groups and the SAWA (Douala), which 
appeared to distance themselves from the opposition, have met with govern-
ment support. The constitution fuelled existing tensions between South 
Westerners and North Westerners in the Anglophone territory. The pro-CPDM 
South West elite increasingly tended to accuse the large-scale northwestern 
settler population of domination and exploitation, land grabbing and ingratitude 
to the welcoming indigenes. They have not hesitated to use the settler presence 
to explain all political disturbances in the South West Province, even going as 
far as insinuating that the poor performance by the ruling CPDM and 
secessionist tendencies among Anglophones could be attributed wholly to the 
settler opposition and dissidents. The litmus test for ‘South-Westness’, it would 
appear, has become membership and militancy in the CPDM. 
The constitution has equally stimulated an alliance between the ethnically-
related Anglophone and Francophone coastal elite (Grand SAWA Movement) 
on the basis of common feelings of domination and exploitation by Anglo-
phone and Francophone Grassfielders (Grand West). The Grand SAWA 
Movement is opposed to wider Anglophone ambitions, including separation 
from Francophone Cameroon or the creation of a two-state federation. Like 
most Francophones, the pro-CPDM South West elite continues to strive for a 
ten-state option, which they regard as a safe guarantee against North West 
domination. The Grand SAWA Movement demonstrates strong allegiance to 
the regime in power for the latter’s protection and strategic appointments in 
government.  
It is with this divide in the Anglophone identity that the Biya government 
has made considerable progress in undermining support both for the North 
West-based SDF and the Anglophone movements’ pursuit of autonomy in the 
form of either a two-state federation or an independent Southern Cameroons 
state. We have, however, provided evidence that the regime has failed to fully 
deconstruct the Anglophone identity, even among elites who support the 
CPDM and the government. A growing number of CPDM leaders appear to 
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identify with Fuh Stanley, the president of the Bafut section of the CPDM in 
the North West when he openly confessed in February 2000: ‘I am CPDM in 
blood and bones, but we must admit that Anglophones have a problem’.75 The 
proclamation of Southern Cameroons’ independence by Justice Ebong on 30 
December 1999 appears to have given added impetus to the Anglophone 
struggle. 
 
 
75  The Post, 14 February 2000, p. 3. 
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The Anglophone struggle for  
the preservation of its educational  
and economic legacy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Among the many confrontations between the Francophone-dominated state and 
Anglophone organisations, two deserve particular attention. The first is the 
Anglophone demand for an autonomous General Certificate of Education 
(GCE) Board in the 1990-1993 period and the second concerns Anglophone 
protests against the government-announced privatisation of the Cameroon 
Development Corporation (CDC) in 1994. During these confrontations Anglo-
phones displayed a sense of solidarity never seen before. In this chapter we 
show that their exceptional unity may be attributed to the fact that they were 
determined to forestall the Francophone-dominated state’s total dismantlement 
of their educational and economic legacy. Two of the remnants of Anglophone 
heritage and identity, the GCE and the CDC, were in danger of being taken over 
by Francophones. 
Confronted with this unexpected Anglophone solidarity, the regime was 
forced to make concessions but the Anglophone victory was short-lived. When 
the Anglophone movements started losing momentum and internal divisions 
among them reappeared, the regime began to regain its lost terrain and to 
withdraw previously offered concessions. 
 
 
163 
The Anglophone struggle for the preservation  
of its educational legacy 
 
The GCE crisis 
Following reunification, the Francophone-dominated government strove to 
harmonise the two different colonial educational systems. Initially, the Anglo-
phones tended to support this harmonisation drive on the assumption that it 
would eventually result in the adoption of the best elements in both colonial 
legacies. They became increasingly worried when harmonisation turned out to 
be an ill-concealed Francophone attempt at assimilation and even dismantle-
ment of their educational system, which they rightly perceived as a direct threat 
to the preservation of their Anglophone identity. 
Harmonisation attempts, in fact, posed many problems to Anglophone 
students and began to lower educational standards in Anglophone Cameroon. A 
few examples suffice here. Technical colleges in the region were systematically 
subjected to harmonisation and were obliged to introduce the Francophone 
curriculum and examination system. They became almost exclusively staffed by 
Francophones, with most teaching either in French, Pidgin English or what 
Anglophones tend to call ‘Franglais’. No wonder that the students had little 
chance of passing their examinations. Students who turned to external examina-
tions, like the City and Guilds and the Royal Society of Arts (RSA) were likely 
to be frustrated by the ministry of national education. Moreover, in sharp 
contrast to Francophone Cameroon, Anglophone Cameroon had once been 
proud of its excellent teacher-training traditions characterised by high standards 
of professional and ethical formation and Spartan discipline. By the end of the 
1960s there were twelve teacher-training colleges in the region almost exclu-
sively owned and run by the established churches. All were boarding institu-
tions that offered a five-year course for primary school teachers. By the middle 
of the 1970s practically all the colleges had closed as a result of a subtle policy 
of asphyxiation on the part of the Francophone-dominated state. Their closure 
had a negative effect on the quality of primary education. 
Against this background, it is understandable that Anglophones began to 
openly resist the Francophone onslaught on Anglophone education. In 1983, 
Anglophone students at the University of Yaoundé strongly opposed govern-
ment attempts to harmonise the Anglophone GCE Ordinary and Advanced 
Levels with the Francophone Baccalauréat (BAC). In a ministerial circular of 
27 September 1983, René Ze Nguele, the Francophone minister of national 
education proposed a new group certificate GCE,1 stressing that ‘it would make 
the GCE look a little more like the BAC’ and help Anglophones to gain 
                                                 
1  This ministerial circular is reproduced in Nyamnjoh 1996a: 42-47. 
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admission to higher institutions of learning in Cameroon. Anglophone 
university students became infuriated when they gained access to the circular 
following its publication in the national weekly, the Cameroon Tribune, on 16 
November 1983. They spontaneously agreed that they had to take action for ‘the 
Francophones had gone too far’. 
It is not surprising that these students took the initiative to defend Anglo-
phone interests. They themselves were facing hardship in the highest institute of 
learning. Though officially a bilingual institution, the University of Yaoundé 
was clearly a Francophone institution. This was once again illustrated by the 
dismissal of Dr Bisong, an Anglophone lecturer in the department of econom-
ics, simply because he was not yielding to Francophone pressures in the 
university to teach in French and ‘Frenchify’ his course content (see Chapter 3). 
The students strongly condemned the assimilationist tendencies in the ministe-
rial circular, arguing that the problems faced by Anglophone students in the 
higher institutes of learning were not due to their inadequate educational back-
ground but rather to these institutes’ Francophone orientation and curriculum. 
They then vowed to save the GCE from the fangs of Francophone assimilation 
and reiterated the need for true bilingualism in the university. They drew up a 
petition demanding the repeal of the proposed reforms. On 22 March, they 
marched to the ministry of national education where they were met by security 
forces who prevented them from presenting their petition to the minister. They 
then decided to boycott classes and organise daily demonstrations. For eleven 
days they braved all odds, being constantly surrounded and attacked by heavily 
armed troops and being described in the government-controlled media as 
enemies of national integration.2 
Eventually, on 2 December, a meeting was arranged between student 
representatives and a government delegation, including a substantial number of 
prominent Anglophone politicians such as Solomon Tandeng Muna, the then 
speaker of the national assembly, John Ngu Foncha, Emmanuel Agbor Tabi and 
Professor Bernard Fonlon. The government delegation informed the students 
that President Biya was requesting they resume classes while their grievances 
and other matters affecting education received appropriate attention. Mean-
while, the proposed reforms were suspended indefinitely. After some hesitation, 
the students decided to call off their strike.3 
In an attempt at appeasement, President Biya set up a commission in 1984 to 
study problems related to the GCE. This commission, chaired by Professor 
Joseph Mboui, the Francophone secretary-general at the ministry of national 
education, spent huge sums of money touring Cameroon, West Africa, Britain 
                                                 
2  See The Messenger, 25 November 1993, p. 11. 
3  For a full account of the students’ protest actions, see Nyamnjoh 1996a: 19-70. 
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and Canada, but never submitted a report. In 1989, another Francophone 
minister of national education, Professor Georges Ngango, attempted to 
introduce a new GCE reform scheme that would impose on Anglophones the 
Francophone structure of four years for the first cycle and three years for the 
second cycle. Fierce opposition and widespread demonstrations by Anglophone 
students and parents forced the Biya regime to sack the minister and halt the 
scheme. Loss of confidence in the Biya regime increased with this new attempt 
to destroy the GCE. 
By 1990, there was ample evidence that the ministry of national education 
was managing the GCE examinations poorly, leading to severe abuse of the 
system and numerous irregularities in the conduct of these examinations. 
Francophone officials attempted to establish control over the GCE, notwith-
standing the fact that most either lacked competence or neglected their 
responsibilities. Financial problems compounded the situation. The ministry 
proved incapable of paying their local examiners and the University of London 
regularly for their services and in 1990, the University of London decided to 
suspend its cooperation with the ministry as a result of debts amounting to 
FCFA 350 million. The consequences were disastrous. Typists who did not 
understand a word of English were recruited to type examination questions. The 
proofreading, printing and packaging of examination questions were badly 
handled. The GCE examinations were rapidly losing their traditional high 
standards and reputation as gross errors were made at all levels. It was only a 
matter of time before its credibility started to sink too.4 
Given these circumstances, Anglophone secondary and high-school teachers 
organised a meeting at Government School Atuakum in the North West 
Province on 25 April 1991 to discuss the problems related to the GCE examina-
tions. Discussions focused on the non-payment of examiners for their services 
and the continuing existence of Yaoundé as one of the marking centres.5 The 
teachers resolved that all dues owed to the GCE examiners for the period 1984-
1990, including marking fees and out-of-station allowances, be paid to them by 
the ministry of national education before the commencement of the correction 
of the 1991 GCE scripts. ‘Money for left hand, red pen for right hand’, they 
stated in Pidgin English. They agreed that there should be only two marking 
centres, Bamenda and Buea. Most of the examiners lived in these two centres 
and this would thus require fewer payments of living allowances. At the end of 
the meeting they decided to organise themselves into an association, the 
Teachers’ Association of Cameroon (TAC), for the defence of their interests.  
                                                 
4  See Nyamnjoh 1996a: 11-12. 
5  See Cameroon Now, 5-12 June 1991, p. 3. 
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Becoming increasingly concerned with the falling standards of GCE 
examinations, the TAC soon broadened its objectives to include the creation of 
an autonomous GCE Board as a matter of utmost urgency. In fact, it made the 
marking of the 1992 GCE examination scripts dependent on the government 
installation of such a board.  
 
The Anglophone struggle for an autonomous GCE board 
In its struggle for the establishment of an autonomous GCE board, the TAC 
received much-needed support from parents, students, churches, associations, 
political parties and the private press in Anglophone Cameroon, all being 
convinced that the TAC’s struggle was of great importance to the preservation 
of Anglophone education and identity. In the course of the struggle, the existing 
Anglophone Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs)6 formed an umbrella organisa-
tion, the so-called Confederation of Anglophone Parent Teacher Associations of 
Cameroon (CAPTAC). Following their foundation in 1992/93, the Cameroon 
Anglophone Movement (CAM) and the All Anglophone Conference (AAC) 
joined the fight. Most political parties also became involved though to differing 
degrees. The majority of the pro-CPDM elite and chiefs, however, either kept 
silent or condemned the struggle, often seeing it as another ploy by the Anglo-
phone parties, in particular the SDF, to attack the government. Interestingly, 
while most Francophones did not understand what the struggle was all about, 
some of the Francophone opposition papers backed the struggle, as did popular 
Francophone intellectuals like Mongo Beti.7  
Confronted with the persistent refusal of the TAC to mark the June 1992 
GCE examinations until the government had approved the installation of an 
autonomous GCE board, the newly appointed Anglophone Prime Minister 
Simon Achidi Achu finally decided on 11 September 1992 to appoint a 
committee charged with making recommendations on the structure, organisation 
and operation of such a board. Apart from the intensified pressure from the 
TAC and parents, other considerations may have influenced the prime 
minister’s decision. First, the 1992 presidential elections were rapidly 
approaching and the GCE question could further undermine Anglophone 
support for the incumbent president. Secondly, the prime minister tried to win 
time and lure the TAC into marking the GCE examination scripts. The examin-
ers were promised that the GCE Board would be in operation before the June 
1993 examinations. As a result, the striking examiners marked the 1992 GCE 
examination scripts. 
                                                 
6  For the PTAs in Cameroon, see Boyle 1996 and 1999. 
7  See Mongo Beti 1993: 77-82. 
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After two months of intensive work, on 20 November 1992, the committee, 
which was mainly composed of Anglophone experts and headed by Professor 
Luc Beiban Sondengam, submitted its report to the minister of national 
education. Its report contained both a project for the decree creating the board8 
and a project for the text of application of the decree. It was widely commended 
as an excellent piece of work and even the minister of national education 
appeared to be impressed. 
Significantly, it was only after a series of follow-up sessions and extreme 
pressure by TAC and parents that the minister forwarded the report with favour-
able comments to the prime minister on 7 January 1993. The latter said that he 
would immediately pass it on to the presidency for the final decision to be 
made, assuring the National Executive of the TAC that the decree creating the 
board would be signed by the end of February 1993. 
By March 1993, the TAC was sending out warning signals. The June 1993 
examinations were not going to be marked before the creation of the board. The 
government nevertheless ignored these signals. The TAC then took the initiative 
of installing a board in Buea on 16 April 1993. According to its executive, this 
was to ensure that the board would have adequate time to handle the 1994 GCE 
examinations effectively. At that point, TAC members pledged to continue 
fighting till their objectives had been realised. The ministry of national 
education quickly declared the board illegal, and everything was done to 
discourage its effective operation. 
When no examiners showed up at the marking centres in mid-June, the 
government was obliged to devise a new scheme to mark the 1993 GCE 
examination scripts. The Francophone secretary-general at the presidency, 
Professor Joseph Owona, returned the draft decree to the minister of national 
education, Dr Robert Mbella Mbappe, with clear instructions on how to 
proceed. Interestingly, Anglophone Prime Minister Simon Achidi Achu was 
ignored in this endeavour. A carefully selected team of directors in the ministry 
of national education, nearly all Francophones, was called upon to study the 
draft decree on the board and make recommendations to the presidency. 
As a result of the work of this team, President Biya signed a vague decree 
creating the GCE Board on 1 July 1993. The decree deliberately left out a text 
of application as recommended by the report of the Sondengam Committee. 
Moreover, it tended to restrict the board’s responsibility to the GCE only, thus 
ignoring the frequently expressed TAC demand for a board that would cater for 
the entire Anglophone education system and examinations. After some hesita-
                                                 
8  The Sondengam Report proposed a Cameroon Examinations Board (CEB) that 
would take care of all Anglophone examinations. This was in agreement with the 
TAC’s initial proposal. 
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tion, the TAC nonetheless accepted the decree in principle, arguing that a future 
text of application of the decree could reflect its aspirations. However govern-
ment hopes that the signing of the decree would encourage the TAC to start 
marking the 1993 GCE examinations were dashed. The TAC made the govern-
ment understand in no uncertain terms that marking would be conditional on the 
government’s publication of the text of application and the actual installation of 
the board. It did not want to be deceived once again by the government. Minis-
ter of National Education Mbella Mbappe then employed all the weapons at his 
disposal to get the GCE examinations marked. His greatest miscalculation was 
to think that threats, insults and intimidation would create panic and disunity 
among the teachers. Armed with a long history of militancy (Verdzekov 1969), 
capable leadership and strong support from the vast majority of the Anglophone 
community, the teachers stood firm. 
On 19 August 1993, Mbella Mbappe called a meeting at the ministry of 
national education attended by members of the Final Award Committee, 
moderators and chief examiners. While many had expected that the minister 
would use this occasion to arrive at a final settlement with the Anglophone 
teachers and parents, he instead strongly attacked the TAC and CAPTAC. To 
the consternation of the Anglophone community, he even displayed a large 
measure of insensitivity with regard to the educational system in the country, 
boasting that he himself had no children studying in Cameroon. He summoned 
all examiners to report to the marking centres by 24 August 1993. They were 
given two weeks to finish marking and he threatened those who dared to 
disobey his orders (Nyamnjoh 1996a: 14). 
Realising very soon that intimidation had not had the desired effect, the 
minister altered his strategy, now being prepared to make some concessions. He 
created an ad hoc committee mainly composed of former members of the 
Sondengam Commission to rewrite and re-table the text of application for the 
GCE Board. Yet, he assured the committee members that they could take their 
time and that there was no hurry! Being aware of the explosive mood in the 
Anglophone community, the committee ignored the minister’s instructions. It 
worked day and night to complete the assignment and submitted the text on 14 
September 1993. In addition, the minister signed an order on 12 September 
1993 that closed the Yaoundé marking centre, leaving Bamenda and Buea as the 
only marking centres. 
Furious that the teachers were still refusing to start marking after these 
concessions, the minister ordered the armed forces to remove the GCE 
examination scripts from Bamenda and Buea a few days later. During the night 
of 14 September 1993, soldiers secretly broke into the Bamenda and Buea 
marking centres and took the scripts to Yaoundé. It took some days before the 
minister actually admitted that the scripts were in Yaoundé. 
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With the assistance of Anglophone CPDM leaders like Dr Peter Agbor Tabi, 
the rector of the University of Yaoundé, the minister then started recruiting new 
markers, particularly among Francophone students, who were often not properly 
qualified for the job. Recruiters and markers appear to have been well rewarded 
for their work. A budget of FCFA 600 million was reserved for the purpose. 
Agbor Tabi’s wife was reported to have received FCFA 22 million for her 
delivery of identification badges for the markers. At the same time, Mbella 
Mbappe and other government officials continued to tell Anglophone teachers 
to start marking in Yaoundé or face the consequences. 
These developments shocked Anglophones. The Anglophone Roman 
Catholic bishops and the Presbyterian Church leaders appealed to the govern-
ment, and particularly to the Anglophone Prime Minister Simon Achidi Achu to 
intervene in the matter, to return the GCE examination scripts to Bamenda and 
Buea, and to sign the text of application of the decree creating the GCE Board 
(Nyamnjoh 1996a: 117-45; Nyansako-ni-Nku 1993: 49-54). On the request of 
the prime minister, the Roman Catholic bishops organised a tripartite meeting 
on 3 October 1993 between the prime minister, the TAC and themselves to 
finally resolve the GCE stalemate. While the participants were convinced at the 
end of this meeting that they had come close to a solution, Mbella Mbappe, 
without awaiting the results of the meeting, issued an order the following day 
requesting that the newly recruited markers proceed with their work. 
On 7 October 1993, CAPTAC warned Mbella Mbappe that it would never 
accept the results of GCE examinations marked by unqualified staff. It threat-
ened to withdraw its children from school if the government refused to negotiate 
with the TAC for the effective marking of the GCE examinations. The minister 
provoked the CAPTAC delegation by replying that ‘he and the government 
were always right’, that ‘he intended to restore the authority of the state’, and 
that ‘he would make sure that the GCE would be marked by all means’. In 
addition, he remarked that ‘if they disapproved of the present markers, they 
should bring pressure to bear upon their own examiners to start marking’.9 
The situation deteriorated quickly. On 12 October 1993, Anglophone parents 
turned out in large number and demonstrated in front of the ministry of national 
education in Yaoundé and the provincial delegation of education in Bamenda. 
In Yaoundé, they were brutally dispersed by security forces but in Bamenda, the 
crowds held the Provincial Delegate for National Education Chief Martin 
Forbuzie hostage for six hours.10 
                                                 
9  The Herald, 13-20 October 1993, p. 5.  
10  Cameroon Post, 20-27 October 1993, especially the report on the Yaoundé 
demonstration by Julius M. Wamey entitled ‘The GCE Saga: Vidi Aquam (I saw 
water)’. 
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This time the regime reacted promptly to these demonstrations. On the same 
day, a text of application creating the GCE Board was read on the national radio 
in French. Anglophones, however, rejected this text since it excluded technical 
examinations from the board’s control. Prime Minister Simon Achidi Achu sent 
an envoy to Bamenda the next day to negotiate a more acceptable version with 
the TAC. This text was published on 15 October 1993. 
The final text still remained a far cry from what the TAC and the Anglo-
phone community had been clamouring for. It was a clear reflection of the 
compromises made between the government and Anglophone organisations. 
While Anglophones strove for an autonomous board, the text still provided the 
government with a measure of control. The government had a considerable say 
in strategic appointments. The text did not conceal government intentions of 
keeping the board under close supervision. Article 4 reads: ‘The Minister of 
National Education shall be responsible for the supervision of the Board’. And 
Article 45 states: ‘The financial management shall be handled according to 
regulatory provisions applicable to public corporations of administrative 
nature’.11 
Having lost faith in the regime, teachers still refused to start marking the 
GCE scripts until the board members were appointed and installed. Their lack 
of faith appeared to be justified when Minister Mbella Mbappe declared during 
a press conference on 19 October 1993 that the appointment and installation of 
the GCE Board was not an urgent matter and that schools were to re-open on 21 
October 1993 even if the marking of the GCE scripts had not yet been 
completed.12 
On 25 October 1993 Anglophones savoured a rare moment of triumph when 
the board was finally installed in Buea and Mr Sylvester Dioh, an experienced 
educational administrator, was appointed as its first chairman. Later on, Mr 
Andrew Azong Wara, the TAC president, was nominated as its first registrar. 
The Anglophone victory was short-lived, however, Since the GCE Board was 
more or less forced upon him, it was to be expected that Minister Mbella 
Mbappe would do all in his powers and means to destroy it. He used several 
strategies to this end. 
Immediately after the installation of the board, he attempted to undermine its 
authority. When Anglophone teachers took over the marking of the GCE scripts 
in Yaoundé, he claimed that almost the entire budget reserved for the marking 
exercise had already been allocated to the former examiners appointed by the 
ministry of national education. Determined not to endanger the board’s 
continued existence, the teachers then decided to mark without compensation. 
                                                 
11  For the text, see Nyamnjoh 1996a: 179-92. 
12  Cameroon Post, 27 October-3 November 1993, p. 8. 
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Although the marking period resulted in much personal hardship, including 
problems with paying for food and transport to and from the marking centres, 
they still persevered. Parents assisted in various ways and contributed a paltry 
sum of FCFA 250,000, and the Anglophone Prime Minister Simon Achidi Achu 
donated FCFA 2 million as a personal contribution. It was only after the 
completion of the marking and publication of the results that parents sent their 
children back to school.  
Following this failure, Mbella Mbappe began to withhold the necessary 
subventions to the board. According to the board’s authorities, the minister gave 
a financial subvention of FCFA 166 million during the first year of its opera-
tions, FCFA 44 million during the second year, and nothing in the third year. 
This compared most unfavourably with the ministry of national education’s 
yearly subventions amounting to FCFA 3.2-3.6 billion prior to the creation of 
the board.13 As a result, the board was obliged to rely heavily on the benevo-
lence of the teachers and parents and to take out loans in order to organise the 
examinations.14 Due to continuous financial problems, it was also forced to lay 
off a number of staff. 
Another strategy to cripple the board was the minister’s attempt to shift the 
debt of over FCFA 500 million owed by the ministry’s department of examina-
tions to the London University Examinations Board to the GCE Board. 
Although this attempt eventually failed, it led to strained relations between the 
GCE Board and the London University Board – a situation that did not augur 
well for the young institution.15 
On 5 September 1995, Mbella Mbappe again declared that the government 
was not going to recognise the technical examinations organised by the GCE 
Board. It was not until the personal intervention of the Anglophone Prime 
Minister Simon Achidi Achu that the minister was prepared to settle the matter 
with the angry TAC leadership.16 
The most important strategy was the minister’s attempt to replace TAC 
activists on the GCE Board with pro-CPDM leaders who tended to be less 
committed to the Anglophone cause. He directed his attacks foremost at Azong 
Wara, who doubled as registrar of the GCE Board and TAC president. In 1996, 
the position of the North Westerner Azong Wara, who continued to champion 
an autonomous GCE board, was seriously undermined by two factors.  
                                                 
13  See National Express, 12-18 June 1996, p. 2 and The Herald, 21-23 March 1997, p. 
5. 
14  The Post, 8 May 2000, pp. 1 and 5. 
15  Cameroon Post, 24-31 July 1995, pp. 1 and 5. 
16  The Herald, 9-11 October 1995, pp. 1-2; Today, 2 October 1995, p. 3 and Cameroon 
Post, 24-31 July 1995, pp. 1 and 5. 
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First, there was the unfortunate GCE examinations leakage in that year.17 
Mbella Mbappe then quickly set up a dubious commission of enquiry – some-
thing he had never done with the Francophone BAC and Brevet leakages in 
1995. He appointed as its chairman a South Westerner, Dr Herbert Endeley, son 
of Emmanuel Endeley and registrar of the University of Buea, a staunch CPDM 
member who was generally known to be more interested in advancing south-
western than Anglophone interest (see Chapter 5). Significantly, when inter-
viewed during a CRTV ‘Cameroon Calling’ programme on 18 August 1996, 
Endeley suggested that part of the organisation and running of the GCE 
examinations be handed back to the government.18 
Second, there were the two strikes by teachers in 1996 aimed at an 
improvement in their conditions of service. TAC members soon lost confidence 
in their leader Azong Wara who did not support the first strike and – after initial 
support – even called off the second strike. TAC members then accused him of 
being a traitor and demanded his resignation as leader of the association.19 There 
is no doubt that the government took advantage of this situation to bring about 
Azong Wara’s downfall as registrar of the GCE Board. 
After the presentation of his report of enquiry into the 1996 GCE examina-
tions leakage, Herbert Endeley was appointed chairman of the GCE Board. On 
12 March 1997, he convened an extraordinary session of the GCE Board, 
ostensibly on the instructions of Mbella Mbappe. During this meeting, Azong 
Wara was replaced by Dr Omer Yembe, a North Westerner with a more 
conciliatory nature.20 The latter used to be a member of the ‘Gang of Five’ that 
tried to forestall the holding of AAC II in Bamenda in 1994 (see Chapter 4). A 
number of TAC hardliners and Anglophones committed to an autonomous GCE 
board, notably Mr John Fodji, Rev. Yufanyi, Rev. Dr Ndingwan, and Dr Nsai, 
were equally removed as board members.21 
The government was sure that those now in power at the GCE Board would 
implement the provisions of a secret decree (no. 97/046) signed by President 
Biya on 5 March 1997 that ‘placed the GCE Board under the authority of the 
Minister in charge of National Education’. This new decree gave the minister of 
national education overall power to control the board. It thus contrasts sharply 
                                                 
17  Many Anglophones believe that this leakage was engineered by the government 
itself. 
18  Cameroon Post, 27 August–2 September 1996, p. 2. 
19  The Herald, 3-5 January 1997, pp. 1-2. 
20  Azong Wara was not immediately re-instated in his position as teacher or 
redeployed. Feeling frustrated and abandoned, he gradually turned his energies and 
intellect to SCNC activism. 
21  Cameroon Post, 11-17 March 1997, p. 1. 
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with the decree of 15 October 1993 that granted the minister only supervisory 
powers  
 
 
The Anglophone struggle for the preservation  
of its economic legacy 
 
CDC privatisation 
Privatisation has been put forward by international donors as one of the magic 
formulas that could cure the ailing Cameroonian economy. For many years until 
the mid-1980s, the economy of Cameroon had been viewed as one of the rare 
success stories in Africa. This was not without foundation: Cameroon’s 
economic performance was impressive, registering a phenomenal growth rate of 
6-7 per cent during the 1970-1986 period (Jua 1991). However, as Hugon 
(1968) was the first to point out, this optimistic view tended to ignore certain 
weaknesses in the domestic economy which constantly threatened the ‘growth 
miracle’ – in particular the economy’s almost total dependence on the export of 
agricultural raw materials and, more recently, of oil. This particular weakness 
became increasingly manifest from the mid-1980s onwards when a sharp fall in 
the prices of these commodities on the world market, together with a 40-per-
cent depreciation of the US dollar relative to the CFA franc, plunged the 
domestic economy into severe crisis (Mama 1996). This situation was worsened 
by large-scale mismanagement, embezzlement and capital flight estimated at 
FCFA 150 billion a year – a quarter of the annual national budget. Apparently 
the much-trumpeted slogans of ‘rigour and moralisation’, which Paul Biya had 
coined on succeeding Ahmadou Ahidjo as president in 1982, had been nothing 
more than hollow phrases. After some procrastination, the government was 
forced to adopt a structural adjustment programme (SAP) in 1988/89 containing 
such conventional prescriptions as cuts in public expenditure, increased state 
revenues, privatisation and rigorous liberalisation (Van de Walle 1993; Konings 
1996a). 
At the start of the economic crisis, there were some 175 public enterprises in 
the country employing around 80,000 people. A considerable number of agro-
industrial parastatals had been created or expanded after independence with the 
aid of international donors (Konings 1993a). These public enterprises served 
both economic and political ends. Besides being political avenues to economic 
modernisation and growth, they allowed the government to engage in prebendal 
politics and to cement a hegemonic alliance, incorporating the country’s 
emerging elite into the state apparatus (Bayart 1979). A patrimonial logic 
existed in many post-colonial African states (Chabal & Daloz 1999) but it was 
particularly strong in Cameroon, a country with stark ethnic and regional 
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cleavages (Nyamnjoh 1999; Gabriel 1999). It is beyond any doubt that this 
logic contributed to the poor performance of most public and para-public enter-
prises (Tedga 1990; Van de Walle 1994). Prior to the economic crisis, the 
Cameroonian government was subsidising parastatal sector losses to the tune of 
some FCFA 150 billion a year. Though much of the oil revenue was initially 
kept in secret bank accounts abroad, its primary function soon became the 
covering of parastatal deficits. 
From the very start of the economic crisis, the World Bank made parastatal 
reform a cornerstone of its lending conditions. Given the growing budgetary 
constraints, the Biya government officially agreed to cooperate. In May 1987 it 
appointed a national commission to recommend reform measures for the 
parastatal sector. One year later the commission reported back to the president, 
having determined which institutions should be liquidated, sold to the private 
sector or rehabilitated. However, few public enterprises were effectively 
privatised, only six between 1988 and 1994 (Mama 1996). Van de Walle (1994: 
162) offered the following reasons for the slow pace of privatisation: 
 
Although the government is proceeding with care on the politically sensitive issue 
of lay-offs, this does not appear to be the major constraint on rapid implementation 
of the reform agenda. Rather, intra-elite competition and haggling over the rents 
freed up by privatisation, along with the lack of technical expertise within the state, 
served to slow down the process of institutional reform. 
 
Dissatisfied with the government’s performance, the World Bank threatened 
in early 1994 to suspend credit of US$ 75 million to Cameroon if the govern-
ment did not accelerate the process of privatisation. Subsequently, on 14 July 
1994, the government announced the privatisation of fifteen large public enter-
prises. Five agro-industrial parastatals, including the CDC, were among them. 
For various reasons, the announced privatisation of the CDC led to considerable 
commotion in the country, particularly in Anglophone regions.  
The CDC is one of the oldest agro-industrial enterprises in the country, with 
its history being closely linked to the political and economic history of Anglo-
phone Cameroon. It was founded in 1946 but its roots can be traced back to the 
German colonial period (1884-1914) (Ardener et al. 1960; Epale 1985; Konings 
1993a). During that period many large-scale private plantations were created on 
the fertile volcanic soils around Mount Cameroon in the present South West 
Province. The establishment of a plantation economy in the region led to the 
expulsion of the original occupants of the land, notably the Bakweri, into 
prescribed native reserves (Courade 1981/82; Molua 1985). With the British 
occupation in 1914/15, the property of German planters was confiscated and 
turned over to the custodian of enemy property. When, shortly afterwards, the 
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British took over the administration of the area, the plantations were merged 
and a government department was formed to manage them. By 1922, however, 
the British Mandate Authority had already decided to get rid of them as the 
administrative costs of maintaining them were said to be prohibitive. It then 
seriously considered returning the plantation lands to the original owners but in 
the end it dropped the idea. Instead, it concluded that it would be in the best 
interests of the territory and its inhabitants to put the plantations back into the 
hands of foreign private enterprise. At an auction held in London in November 
1924 almost all the estates were bought back by their former German owners.  
At the start of the Second World War, German estates were again expropri-
ated by the custodian of enemy property and after the war, a decision had to be 
reached once more on how to dispose of the properties. The educated Bakweri 
elite, organised in the so-called Bakweri Land Committee, immediately began 
agitating for the return of its ancestral lands. It sent several petitions, first to the 
British Crown and subsequently to the United Nations, as Britain had assumed 
responsibility for the administration of the territory under United Nations 
trusteeship after the war. However, after considerable deliberation, the British 
Trusteeship Authority again declined to surrender the ex-German plantation 
lands to their original owners. Instead, it announced in November 1946 that 
they would be leased to a newly established statutory corporation, the 
Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC). 
The corporation came into being with the passage of two ordinances in 
December 1946. The first of these, the Ex-Enemy Lands (Cameroons) Ordi-
nance no. 38 (1946), provided for the acquisition of the ex-German plantation 
lands that had been vested in the custodian of enemy property for the duration 
of the Second World War. Under the terms of this ordinance, the Governor of 
Nigeria, responsible for the administration of the Southern Cameroons, was to 
declare them ‘native lands’ and hold them in trust for the common benefit of all 
inhabitants of the territory. The second ordinance, the Cameroons Development 
Corporation Ordinance no. 39 (1946), provided for the setting up of the corpo-
ration. All the lands acquired by the governor under the first ordinance were to 
be leased to this corporation for a period of sixty years. Significantly, the corpo-
ration was charged with a double responsibility: it was to develop and manage 
the approximately 100,000 hectares of estate lands in the interests of the people 
of the Trust Territory and it was to provide for the spiritual, educational and 
social welfare of its employees. After fulfilling all its obligations, the corpora-
tion was to pay direct taxes to the government of Nigeria and all profits were to 
be used for the benefit of the people of the Trust Territory. 
The CDC was, and still is, the largest agro-industrial enterprise in the 
country. It is the second largest employer of labour, surpassed only by the 
government. It formerly employed 25,000 workers. At present, it still engages 
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about 12,500 permanent workers and a few thousand seasonal and casual 
workers.22 Interestingly, while the South West Province has remained the largest 
supplier of land to the CDC, the North West Province has become by far the 
largest supplier of labour to the CDC, being responsible for about three-quarters 
of the corporation’s labour force (Konings 1993a: 68). The CDC is one of the 
few agro-industrial enterprises in the world that specialises in a variety of crops: 
its four major ones are rubber, palm oil, tea and bananas. It has for a long time 
been dependent on foreign management. In 1960, the Commonwealth 
Development Corporation (COMDEV) took over the management of the 
corporation until 1974 when a North Westerner, Mr J.N. Ngu, was installed as 
the first Cameroonian general manager. The CDC management has since 
become almost completely Cameroonianised. Following independence and 
reunification in 1961, the corporation expanded its area of cultivation from 
20,000 to more than 40,000 hectares with the help of huge loans from several 
well-known financial institutions including the World Bank, the International 
Development Association (IDA), the European Development Fund (FED), 
COMDEV, and the (French) Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE). 
In 1977 the government ordered the CDC management to expand outside its 
original base, the South West Province, in an attempt to transform the corpora-
tion from a regional to a national corporation. As a result, the CDC now owns a 
few estates in the North West Province and in the neighbouring Francophone 
West and Littoral Provinces. Nevertheless, the people of Anglophone 
Cameroon in general, and the South West Province in particular, have 
continued to perceive the CDC as ‘their’ corporation. 
The CDC, in fact, has been of great importance to development in the 
Anglophone territory. Students of plantation agriculture, such as Beckford 
(1972), have blamed the persistent poverty and underdevelopment of Third 
World economies on this mode of production. In the case of the CDC, however, 
this thesis finds little support. The corporation has been a major instrument of 
modernisation and is largely credited with whatever socio-economic develop-
ment has occurred in Anglophone Cameroon. It has created employment for 
many men and women, constructed numerous roads, supplied water and 
electricity, built and staffed schools, awarded a substantial number of scholar-
ships, provided medical care for a large proportion of the local population, 
stimulated the supply of goods and services to itself and its workers and it has 
played a key role in the commercialisation and modernisation of peasant 
production. It worked as an intermediary in marketing the Bakweri peasantry’s 
banana production in the 1950s and in the establishment of regional small-
holders’ oil-palm and rubber schemes from the early 1960s onwards (Ardener 
                                                 
22  CDC, Staff and Labour Force Return, October 1995. 
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1958; Konings 1993b). Of late, it has handed over a substantial part of its oil-
palm plantations to local contractors. The CDC has, as a result of all this, often 
been seen as the economic lifeline of Anglophone Cameroon. 
The government announcement of the privatisation of this important agro-
industrial enterprise was all the more shocking to the Anglophone population 
since the CDC (i) had been one of the rare public enterprises in Cameroon to 
perform relatively well until the economic crisis; (ii) had been able to survive 
this crisis mainly because the management and the workers had agreed to adopt 
a series of drastic adjustment measures; and (iii) was on the way to economic 
recovery following the 50-per-cent devaluation of the CFA franc in early 1994. 
From its inception, the CDC has generally yielded positive results, though 
these have fluctuated over the years. In the three years preceding the crisis 
(1983/84-1985/86), the corporation was still making substantial profits, 
totalling FCFA 3.2 billion. The crisis, however, had a dramatic impact on the 
corporation’s financial situation: during the 1986/87-1990/91 period it suffered 
a loss of about FCFA 18 billion (Konings 1993a and 1995b). Evidently, the 
sharp fall in commodity prices on the world market together with the 40-per-
cent depreciation of the US dollar relative to the CFA franc were the principal 
causes of the near bankruptcy of the corporation. Nevertheless, other factors 
also contributed to the emergence and continuation of the crisis. First, there was 
the political elite’s inability or unwillingness to control the impact of cheap tea 
and palm oil, which impeded CDC sales on the domestic market. Second, there 
have been frequent reports of the managerial elite’s involvement in massive 
embezzlement, reckless expenditure, waste, and power struggles frequently 
based on ethnic and regional considerations. 
The South West-North West divide, in fact, has often paralysed the corpora-
tion’s administration.23 Since independence and reunification, the chairman of 
the CDC Board of Directors has usually been a South Westerner. Prominent 
SWELA members like Chief Victor Mukete, Chief Sam Endeley and Messrs 
John Ebong Ngolle and Nerius Nomaso Mbile have all occupied this position. 
The daily management of the corporation, however, has been dominated by 
North Westerners. The appointment of the North Westerner, Mr J.N. Ngu, as 
CDC general manager in 1974 occurred on the ‘advice’ of the corporation’s 
external financiers but was strongly resented by the southwestern managerial 
elite. First, there were also some suitable southwestern candidates for the post, 
particularly Mr I.N. Malafa who used to be senior to Mr Ngu in the corpora-
tion’s hierarchy having served as the deputy general manager during the last 
years of the COMDEV management. Second, the southwestern managerial elite 
                                                 
23  For a similar phenomenon in Pamol Ltd, a former Unilever subsidiary and another 
large agro-industrial enterprise in the South West, see Konings 1998. 
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feared that Ngu’s appointment would reinforce northwestern domination of the 
CDC management. Ngu’s fourteen years in office (1974-1988) were marked by 
strong anti-North West feelings, he himself being regularly accused by the 
southwestern managerial elite of favouring his own countrymen. Ngu’s 
conflicts with two of the southwestern CDC chairmen, Chief Victor Mukete and 
Chief Sam Endeley, have become almost legendary. 
When Biya started to appoint South Westerners to key positions in the South 
West to reduce North West domination and to achieve a regional balance (Nkwi 
& Nyamnjoh 1997), his close friend Ngu was replaced in 1988 by Mr Peter 
Mafany Musonge, a Bakweri. Ngu was then appointed as minister of agricul-
ture, a post that, incidentally, had meanwhile become supervisory minister of 
the CDC. In this capacity Ngu continued to interfere in the running of the CDC, 
denying his successor the freedom to discharge his duties. The southwestern 
managerial elite alleged that Ngu was using his brothers among the manage-
ment staff to harass or even get rid of Musonge. Together with other sections of 
the southwestern elite, they put constant pressure upon Musonge to reduce 
North West influence in the corporation. Particularly after the foundation of the 
SDF, the pro-CPDM elite associations in the South West and especially in the 
Bakweri area urged Musonge to sack northwestern managers suspected of being 
SDF supporters. In a strongly worded petition, the so-called Bakweri Elite 
Youth Wing declared in July 1991: 
 
This is a reminder of an earlier letter to you this year in which we required you to 
support our fight against SDF and their ‘Graffi’ domination that has caused the 
Bakweri people to be deprived of what belongs to them. Mola, you have to 
redundant the following ‘Grasslanders’ who are strong supporters of SDF. They are 
Ngeh F., Che W., Tatani, Ndenesho, and Fomuso. Do this now. We are behind you. 
You are also supported by Chief Justice S.M.L. Endeley and all Vikumas.24 
 
Just a few months before the announcement of the privatisation of the CDC, 
the South West-North West divide created such a severe managerial crisis that 
it even attracted the attention of the North West Prime Minister Simon Achidi 
Achu who, in turn, dispatched an investigation team from Yaoundé to reconcile 
the warring factions. Eventually, two northwestern managers, namely Mr Che, 
the Group Palms deputy manager, and Mr Tanyi, the Bota Palms manager, were 
sacked. These two men had the courage to admit that they were party to a 
memo by 22 management staff members of northwestern origin. The memo 
accused the CDC general manager, Peter Mafany Musonge, of ethnic discrimi-
nation and of favouring the Bakweri and victimising North Westerners. When it 
was leaked to Musonge before it had been signed, all of its authors except Che 
                                                 
24  See The New Standard, 30 July 1991. 
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and Tanyi cowardly disowned it and apologised. After two regional papers both 
well known for their anti-North West views, The Sketch and The Weekly Post, 
had informed the public of the memo, the Bakweri elite organised a ‘march of 
shame’ in support of Musonge, with the participants carrying spears, machetes, 
dane guns and sticks, singing war songs and displaying placards proclaiming 
‘Sack all those North West managers’, ‘CDC is our own’, and so on.25 
Without doubt, these internal conflicts within the CDC management 
impeded management’s ability to combat the economic crisis. Managerial 
problems were aggravated by the fact that the government was no longer 
prepared to render financial assistance to the ailing parastatal during the crisis. 
To save the company from total collapse, the management and the trade unions 
on the CDC estates agreed to adopt a series of adjustment measures aimed at 
reducing costs and increasing productivity (Konings 1995a and b). On 23 
August 1987, the union presidents and management agreed on a substantial 
increase in the productivity of estate workers. For example, the daily quota 
required of tea pickers was raised from 26 to 32 kg of green leaves. And as the 
corporation’s financial position continued to deteriorate, management proposed 
further austerity measures to the union’s presidents. Following negotiations, a 
new agreement was signed on 6 January 1990 that involved drastic cuts in the 
salaries and fringe benefits of all workers and managerial staff, amounting to 
some 30 to 40 per cent of their previous incomes. The corporation had formerly 
supplied the workers with free housing, water, electricity and medical facilities 
but from now on they would be obliged to make substantial contributions 
towards these services. The most draconian measure, however, was the intro-
duction of a compulsory savings scheme, forcing workers to save at least 15 per 
cent of their basic wages to assist the corporation’s recovery. It was not until 27 
June 1997 that this agreement between the unions and management was 
abrogated and conditions of service existing before 1990 were restored.26 
This managerial strategy for economic recovery was reinforced in 1989/90. 
The IMF- and World Bank-inspired SAP obliged the CDC management to sign 
a four-year performance contract (1989/90-1993/94) with the government, 
stipulating that the corporation achieve a set of objectives relating to plantation 
management, production costs, quantity and quality of output, and personnel 
productivity (Tedga 1990; Mama 1996). In return, the government was to write 
                                                 
25  See The Herald, 21-24 July 1994, p. 3 and The People's Voice, Vol. 3, No. 14, May 
1994, pp. 1 and 3-8. 
26  See report on meeting held on 27 June 1997 between CDC management and the 
presidents of the Agricultural Workers’ Union, presented by the provincial delegate 
of labour and social insurance for the South West Province, Ebot Ayuk Charles, to 
the honourable minister of labour and social insurance in Yaoundé on 10 July 1997, 
in File MTPS/DPTPS/SWP/BU.22, CDC General Correspondence, Vol. 1, 1997. 
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off some of the corporation’s debts amounting to FCFA 9 billion and to exempt 
it from the payment of certain taxes. The various adjustment measures did bring 
some relief to the company’s liquidity problems but, due to the continuing 
decline in commodity prices, its existence remained precarious. It was not until 
early 1994 that any prospect of economic recovery appeared.27 The devaluation 
of the CFA franc made CDC products more competitive on the world market 
and then, a few months later, the government surprisingly announced the 
privatisation of the corporation, which prompted vehement protests in Anglo-
phone Cameroon. 
 
Anglophone opposition to CDC privatisation 
During the economic crisis there were frequent rumours in Anglophone 
Cameroon that the Biya government was hoping to privatise the CDC and sell it 
to French or Francophone interests.28 Although the government strongly denied 
such rumours, Anglophones remained on the alert, ready to act if their regional 
patrimony was threatened. This is a clear sign that they had lost all faith in the 
corrupt, authoritarian regime and were not prepared to tolerate any further 
attempts by the Francophone-dominated state to dismantle their cultural and 
economic heritage. They were particularly determined to keep control over the 
CDC, the pride and economic lifeline of Anglophone Cameroon. 
In 1992, for instance, it was rumoured that the French were about to take 
over the corporation. This occurred after the French CCCE, which had 
previously already invested FCFA 2 billion in the CDC, offered another FCFA 
7 billion low-interest loan to the ailing company. Although this loan provided 
much-needed capital for investment purposes, the increased control by France 
over the CDC was highly resented by the Anglophone population who saw it as 
a first step towards the ultimate takeover of the corporation by the CCCE. 
When local newspapers subsequently reported that the CCCE wanted to take 
over the CDC oil-palm estates, there were again widespread protests in Anglo-
phone Cameroon. SWELA in particular was engaged in several protest actions 
in 1992. In February it collected the signatures of persons agitating against the 
alleged impending sale of the CDC to French interests, and it petitioned the 
head of state and British government on the issue. SWELA cautioned the 
government against a unilateral decision on any future privatisation of the CDC. 
Any such move, it said, would require dialogue with all the parties concerned, 
namely the landowners, the workers and the beneficiaries for whom the CDC 
                                                 
27  For the current financial position of the corporation, see the CDC Annual Reports 
and Accounts for the Years 1995-2002, Bota: CDC Head Office. 
28  See, for instance, The Messenger, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1992, pp. 1 and 4 and Cameroon 
Post, 11-18 February 1992. 
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had been created in 1946. On 12 August 1992, SWELA organised demonstra-
tions in the South West Province on the CDC issue.29  
This outcry against expanded French control of the corporation contrasted 
sharply with Anglophone sentiments regarding transfers by the management of 
two major CDC crops to Anglo-American companies. Few protests were voiced 
in Anglophone Cameroon when the corporation entrusted the management of 
the banana sector to the American multinational Del Monte in 1987 (Fonsah & 
Chidebelu 1995). And Anglophone newspapers even lauded the agreement 
between the CDC and COMDEV in February 199330 that stipulated that 
management of the corporation’s three tea estates be transferred to COMDEV 
for a period of ten years (Konings 1995a and b). Anglophones argued that these 
two Anglo-American companies had extensive experience in plantation 
management, and COMDEV even had experience in Anglophone Cameroon, 
having satisfactorily managed the CDC from 1960 to 1974. Above all, Anglo-
phones strongly believed that Anglo-American companies would be less 
inclined than French ones to dominate and exploit an English-speaking region 
and that the Anglo-American business culture fitted in well in Anglophone 
Cameroon. 
When the government did finally announce the privatisation on 15 July 
1994, Anglophones were deeply incensed. It even appeared that the Anglo-
phone minister of agriculture who was responsible for CDC matters, Mr 
Stephen Njinyam, had threatened to resign if the CDC were placed on the list of 
enterprises to be privatised. He was soon replaced by Mr A.F. Kodock, a 
Francophone, who had no scruples about privatising the CDC.31 While a few 
months earlier the South West-North West conflict had still divided Anglo-
phones inside and outside the corporation (see above), all the existing parties, 
associations and pressure groups in Anglophone Cameroon now formed a 
united front to resist the government’s decision. It would be wrong to conclude 
from this opposition that Anglophones were against privatisation per se. In fact, 
privatisation of poorly performing public enterprises has been included in the 
programmes of most Anglophone parties, including the SDF (see Konings 
2001a). In a memorandum addressed to the head of state after the announced 
privatisation of the CDC, which was co-signed by the various Anglophone 
pressure groups and Bakweri chiefs, it is equally stated that 
                                                 
29  See Cameroon Post, 11-18 February 1992, p. 5 and The Herald, 6-9 October 1992, 
p. 3. 
30  The agreement failed to function because of the government’s inability to fulfil 
some of the conditions, notably the payment to COMDEV of ₤1 million (FCFA 450 
million pre-devaluation) which was part of the debt owed to COMDEV. 
31  See Cameroon Post, 26 July-2 August 1994, p. 12 and La Nouvelle Expression, 26 
July-1 August 1994, p. 12. 
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in principle, the Bakweri and other Anglophones have no quarrel with the idea of 
privatisation or sale of companies in which government enjoys majority control 
since we fully understand the logic behind such an exercise, i.e. the relocation of the 
management of inefficiently managed parastatals in more efficient hands. We 
recognise that government, as the controlling shareholder in these companies, has an 
obligation to the majority shareholders and the Cameroonian taxpayers to ensure 
that their tax revenues are not wasted in failing parastatals.32 
 
Anglophones, however, claimed that the CDC should have been excluded 
from this privatisation exercise for various reasons. 
First, the CDC was one of the few remaining large-scale enterprises in 
Anglophone Cameroon still largely controlled by Anglophones. Many regional 
enterprises, such as the West Cameroon Electricity Corporation (Powercam), 
the Cameroon Bank, the West Cameroon Development Agency and the West 
Cameroon Produce Marketing Board, had all been systematically dissolved by 
the Francophone-dominated state after reunification (Mukong 1990; All Anglo-
phone Conference 1993). Another leading regional agro-industrial enterprise, 
the Plantations Pamol du Cameroun Ltd, a Unilever subsidiary, decided in 1987 
to go into liquidation after the government refused to provide it with similar 
bank and infrastructural facilities to those enjoyed by the agro-industrial 
parastatals. It was widely believed in Anglophone Cameroon that the principal 
reason for government refusal was to force a company with British connections 
to wind up its activities in the region. A Frenchman was appointed as liquidator 
but instead of selling the company to the highest bidder, he ran it as an on-going 
business for several years, earning himself a comfortable income in the 
meantime (Konings 1998). Another leading enterprise in Anglophone 
Cameroon, Sonara, the oil-refinery near Victoria (Limbe), could hardly be 
called a regional enterprise: its oil is transported through a gigantic pipeline to 
Douala and its managerial staff and workers are predominantly recruited among 
Francophones (Ndzana 1987; Ngu 1989; Jua 1993). 
Second, the CDC was a unique enterprise in Cameroon and economically 
vital to Anglophone Cameroon. From its inception, it had been oriented not 
only to capital accumulation but also to regional development. One Anglophone 
columnist, Mr Jing Thomas Ayeh, captured the essence of what the CDC meant 
for Anglophones: 
 
The CDC is unlike any other corporation. It means native lands, especially those of 
the Bakweri. It means jobs for Cameroonians, especially the Anglophones. It is a 
                                                 
32  For this memorandum, see Fako International, Vol. 1, No. 2, January 1995, p. 14. 
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symbol of Anglophone survival against all odds... If the CDC falls ... the last act of 
internal colonialisation would have been completed.33  
 
Third, unlike many other Cameroonian enterprises, the CDC had performed 
well until the economic crisis, and the announcement of its privatisation came at 
a time when there were good prospects for the corporation’s economic recovery 
following the devaluation of the CFA franc. 
Fourth. in accordance with the agreement between the management and the 
unions in 1990, the workers had injected FCFA 5.5 billion into the corporation 
as compulsory savings during the crisis. Therefore, the CDC could not be 
privatised without consulting the unions and workers.34 
All the Anglophone movements, like the SCPC, CAM and the FWCM, were 
unanimous in their opposition to the announced privatisation of the CDC, which 
they regarded as ‘a declaration of war against the people of Southern Camer-
oons by the Biya regime’35 and as ‘a government ploy to hand over the profit-
able CDC to French interests’.36 In a press release issued at the end of an 
extraordinary session in Buea on 23 July 1994, the SCNC warned ‘France, 
French interests, French nationals and their Biya acolytes that we hold them 
jointly and separately responsible and liable for this recent scheme against our 
territory and our people’, pointing out that ‘the proposed privatisation ... is 
designed to transform the Southern Cameroons into an economic and industrial 
desert, and its people into perpetual slaves to France’. It called upon all Anglo-
phone movements to engage in concerted action ‘so as to settle this threat to our 
inheritance’. It also declared 16 August 1994 as CDC Solidarity Day, request-
ing that Southern Cameroonians mark this day by staying at home.37 Subse-
quently, there were protest marches in Anglophone towns organised by Anglo-
phone movements and the SDF. Posters carried banners with slogans such as 
‘France: Hands off Anglophones’ and ‘Hands off or we will burn the planta-
tions’.38 
On 31 July 1994, SWELA, too, vehemently warned all investors, particu-
larly the French, to stay clear of the corporation or ‘meet with far-reaching 
consequences’. It stated that ‘it totally rejected government design to re-
                                                 
33  Cameroon Post, 26 July-2 August 1994, p. 12. 
34  See, for instance, the statement of Mr C.P.N. Vewessee, president of the Fako 
Agricultural Workers’ Union, in Cameroon Post, 6-13 September 1994, p. 9. 
35  CAM Resolution, On the Privatization of the CDC, Bamenda, 31 July 1994 
(mimeo). 
36  Cameroon Post, 26 July-2 August 1994, p. 6. 
37  Ibid. 
38  New African, No. 326, January 1995, p. 25 and Africa International, Nos. 279/280, 
January-February 1995, p. 39. 
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colonise and dehumanise South Westerners in particular and Anglophones in 
general’, and it strongly requested the government to revoke its decision 
forthwith. It invited all South Westerners ‘to collaborate with any group that try 
to call for strikes and other forms of mass action intended to stop the privatisa-
tion’. In addition to 16 August, it declared 12 August as another CDC Solidarity 
Day.39 Although demonstrations organised by SWELA on 12 August were 
readily broken up or prevented by the police, a determined group of SWELA 
members led by their secretary-general, Mr Martin Nkemngu, marched success-
fully to the office of the South West Governor in Buea where they handed in a 
memorandum for the attention of the head of state.40 
Unsurprisingly, the most vehement opposition to the announced privatisa-
tion of the CDC came from the landowners, both in the South West and in the 
North West of Anglophone Cameroon.  
The Bakweri in the South West Province, whose lands had been expropri-
ated under German colonial rule and later leased to the CDC for a term of 60 
years, felt particularly aggrieved. On 23 July 1994, the Bakweri chiefs and elite 
met in Buea under the chairmanship of Paramount Chief S.M.L. Endeley of 
Buea and Paramount Chief F. Bille Manga Williams of Victoria (Limbe) to 
discuss the implications of the government decision. They agreed to oppose the 
announced privatisation on the grounds that CDC lands were Bakweri lands and 
thus could not be sold to non-natives without Bakweri consent.41 After lengthy 
and passionate discussions, an ad hoc committee was elected by acclamation to 
prepare a detailed memorandum on the Bakweri position to be presented to the 
government and all other interested parties.42 
On 4 August 1994, over 500 Bakweri elite and notables gathered at the Buea 
Youth Cultural and Animation Centre approved the memorandum drawn up by 
the ad hoc committee. They later presented it to the provincial governor for 
onward transmission to President Biya. On the same day, the eminent Bakweri 
scholar, Professor Ndiva Kofele-Kale, secretary of the ad hoc committee, was 
designated counsel for the Bakweri people with instructions to present their 
case before the United Nations and other international fora.  
                                                 
39  The Herald, 4-7 August 1994, p. 2. 
40  Ibid. 
41  According to the Bakweri, the 1974 Land Law (Ordinance No. 74-1 of 6 July 1974 
to establish rules governing land tenure) does in fact ground Bakweri land rights in 
positive law in its classification of all ‘land tenured into the Grund Buch (the case 
with all CDC lands)’ as ‘land ... subject to the right of private property’. See BLCC, 
Open Letter to All Prospective Buyers of CDC Plantations, Buea, 12 October 2000. 
For the 1974 Land Law, see Republic of Cameroon (1981), Land Tenure and State 
Lands, Yaoundé: Imprimerie Nationale. 
42  Fako International, Vol. 1, No. 2, January 1995, pp. 14-16. 
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The Bakweri case was emphatically supported by Anglophone movements. 
A strongly worded petition to the head of state, co-signed by the Anglophone 
movements and the Bakweri chiefs, reiterated that the Bakweri had never 
relinquished ownership of CDC lands and that the corporation could not be sold 
without Bakweri consent. It pointed out that the Bakweri had not been paid 
royalties for the use of their lands since the creation of the CDC in 1946. It also 
stressed that the Bakweri were not inclined to renew the 60-year CDC lease and 
wanted to reclaim CDC lands after its expiry in 2007. 
Concerned about the mounting anger in the Anglophone region in general 
and the Bakweri community in particular, the Biya government decided to send 
a delegation of high-ranking Anglophone allies to the South West to appease 
the population. The delegation was led by Chief Ephraim Inoni, deputy secre-
tary general at the presidency and Chief of Bakingili, a village located on the 
territory of a Bakweri subgroup. The delegation met a number of Bakweri 
representatives in Buea to discuss the land problem. Though speaking on behalf 
of the government, Chief Inoni appealed to the Bakweri representatives not to 
forget that he was one of them. He acknowledged that there should have been 
contact between the government and the Bakweri prior to the announcement of 
the corporation’s privatisation but he denied the widespread rumours in Anglo-
phone Cameroon that the French and some high-ranking Francophones had 
masterminded the whole operation. While admitting that the financial situation 
had improved after the devaluation of the CFA franc, he argued that privatisa-
tion would enable the corporation to obtain new capital for necessary invest-
ments in production and processing. The Bakweri Paramount Chief S.M.L. 
Endeley, who had always been a staunch supporter of the regime until the 
Bakweri land issue arose, then took the floor. Amid thunderous applause he 
declared that he, as the custodian of the ancestral lands, and the Bakweri 
population as a whole were against the privatisation of the CDC and requested 
that Chief Inoni report this to President Biya: 
 
We are in a country where we like to cheat ourselves, where government hands 
decisions through dictatorship... We say no, no [to privatisation], go and tell Mr 
Biya that he cannot afford to go down in history as the man who sold the CDC.43 
 
The delegation had an equally tough time when they met CDC workers at 
Tiko, Victoria (Limbe) and Kumba. They were jeered and questioned as to why 
Anglophones had been chosen to deliver the unhappy message of privatisation. 
Was it because they would benefit from the spoils? Workers requested they take 
                                                 
43  Ibid., p. 16. 
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home one message to the government – that the CDC would be sold to the 
French only over their dead bodies.44 
In the North West Province, the Wimbum of the Donga-Mantung Division, 
owners of the CDC Ndu Tea Estate (Konings 1995a), also strongly protested 
against the privatisation of the CDC. During a meeting in Bamenda on 22-24 
July 1994, the Mbum Abi, the Wimbum People’s Congress, resolved as 
follows: 
 
We completely reject the proposed sale of this corporation around which the liveli-
hood of all Anglophones revolves and depends... The people of Donga-Mantung in 
general and the Wimbum in particular shall not stand idly by and see the Ndu Tea 
Estate go. We shall resist with all our might! 
 In this light, we shall no longer lease our land to any person (moral or physical). 
Mbum Abi and the workers are prepared to take over the running of the estate. 
 Once more we launch a fervent appeal to all people of goodwill within and out-
side the country to rally behind us in this just cause. The CDC shall not go!45 
 
Another Anglophone delegation headed by the North Westerner Peter 
Abety, minister for special duties at the presidency, was sent to Ndu by the Biya 
government to try to calm the population. 
After these government delegations had returned to Yaoundé, the govern-
ment took no further action with regard to CDC privatisation. However this 
apparent victory of Anglophone resistance turned out to be short lived. Particu-
larly after 1997, rumours of an imminent privatisation of the CDC became more 
and more persistent. In conformity with the agreement concluded with the IMF 
and the World Bank within the framework of the Enhanced Structural Adjust-
ment Programme (ESAP) in 1997, the privatisation of the CDC was soon 
expected to be launched. That the government, under severe pressure from the 
Bretton Woods institutions, was preparing the ground for the privatisation of 
the CDC could be deduced from the speeches and interviews of leading 
government and CDC officials at the opening ceremony of the corporation’s 
golden jubilee celebration in Bota-Victoria on 1 December 1997. In his speech 
on that occasion, Prime Minister Peter Mafany Musonge, who still simultane-
ously occupied the post of CDC general manager, said: 
 
Since the traditional international funding agencies no longer finance corporations 
like CDC, the establishment should be prepared ... to foster new business relation-
ships to raise new money while the state plays the role of facilitator... Traditional 
rulers within CDC’s areas of operation, workers and other Cameroonians must 
                                                 
44  See Cameroon Post, 29 August-5 September 1994, p. 4. 
45  Cameroon Post, 26 July-2 August 1994, pp. 6-7. See also The Herald, 22-24 August 
1994, pp. 1-3 and La Nouvelle Expression, 26 July-1 August 1994, p. 12. 
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understand perfectly well and make sure that peace reigns for conclusive invest-
ment.46 
 
                                                
The CDC chairman, Mr N.N. Mbile, added that ‘privatisation should not 
scare us as we are confident that government will protect the interests of the 
Cameroonian people, the original landowners, the workers, new investors and 
the state itself’.47 Moreover, the CDC deputy general manager, Mr Richard 
Grey, then revealed that the reputable international consultancy firm, Coopers 
and Lybrand, had already been selected by the World Bank and the government 
to carry out a study on the privatisation of the CDC which would be completed 
by 30 June 1998. The Bakweri chiefs who attended the ceremony, notably 
Chief S.M.L. Endeley of Buea, were frustrated by these statements and revela-
tions, and condemned any future privatisation. 
The CDC was finally put up for sale in January 1999. Very little protest was 
heard from the now almost dormant Anglophone movements. Just a few weeks 
before his death on 10 April 1999, John Ngu Foncha and Ambassador (retired) 
Henry Fossung signed a strongly worded statement on behalf of the SCNC 
warning prospective buyers of the CDC to desist from investing in the purchase 
of the CDC. Traditional rulers and elite in the South West Province, however, 
quickly rallied again. In a meeting with southwestern members of parliament 
and government, they strongly denounced the privatisation of the CDC, saying 
that the latter’s acceptance of the sale of the CDC ‘was tantamount to a betrayal 
of their people’.48 The Bakweri Land Claims Committee (BLCC)49 officially 
wrote to President Biya on behalf of the Bakweri people on 3 March 1999 
requesting that it be included in the privatisation negotiations and that compen-
sation be paid for the use of Bakweri lands. When rumours became widespread 
that multinational companies like Fruitiers/Dole, Chiquita and Del Monte were 
already negotiating with individual government officials about the purchase of 
the whole or parts of the CDC at throwaway prices, the Bakweri in the diaspora 
once again addressed the head of state on 1 October 1999 in support of the 
BLCC position.50  
Since no reply was forthcoming from the presidency, the BLCC, with much 
support from the Bakweri chiefs, SWECC and SWELA decided to start a high-
profile public relations campaign involving the extensive sensitisation of 
national and international opinion through the writing of open letters, petitions 
 
46  The Post, 5 December 1997, pp. 1-2. 
47  Ibid. 
48  Isaha’a Boh Cameroon, Bulletin No. 405. 
49  The BLCC is the revived Bakweri Land Committee founded in 1946. 
50  See letter from the Bakweri around the world to President Paul Biya of Cameroon, 
dated 1 October 1999. 
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and newspaper articles and the use of the Internet. The BLCC-USA in particular 
became very vocal, creating its own website on the Internet.51  
In a letter to the managing director of the IMF, Mr Horst Köhler, on 16 June 
2000, the BLCC warned him about the growing unrest among the Bakweri and 
threatened legal action should the privatisation of the CDC be pursued without 
its involvement: 
 
As the current impasse in Zimbabwe and Kenya demonstrate, land expropriated 
from African natives by European colonialists a century ago is the source of much 
contemporary unrest and instability. All Cameroonians of goodwill bear witness that 
the Bakweri people have over the years opted for a peaceful resolution of the CDC 
Bakweri land problem. However, should the privatisation of the CDC go ahead 
without the input of the Bakweri on whose land most of the corporation’s agro-
industrial activities are located, we preserve the right to seek legal redress against 
the government of the Republic of Cameroon, the IMF, the World Bank as well as 
all lessees who derive title to the land by whatever means, in any country of the 
world where such bodies are located.52 
 
In a press release on 5 August 2000, the BLCC revealed that it was going to 
take its campaign for land restitution and compensation a notch higher by 
seeking consultative status within the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC). It believed that the granting of such consultative status 
would provide it with a global platform to proclaim its struggle for land rights, 
‘bringing it into contact with other NGOs which claim to represent the interests 
of indigenous groups from around the world as well as with sympathetic UN 
members who have championed the cause of dispossessed people on the floor 
of the General Assembly and at the numerous ECOSOC meetings over the 
years’. Soon thereafter, on 21 August 2000, the counsel of the BLCC, Professor 
Ndiva Kofele-Kale, was invited by the United Nations to make a representation 
on the Bakweri lands issue to the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva. 
Following the government’s renewed call for tenders for the sale of the CDC 
in September 2000, the BLCC cautioned prospective buyers in an open letter as 
follows: 
It is our duty to advise you to think twice before you commit the resources of your 
shareholders in a venture that is still mired in controversy and whose promised 
financial and economic rewards may prove to be illusory in the long run.53 
                                                 
51  See http://www.bakwerilands.org. Most of the documents quoted in this section can 
be found on this website. 
52  Letter from Dr Lyombe Eko, executive director of BLCC-USA, to Mr Horst Köhler, 
managing director of the IMF, dated 16 June 2000. 
53  BLCC, An Open Letter to All Prospective Buyers of CDC Plantations, 12 October 
2000. 
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It soon became evident that the BLCC found it hard to defend Bakweri 
interests at a national level after ‘their own son’, Peter Mafany Musonge, had 
been appointed prime minister in 1996. It is beyond doubt that one of the main 
reasons for his appointment in this position was that President Biya regarded 
him, being an ex-CDC general manager and a Bakweri himself, as the most 
suitable candidate for handling the delicate issue of CDC privatisation. 
The appointment of Musonge had initially raised high expectations among 
the Bakweri. They were convinced that ‘their son’ would pay particular 
attention to the land question and take Bakweri interests into consideration 
during the eventual sale of the CDC. Their expectations appeared to have a 
sound foundation because, in his former capacity as CDC general manager, 
Musonge had publicly declared during a radio interview in 1994 that any 
privatisation of the CDC should be ‘not only economically effective but also 
socially equitable’. For that matter, the following groups should be directly 
involved in this endeavour: (i) the indigenous landowners; (ii) the workers; and 
(iii) the investors. Once appointed prime minister, however, he came under 
immense pressure from the IMF and his master, Paul Biya, to champion the 
economic advantages of CDC privatisation and to forget about the payment of 
any compensation to the Bakweri landowners. Unable to convince his ethnic 
group to give up its claim to what could possibly amount to tens of billions of 
CFA francs after more than fifty years of CDC existence, he is reported to have 
resorted to intimidation, using the Buea sub-prefect and the Fako prefect for 
such purposes. 
In March 2000, the Buea sub-prefect banned a BLCC general assembly 
meeting for which he had earlier given approval. The prime minister appears to 
have quickly ordered a halt to the meeting when he learnt that compensation 
was high on the agenda, but he failed to intimidate the committee that had just 
elected a new executive composed of some of the most respected Bakweri elite 
such as Chief Peter Moky Efange (chairman) and Mola Njoh Litumbe (secre-
tary-general). The committee was subsequently ordered by the Fako prefect, 
Jean-Robert Mengue Meka, to halt its activities, and it was accused of being an 
illegal organisation. Efange and Litumbe, in response, told Mengue Meka that 
he himself was acting illegally by claiming that the BLCC, which was founded 
as long ago as 1946, was an unlawful association. The prefect was reminded 
that the committee had been received by the South West governor in 1994 and 
could thus not now have its legality questioned. 
Musonge and other senior southwestern government officials also tried to 
persuade the BLCC to curtail its ongoing national and international campaign, 
arguing that this campaign had resulted in the refusal of several multinational 
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enterprises to submit tenders until the land issue had been resolved.54 During a 
meeting in October 2000, Musonge and Chief Ephraim Inoni, the Bakweri 
deputy secretary-general at the presidency, requested that BLCC leaders allow 
the process of CDC privatisation be completed before tackling the land issue. 
Through such manoeuvres, Musonge even succeeded, albeit temporarily, in 
dividing the BLCC into two camps: one radical faction led by Chief Efange 
which stood its ground, and one moderate faction led by the Bakweri Para-
mount Chief of Buea Sam Endeley that was more sensitive to Musonge’s 
arguments. Later on, both factions agreed again that the government should 
recognise Bakweri ownership of CDC lands prior to any sale of the corporation 
and involve the BLCC in its actual sale. 
Of late, some Anglophones, especially North Westerners, have blamed the 
BLCC for turning the privatisation of the CDC into an exclusively Bakweri 
affair. They stress that the BLCC has not been playing its cards well by 
ignoring the equally legitimate claims of the entire Anglophone community to 
the CDC. In September 2000, one of the most respected northwestern opinion 
leaders, N.N. Susungi, observed in this respect: 
 
The United Nations Trusteeship Council resolution of March 1950 is very clear in 
its language that the CDC is the common property to the people of the British 
Trusteeship Territory of Southern Cameroons. The problem is that the BLCC has 
never accepted the principle that the CDC is the common property of the people of 
Southern Cameroons, because over the years the land and the company have come 
to signify one and the same thing to the BLCC.55 
 
To protect both the general Anglophone and specific Bakweri interests in 
any future privatisation of the CDC, he suggests the need for a common front. 
He is thus proposing to the BLCC that it spearhead the convening of a joint 
conference of North West and South West chiefs and parliamentarians. Such a 
conference of Anglophone representatives would discuss the consequences of 
the UN Trusteeship Council resolution of March 1950 for the current govern-
ment’s role in the privatisation of the CDC and to take a common stand on (i) 
the BLCC land compensation claims; and (ii) the use of the proceeds of the sale 
of the CDC. It is evident that Susungi’s suggestions would greatly enhance the 
Anglophone bargaining position. 
When the government announced in October 2002 that the CDC tea estates 
had been sold to Brobon Finex PTY, a South African consortium, a different 
reaction could be observed from the side of the BLCC and the Anglophone 
                                                 
54  See Report of the SWECC Meeting on 27 January 2000 focused primarily on ‘the 
question of privatisation of the CDC, and the role of the BLCC in relation thereto’. 
55  See the intervention of N.N. Susungi on Scncforum, 25 September 2000. 
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movements – a clear sign of disrespect for Susungi’s call for Anglophone unity 
in respect of the CDC’s privatisation. 
The BLCC reiterated that it was not opposed to privatisation per se, being 
in agreement with the government that privatisation of the CDC estates could 
contribute to better management of the giant corporation, attract capital for the 
necessary investment in the corporation’s modernisation, and lead to increased 
productivity. However, it expressed its ‘total bewilderment’ at the sale of the 
CDC estates without any consultation or compensation of the landowners in 
spite of previous deliberations between the government and the BLCC. It then 
resolved to resist the sale by all possible means, including legal proceedings.56 
In sharp contrast to the BLCC, the SCNC claimed that the government of 
La République du Cameroun, which had unilaterally seceded from the union in 
1984, had ‘no locus standi whatsoever to privatise, sell or transfer the CDC 
Tole Tea Estate and the CDC Ndu Tea Estate located undisputably and exclu-
sively within the territorial boundaries of the Southern Cameroons to the South 
African consortium Brobon Finex PTY or to any other person’.57 Like the 
BLCC, it threatened to resist the ‘illegal deal’ by all means possible. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Both the Anglophone demands for an autonomous GCE Board and their 
protests against the privatisation of the CDC basically originated from wide-
spread concern among the local population about what had happened to its 
educational and economic legacy after reunification. Anglophones were no 
longer prepared to tolerate any further Francophone onslaught on their identity. 
Their initial successes, however, were largely undermined when internal 
divisions reappeared. The regime was then able to re-establish a large measure 
of control over the GCE Board. Strikingly, the government has not yet been 
able to sell the CDC. While the Anglophone movements, being increasingly 
paralysed by both leadership problems and government divisive and repressive 
tactics, have, since 1995, almost stopped protesting against the privatisation of 
the CDC, the Bakweri – the owners of the CDC lands – have not yet given up 
their resistance. The latter have launched a national and international campaign 
                                                 
56  See BSCNation, 13 June 2002, ‘Statement by the BLCC following the Announce-
ment on the Privatisation of the Tea Estates of the Cameroon Development 
Corporation’. 
57  SCNC, ‘Privatisation of the CDC or part thereof by La République du Cameroun is 
illegal and unacceptable’, BSCNation, 1 November 2002. See also SCNC Press 
Release on CDC Privatisation, Bamenda, 24 October 2002. 
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for the defence of their interests, insisting that the corporation cannot be sold 
without their consent and without them receiving compensation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
The Anglophone problem: impasse  
and suggestions for a solution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this book we have attempted to show how the Anglophone problem has 
become a major challenge to the post-colonial state’s nation-state project that 
has continuously stressed the importance of national unity and national integra-
tion to the achievement of political stability and economic development. The 
various Anglophone movements that were created or reactivated during 
political liberalisation have been at the forefront of region-centred political 
protests and demands for the rearrangement of state power. In the first section 
of this concluding chapter we summarise the major findings of this study and 
argue that the relations between the Anglophone movements and the regime 
have been at an impasse since the mid-1990s. In the second section we suggest 
some proposals that might put an end to the existing stalemate and, hopefully, 
solve the Anglophone problem.  
 
 
Impasse in relations between the Anglophone movements  
and the regime 
 
The various Anglophone movements have made a significant contribution to 
raising Anglophone consciousness and have been able to put the Anglophone 
problem on the national and international political agenda. They have claimed 
that reunification, the federal constitution for a reunified Cameroon and the 
 
194 
post-colonial nation-state project have been unwelcome and unfortunate events, 
being contrary to the aspirations, interests and assumed values of the Anglo-
phone minority. Our study has shown that such claims are not without founda-
tion. 
The idea of reunification appears to have been much more popular among 
the Francophone population than among Anglophones in the southwestern 
quadrant. Its devoted and consistent flag-bearers were UPC loyalists and 
Francophone immigrants who converted some Anglophone leaders to the 
reunification doctrine. Significantly, the latter largely regarded the reunification 
idea in the first instance as an effective weapon to bring pressures to bear upon 
the British trusteeship administration to grant their territory either a larger 
measure of autonomy within the Nigerian Federation or separation from Nigeria 
altogether. Although the Southern Cameroons population ultimately voted by a 
majority of seven to three in favour of union with the former French Cameroon 
during the 1961 UN-organised plebiscite, there is overwhelming evidence to 
suggest that if a third alternative of either independence or continued trustee-
ship had been put forward, it would have been considered in a favourable light. 
Being deprived of this preferred option by the United Nations and with the 
complicity of the British, the Southern Cameroons population was given what 
amounted to Hobson’s choice: independence by either joining Nigeria or 
reunification with the then independent Republic of Cameroon. The eventual 
vote in favour of reunification appeared to be more of a rejection of continuous 
ties with Nigeria than a vote for union with Francophone Cameroon. While 
most Southern Cameroonians dismissed outright integration into Nigeria 
because of the territory’s previous neglect and domination by the Igbo under 
Nigerian colonial administration, they were also reluctant to join Francophone 
Cameroon fearing that reunification might entail domination by the Franco-
phone majority and loss of their cultural heritage and identity. In the end, the 
majority of Anglophones opted for the lesser of the two evils because the ruling 
party in the Southern Cameroons, the KNDP, had assured them that the 
constitutional provisions for a reunified Cameroon would guarantee equality of 
both partners and the preservation of their cultural legacies. As Susungi (1991) 
aptly put it, the reunification episode was far from being the reunion of two 
prodigal sons who had been unjustly separated at birth but was more like a 
loveless marriage arranged by the United Nations between two people who 
hardly knew each other. Indeed, prior to reunification in 1961 the two 
Cameroonian communities had not only gone through two completely different 
colonial experiences but had lived longer apart than together in a body politic 
(Fombad 2001). Playwright and journalist Victor Epie Ngome captures this 
mismatch remarkably well in a play implying that the United Nations had no 
business bringing together What God Has Put Asunder (1992). The marriage 
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has only subjected Anglophones to the whims and caprices of their Franco-
phone overlords, whose imperial presidents have inspired other Anglophone 
playwrights to dream of Requiem for the Last Kaiser (Besong 1991), celebrate 
the end of the Dance of the Vampires (Butake 1999), and make Anglophones 
long for the day Palm-Wine Will Flow (Butake 1990) when recognition and 
representation of their expectations become reality. 
By reuniting with the former French Cameroon, the Anglophone political 
elite had hoped to enter into a loose federal union as a way of protecting their 
territory’s minority status and cultural heritage. However it soon became 
manifest that the Francophone political elite preferred instead a highly 
centralised, unitary state as a means of promoting national unity and economic 
development. This difference of opinion about the future form of state during 
constitutional talks for reunification was the beginning of a fierce and 
protracted struggle between Francophone unitarists and Anglophone federalists 
in Cameroon’s constitutional history. While the Francophone elite received 
strong support from the French during the constitutional negotiations, the 
Anglophone elite was virtually abandoned by the British who deeply resented 
the Southern Cameroons option for reunification with Francophone Cameroon. 
As a result, Southern Cameroons, according to Charles de Gaulle, ‘became a 
small gift of the Queen of England to France’. In the end, the Francophone elite 
was only prepared to accept a highly centralised federation that, moreover, was 
regarded merely as a transitional phase to the unitary state. Such a federation 
actually demanded relatively few amendments to the 1960 Constitution of the 
Republic of Cameroon. Interestingly, Pierre Messmer (1998: 134-35), one of 
the last French high commissioners in Cameroon and a close advisor of Ahidjo, 
points out that he and others knew at the time that the so-called federal 
constitution provided merely for ‘a sham federation’, which was ‘safe for 
appearances, an annexation of West Cameroon’. Under the new constitution, 
West Cameroon lost most of the limited autonomy it had enjoyed as part of the 
Nigerian Federation. Even worse, a few months after reunification Ahidjo 
created a system of regional administration in which West Cameroon was 
designated as one of six regions, basically ignoring the federal character of the 
country. These regions were headed by powerful federal inspectors who, in the 
case of West Cameroon, in effect overshadowed the prime minister with whom 
they were in frequent conflict concerning jurisdiction. Besides, the West 
Cameroon government could barely function properly since it had to depend 
entirely on subventions from the federal government that controlled the major 
sources of revenue. When, in 1972, Ahidjo created a unitary state in blatant 
disregard of constitutional provisions, there was in reality little left of the 
federation except perhaps in name. What many considered as one of the last 
visible symbols of the 1961 union was removed in 1984 when Ahidjo’s 
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successor, Paul Biya, abolished the appellation ‘United Republic of Cameroon’ 
and replaced it with ‘Republic of Cameroon’, which significantly was the name 
the French-administered part of the country adopted when it became independ-
ent in 1960. 
There appear to be sufficient grounds to justify the claim of the Anglophone 
movements that the nation-state project after reunification has been driven by 
the firm determination of the Francophone elite to dominate the Anglophone 
minority in the post-colonial state and to erase all cultural and institutional 
foundations of Anglophone identity. Various studies have shown that Anglo-
phones have regularly been relegated to inferior positions in the national 
decision-making process and have been constantly underrepresented in ministe-
rial as well as senior and middle-level positions in the administration, the 
military and parastatals (cf. Fonlon 1964; Kofele-Kale 1986; Takougang 1993). 
There is general agreement that the Anglophones have been exposed to a 
carefully considered policy aimed at eroding their language and institutions 
despite the fact that the Francophone political leaders had assured their Anglo-
phone counterparts during the constitutional talks on reunification that the 
inherited colonial differences in language and institutions were to be respected 
in the bilingual union. And, last but not least, the relative underdevelopment of 
the Anglophone region shows that it has not benefited sufficiently from its rich 
economic resources, particularly oil. 
Strikingly, the Anglophone movements have been inclined to lay all the 
blame for the Anglophone problem on the Francophone-dominated state and to 
gloss over the co-responsibility of the Anglophone elite who have dismally 
failed to form a united front in the pre- and post-reunification period for the 
representation and defence of Anglophone interests, being preoccupied with 
their own internal power struggles. Of course, their one-sided presentation of 
Francophones as ‘exploiters and oppressors’ and Anglophones as ‘poor victims’ 
has served first and foremost the purpose of mobilising the Anglophone 
population and advancing their goal of autonomy. By presenting their commu-
nity as beyond impeachment and by making a golden age of the past, Anglo-
phone movements have been able to harness uncritical support against ‘Franco-
phoneness’ as a collective enemy. 
Although the regime has often attempted to present the Anglophone 
movements as organisations that merely serve the interests of some disgruntled 
power-seekers, notably members of the Anglophone elite who have been in one 
way or another excluded from power in the national arena, their narrative of 
untold Anglophone suffering in the Francophone-dominated state appears to be 
widely supported by Anglophones irrespective of class, ethnicity, age and sex. 
Most Anglophones have multiple grievances about Francophone domination, 
assimilation and exploitation on the basis not only of their own personal 
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experiences but also their frequent exposure to the sensitisation activities of 
Anglophone leaders, journalists and artists. Similar to the Anglophone move-
ments, they are often inclined to compare their present predicament with an 
idealised colonial past. The older generation, born in the colonial era, often 
transmits to the youth the myth or nostalgia for the good old days when there 
was political pluralism, good governance based on principles of representation, 
transparency and accountability, and high moral standards in society. Compared 
to this imagined colonial paradise, the post-reunification era is bound to appear 
unattractive to Anglophones who have been confronted with unprecedented 
state violence in the wake of the extension of the brutal campaign against the 
UPC to their region, manifest in the frequent occurrence of various forms of 
intimidation and repression like arbitrary arrests, beatings and torture of so-
called subversive elements and even peaceful civilians by police and 
gendarmes, widespread corruption and bureaucratic incompetence as a result of 
the over-centralisation of administrative authority, and economic mismanage-
ment leading to a breakdown in public services and infrastructure as well as 
growing impoverishment. Anglophones are often inclined to attribute such 
vices to French traditions, values and institutions inherited by the Francophone-
dominated state. Daily encounters with the predominantly Francophone 
administrators and security officers in their own region, many of whom have no 
even basic knowledge of English, give them the impression of complete loss of 
power over Anglophone space (Eyoh 1998a: 165-66). That such encounters are 
traumatic is best evidenced by how rural pottery in the Ndop plains of the 
Bamenda Grassfields has sought to domesticate or neutralise gendarmes and 
military officials as vehicles of state repression, through the mass production of 
their figures for public consumption by potential victims of the brutality they 
bring. 
The first years of political liberalisation raised high expectations among the 
Anglophones of an imminent change in the regime and a reconfiguration of 
state power in their favour. The corrupt and authoritarian Biya regime had been 
seriously weakened during the deepening economic and political crisis, having 
lost legitimacy among the vast majority of the population. The enormous 
expansion of the SDF and the emergence of several Anglophone organisations 
strengthened the conviction of a growing number of Anglophones that the 
regime could be forced either to hand over power to the SDF or to make far-
reaching concessions including the granting of Anglophone autonomy. By the 
end of 1991, the SDF and other opposition parties succeeded in forcing the Biya 
regime to accept constitutional reform and Anglophones immediately started 
demanding the dismantlement of the unitary state and a return to federalism. 
Biya’s alleged ‘theft of Fru Ndi’s victory’ in the fraudulent 1992 presidential 
election was a traumatic experience for Anglophones. Nevertheless, it 
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reinforced their feelings that the regime, supported by France, would do every-
thing to prevent an Anglophone from seizing power. This made them even 
more determined to achieve autonomy. 
Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that the Anglophone move-
ments had their heydays during this era. Under a capable and committed leader-
ship, they organised frequent meetings, rallies, strikes, demonstrations and 
boycotts throughout the Anglophone territory and started a diplomatic offensive 
to acquire international recognition for their cause. Major achievements were 
the organisation of AAC I and AAC II attended by a large number of the 
Anglophone elite, which put first federalism and later secession on the 
constitutional reform agenda. Some important though temporary victories were 
booked in this period, in particular the creation of a GCE Board and the post-
ponement of the CDC privatisation. On these occasions, the leadership was 
capable of mobilising Anglophones against government encroachment on their 
educational and economic legacies. Widespread euphoria could be observed in 
Anglophone Cameroon when the SCNC delegation returned from the United 
Nations in 1995 announcing that independence was only a matter of time. 
From the mid-1990s onwards, the situation changed dramatically, with the 
Anglophone movements rapidly losing their initial momentum. Two main 
factors appear to be responsible for this unfortunate development: first, the 
apparent ability of the government to regain control over political events in the 
country and to contain the Anglophone threat; and second, the complex of 
internal problems faced by the Anglophone movements. 
The government proved increasingly capable of neutralising the opposition 
parties and the Anglophone movements to a large extent by employing a 
number of long-standing tactics including divide-and-rule, co-opting party and 
ethno-regional leaders in the regime, and severe repression. Its major strategy 
was to divide the Anglophone elite by capitalising on existing rivalries between 
the South West and North West elite. Feeling dominated by the North West 
elite in numerical, economic and political terms, most of the South West elite 
are inclined to explain and solve the Anglophone problem in a way different 
from the Anglophone movements: they tend to make the North West elite, who 
led the Anglophone territory to reunification and controlled power in the 
federated state of West Cameroon, co-responsible for the current Anglophone 
predicament and propose a ten-state federation so as to forestall renewed North 
West domination in a future federal state. The government has found it 
increasingly rewarding to tempt the South West elite away from Anglophone 
solidarity with strategic appointments and the idea that the North West elite 
rather than the Francophone-dominated state is their major enemy (cf. Eyoh 
1998a; Mbile 2000). Following the 1996 constitution that provided state 
protection to autochthonous minorities, it became instrumental in cementing an 
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alliance between the South West elite and the ethnically-related Francophone 
coastal elite, the so-called Grand Sawa Movement – an alliance that appears to 
transcend the Francophone-Anglophone divide. In addition to its divisive 
strategies, the government has enhanced its repressive tactics after the SCNC’s 
adoption of a secessionist programme. 
A series of closely related problems has also contributed to the dramatic 
backdrop in the Anglophone struggle for autonomy. First, there is the problem 
of leadership. Since the resignation of the founding fathers (Sam Ekontang 
Elad, Simon Munzu and Carlson Anywange) from the leadership, the SCNC 
has lacked competent and committed leadership. The SCNC became almost 
dormant under their successor, Ambassador (retired) Henry Fossung. A poorly 
orchestrated attempt in 1998 to replace him with Prince Ndoki Mukete led to a 
factionalisation of the leadership. The two leaders appeared to be more 
concerned with contesting each other’s position of power than promoting the 
Anglophone cause. An indication of their lack of commitment was their attitude 
to the proclamation of the restoration of the sovereignty and independence of 
the Southern Cameroons by Justice Fred Alobwede Ebong on 30 December 
1999. Both not only dissociated themselves from this action but also resigned 
from the SCNC leadership.  
Second, there is the problem of regular disunity among the various Anglo-
phone organisations and ambiguity in their objectives. Subsidiary organisations 
like the Free West Cameroon Movement (FWCM), the Ambazonian Movement 
(AM), the Southern Cameroons Restoration Movement (SCARM) and the 
Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL) often develop objectives and 
strategies different from the umbrella organisation, the SCNC. Whilst most of 
them nowadays champion in various ways the independence of the Southern 
Cameroons, some appear never to have altogether dropped the idea of a return 
to a federal state. This ambivalence tends to create confusion among the Anglo-
phone population. In June 2001, four of these organisations – namely the 
SCNC, the AM, the SCARM and SCYL – agreed to form an alliance to achieve 
the independence of the Ex-British Southern Cameroons. Strikingly, the AM 
immediately withdrew from the alliance when its leader, Fon Gorji Dinka, was 
not elected as head of the British Southern Cameroons Provisional Administra-
tion. 
Third, there is the problem of strategy. Although the government has 
persistently refused to start negotiations about either a return to a federal state 
or peaceful separation, the SCNC has never been prepared to drop its motto of 
‘the force of argument’ and adopt a more confrontational strategy or even 
armed struggle as propagated by the SCYL. Such a strategy is unlikely to bring 
about a change in government position or international recognition. There is 
ample evidence that appeals and petitions of separatist movements to the United 
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Nations, the Commonwealth, the OAU and other international organisations are 
usually ineffective since these organs tend to respect the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of their member states. The case of Eritrea is a clear 
example. The right to Eritrean self-determination was never recognised despite 
the fact that the Eritreans had an excellent case for self-rule based on the 
abrogation of international agreements by successive governments in Addis 
Ababa and the fact that they had physical control over at least some of the land 
they claimed. Instead, Eritrea was recognised as an independent state once a 
military victory had been won over the government in Addis Ababa, the 
traditional way that international society recognises new states. Moreover, with 
their tendency to make the entire Francophone community responsible for the 
Anglophone predicament, the Anglophone movements have managed to 
alienate even Francophones who have shown sympathy for their cause. 
Obviously, this tendency tends to be harmful to their planning of viable 
strategies for the achievement of their objectives and the formation of alliances 
with Francophone groups that sympathise with the Anglophone cause.  
However, it would be a grave error to assume that the Anglophone move-
ments have become fully paralysed or even defeated by divisive and repressive 
government tactics and their own organisational and strategic shortcomings. 
Following the proclamation of the restoration of the sovereignty and independ-
ence of the Ex-British Southern Cameroons by Justice Fred Alobwede Ebong 
on 30 December 1999 and the subsequent nomination of a provisional govern-
ment, the Anglophone struggle appears to have acquired a new impetus. 
Moreover, the new SCNC leadership appears to have adopted a more radical 
posture in the face of oppression. One of its boldest initiatives was the 
organisation of the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of independence of the 
Southern Cameroons on 1 October 2001. Despite government orders banning 
all demonstrations throughout the Anglophone region, a considerable number of 
SCNC activists decided to march on that day in the North West Province, 
defying the massive presence of police and armed forces. At Kumbo, five 
peaceful demonstrators were killed and many injured. Over 200 SCNC activists 
were arrested in Bamenda and elsewhere, including the new leaders. Remarka-
bly, when Anglophone magistrates eventually ordered the release of the 
detainees, court orders were flouted by the regime. In addition to the tragic 
events in Kumbo, the government’s gross lack of respect for the Anglophone 
courts was another shocking experience for Anglophones. 
In 2001, the Ex-British Southern Cameroons Provisional Administration 
created a new body, the Southern Cameroons People’s Organisation (SCAPO), for 
the specific purpose of pursuing legal avenues to address ‘the claims of the 
peoples of Southern Cameroons to self-determination and independence from La 
République du Cameroun’. SCAPO, led by the SCNC chairman and chancellor of 
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the provisional administration Dr Martin Luma, and Dr Kevin Gumne, rapidly 
filed a lawsuit against the Nigerian government in the Federal High Court in Abuja 
‘for the purpose of obtaining judicial relief to restrain the government of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria from treating or continuing to treat or regard the 
Southern Cameroons or the people of that territory as an integral part of La 
République du Cameroun’.1 SCAPO had two reasons for taking Nigeria to court in 
its legal battles for the recognition of an independent Southern Cameroons state. 
First, the trust territory of Southern Cameroons had been administered by Britain 
as an integral part of Nigeria. Consequently, SCAPO was inclined to regard 
Nigeria as a co-conspirator with Britain in the process that led to the annexation of 
the Southern Cameroons by La République du Cameroun. Second, Nigeria had 
ratified the OAU Banjul Charter of Human Rights that lays down in Article 20 the 
right of all colonised or oppressed people to free themselves from the bonds of 
domination by resorting to any means recognised by the international community. 
In the end, SCAPO scored a landmark victory when, in March 2002, the 
Nigerian Federal High Court ruled that ‘the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be 
compelled to place before the ICJ and the UN General Assembly and ensure 
diligent persecution to the conclusion the claims of the peoples of Southern 
Cameroons to self-determination and their declaration of independence’. It also 
placed a perpetual injunction, restraining ‘the government of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria from treating the Southern Cameroons and all the peoples of the 
territory as an integral part of La République du Cameroun’.2 This ruling may pave 
the way for international recognition of the Anglophone struggle for the creation 
of an independent state.  
Significantly, owing to these and previous events, an increasing number of 
the Anglophone and Francophone CPDM elite now acknowledge, after long 
years of public denial, that there is indeed an Anglophone problem. In January 
1999, Biya for the first time admitted, albeit in a dismissive fashion, that such a 
problem existed, even if he perceived it as one promoted by a handful of 
hotheads and vandals. Still, he has not yet shown any interest in negotiations 
with the Anglophone movements in spite of regular appeals by Anglophone, 
Francophone and international dignitaries to solve the Anglophone problem 
through dialogue. 
Another interesting development is that the youth, frustrated by the various 
strategies of containment of the Anglophone community’s legitimate aspirations 
for recognition and representation, have turned to alternative channels for 
mobilisation and strategy. Increasingly, they are using the Internet as a vehicle to 
air their views on various aspects of their predicament, centring mostly on their 
                                                 
1  Cited in http://yahoo.groups.com/group/BSCNation/message/6830. 
2  West Africa, 31 March 2002, p. 19. 
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territory and community as having suffered from the gross mismanagement of a 
corrupt and inefficient Francophone-dominated state and government. Their 
Internet sites and discussion groups are created and managed by Anglophone 
youths mostly based in the diaspora, the United States in particular. Because of 
their influential nature, these mailing and discussion groups have attracted even 
the state, which has normally been indifferent in the past. Given the flexible nature 
of the Internet, the real identities of users can be hidden under ambiguous user-
names, making provocative and fearless exchanges easier. The implication of 
these developments is that future negotiations on the Anglophone problem can 
afford to ignore neither the youth nor the diaspora. 
 
 
Suggestions for a solution to the Anglophone problem 
 
Given the current stalemate and the SCNC’s continuous adherence to its motto 
of ‘the force of argument and not the argument of force’, it would appear that 
future negotiations between the Anglophone and Francophone elites, like the 
1961 constitutional talks in Foumban, are the most likely way of solving the 
Anglophone problem. Increasing numbers of the Anglophone and Francophone 
elite are beginning to support a negotiated solution. 
A major opportunity to lay the long-standing Anglophone problem to rest 
was missed during the constitutional reform debate in the 1991-96 period when 
the Anglophone elite proposed a return to the federal state and even drew up a 
federal draft constitution. At the end of this process, which was fully controlled 
by the government, the 1996 constitution introduced a new classification of 
Cameroonians: those who belong to autochthonous minorities and those who do 
not. No attempt was made to define this bizarre concept but the Anglophone 
minority problem was carefully fudged. This attempt by the regime to re-
conceptualise ‘belonging’ was obviously aimed at safeguarding its survival. 
Finding it hard to win free and fair elections in the new multi-party system and 
to meet the Anglophone challenge to the unitary state, it felt obliged to 
encourage the resurgence of local identities which were likely to support its 
continued stay in power and to stretch the conventional ideas of minorities to 
such ambiguous proportions that historical minorities like the Anglophones 
were denied minority status in the 1996 constitution (Konings & Nyamnjoh 
2000). 
It has become increasingly evident that Biya forms the major obstacle to the 
multiple calls for negotiations between the Anglophone and Francophone elite. 
As recently as December 2001, he declared in his New Year message that it 
would be a betrayal of the founding fathers of nation-building to make any 
concessions to forces seeking secession or the fragmentation of Cameroon. He 
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appears not yet to realise that his present strategies of appointing a few Anglo-
phones in strategic positions previously reserved for Francophones and 
brutalising the Anglophone movement are more likely to radicalise Anglophone 
demands than offer a lasting solution to the problem. The emergence of the 
SCYL with its advocacy of armed struggle, the election of a new and apparently 
bolder SCNC leadership, and the heated discussions of the Anglophones in the 
diaspora on the Internet furnish proof for possible radicalisation. At present, the 
gap between the Biya camp and the Anglophone leadership is so wide that there 
are no political or religious leaders in the country who command enough trust 
among both sides to be able to serve as credible intermediaries or facilitators of 
any discussion on the sensitive Anglophone problem. That is why the Anglo-
phone leadership strongly believes that no meaningful dialogue is possible 
without the involvement of the United Nations, the supervisory organ of the 
former Cameroon trust territories. During his visit to Cameroon in May 2000, 
the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan pleaded for dialogue between the 
Anglophone and Francophone leaders. To forestall any further bloodshed and 
an escalation of the conflict between the Anglophone movements and the 
Francophone-dominated state, he should bring more pressure to bear upon Biya 
to accept dialogue and help organise constitutional talks under the auspices of 
the United Nations. 
Unlike the constitutional talks in Foumban in 1961, it would be advisable 
that, prior to the negotiations, the Anglophone and Francophone populations 
were to be actively involved in the constitutional process about the future form 
of state and eventually consulted in a referendum. We have stressed in this book 
that Anglophones and Francophones are by no means monolithic blocs. Both 
are divided along various lines, including ethno-regional ones (for example, the 
South West-North West divide in Anglophone Cameroon and the Bamileke-
Beti divide in Francophone Cameroon), political ones (supporters and 
opponents of the regime), and constitutional ones (different opinions about the 
future form of state). 
During the actual negotiations, the various options for a future form of state 
are to be discussed freely and frankly. The major options appear to be the 
following: 
 
 The formation of two independent states. The Anglophone call for an inde-
pendent state has a long tradition. It was the most popular option in the 
Southern Cameroons in the years preceding reunification but the local 
population was eventually not given the chance by the United Nations to 
vote for it during the 1961 plebiscite. The Anglophone movements renewed 
this call during political liberalisation in the early 1990s. Contrary to the pre-
reunification period, the renewed pursuit of an independent state was 
204 
initially a minority option with most Anglophone movements striving for a 
return to a federal state. It was only after Biya’s persistent refusal to discuss 
the federal option that the leadership of the Anglophone movements started 
championing a non-violent separation between Anglophone and Franco-
phone Cameroon into two sovereign states along the lines of what happened 
between the Czechs and Slovaks in 1992. Such a peaceful separation would 
be accompanied by an equitable sharing of assets and liabilities, and perhaps 
supported by the establishment of other cross-border confidence-building 
institutions. Most leaders of the Anglophone movements now argue that this 
solution possibly holds the best chance for peace in the long run because any 
attempts to engage belatedly in democratic and institutional reforms just to 
placate the Anglophones and preserve international appearances may only 
prolong the agony of the Anglophones and postpone the day of reckoning. 
An increasing number of scholars like Ghai (1998) and Sandbrook (2000) 
also regard secession as the best solution in cases where there are no 
prospects for any peaceful coexistence of territorial units within dysfunc-
tional and deeply divided nation-states. Eritrea’s peaceful separation from 
Ethiopia in 1994 following a referendum the previous year reassured those 
who feared that secession in any African country would open a Pandora’s 
box of violence and fragmentation.  
 The question, however, arises of whether there is sufficient support for 
the Anglophone movements’ call for the creation of an independent 
Southern Cameroons state. They themselves claim widespread support in the 
Anglophone region, often referring to the 1996 signature referendum. Since 
there are several indications that the results of this referendum were clearly 
biased, a new referendum held under UN supervision would form a more 
reliable source of information about the Anglophone population’s aspira-
tions. Our own research instead provides evidence that the majority of the 
Anglophone elite tends to favour a federation, albeit differing on the number 
of states. Even some SCNC leaders, like the late John Ngu Foncha and the 
late Solomon Tandeng Muna (the Anglophone architects of reunification), 
appear never to have abandoned their federalist ideal although they contin-
ued to support the SCNC line in public for strategic reasons. 
 It is, however, unlikely that the Anglophone movements’ call for an 
independent Southern Cameroons state will receive any support from the 
Francophone elite and the international community. The majority of the 
Francophone elite is clearly in favour of a decentralised unitary state and is 
determined to keep control of Anglophone Cameroon’s rich natural 
resources, in particular oil. International organisations continue to respect 
the territorial integrity of member states and to disapprove of any move 
towards a further Balkanisation of Africa. That is why, during his recent 
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visit to Cameroon, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan made the Anglo-
phone movements understand, in no uncertain terms, that dialogue and 
reconciliation rather than separation were instrumental in solving the 
Anglophone problem. 
 The question of the fiscal prospects of an independent Southern Camer-
oons state deserves more attention to justify the SCNC’s pursuit of 
independence. The same question was posed in the period preceding reunifi-
cation and the then existing British doubts about the economic viability of a 
tiny independent Southern Cameroons state turned out to be one of the main 
reasons for the UN’s refusal to consider this option. The area has in the 
meantime become the country’s breadbasket and the source of its consider-
able oil wealth and a detailed study of the post-colonial Southern Cameroo-
nian economy is needed to re-assess the economic viability of an independ-
ent Southern Cameroons state. 
 
 A return to the federal state. Since the formal dismantlement of the sham 
federation in 1972, federalism has been rejected by the regime as alien and 
synonymous with fragmentation and secession. However, more than forty 
years of centralisation has not brought about the declared goals of national 
unity and integration, or economic progress. Why not start an experiment in 
true federalism, requiring among other things, the transfer of power to a 
lower level of jurisdiction with clear geographical boundaries, a legal status, 
specified functions, fixed financial resources and autonomous personnel. Of 
course, federalism per se offers no magic and ultimate solution to the 
Anglophone problem but properly conceived and implemented it might 
enhance the chances of regulating deep divisions within society and prevent 
them spilling over into inter-communal violence. The past fifty years have 
witnessed a federalist revolution. According to one estimate, nearly 40 per 
cent of the world’s population now live within polities that are partly 
federal, and another third in polities that apply federal arrangements in some 
way (Fombad 2001). The seeming viability and durability of the Nigerian 
federal experiment in the face of severe odds has turned the country into an 
important reference point of constitutional efforts to engineer unity and 
peace in Cameroon and other deeply divided societies on the African 
continent (cf. Suberu 1999). At the same time, however, the continuing 
Nigerian problem of developing criteria for the sharing of federal revenues 
requires us to devote ample attention to the economic implications of 
federalism (Olukoshi & Agbu 1996). The 1961 federal constitution did not 
provide for any autonomous financial resources for the federated state of 
West Cameroon and this quickly became a source of fierce conflict between 
the West Cameroonian authorities and the federal government. The high 
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costs of federalism later allegedly became a pretext for the central govern-
ment in Cameroon to abolish the federation and to oppose the re-introduc-
tion of a federal state. 
 Secessionist tendencies may disappear in Anglophone Cameroon if the 
present situation is turned in the direction of federalism and Anglophones 
are constitutionally guaranteed equal status and the preservation of their 
language and cultural identity. Federalism is widely supported in Anglo-
phone Cameroon but Anglophones clearly differ on the number of states 
there should be. The Anglophone movements used to propose a return to the 
two-state (Anglophone-Francophone) federation but in sharp contrast to the 
pre-1972 federal arrangement, they have devised a federal draft constitution 
that provides for true autonomy for the federated states and even for the 
provinces within the federated states. The South West elite in particular are 
proponents of the ten-state option that calls for radical decentralisation of 
power based on the current ten provincial administrative units. For them, 
multi-party electoral competition and advocacy of a return to a two-state 
federal arrangement amplify fears of the domination of ‘their’ political space 
by North Westerners (Eyoh 1998a). The major opposition party in the 
country, the North West-based SDF, proposes a four-state federation so as 
not to alienate its majority Francophone membership. Anglophone pursuit of 
a federal state is also backed by certain ethno-regional groups and opposi-
tion parties in Francophone Cameroon, albeit differing, like Anglophones, 
on the number of states. 
 
 Regional decentralisation. Decentralisation within the unitary state is an 
option that has been supported by the vast majority of the Francophone elite 
and a small minority of the Anglophone elite from the very start of the 
constitutional reform process in 1991. At present, many appear to be 
disappointed by the decentralisation clauses laid down in the 1996 constitu-
tion and their actual implementation. While the constitution provides for the 
possibility of some deconcentration of powers through the creation of 
regional and local authorities, these provisions are stated in such dubious, 
obscure and circumlocutory language that it is doubtful if there were ever 
any serious intentions of implementing them (Fombad 2001). None of these 
so-called new institutions, like regional councils, have been established. 
Moreover, recent official statements by senior government officials, 
including the president, have called for the postponement of their 
implementation.  
 Some Francophone scholars, such as Olinga (1994) and Donfack (1998), 
are now proposing the introduction of regional states with larger powers 
than the regime has been willing to grant, occupying a middle position on 
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the constitutional spectrum between decentralisation and federalism. The 
formation of such states that in their view form an adequate answer to the 
widespread desire for autonomy in both the Anglophone and Francophone 
parts of the country could be based on the ten existing provinces or on new 
constitutionally recognised regions. The latter makes it possible to recognise 
one Anglophone region. The creation of an Anglophone region could be 
even more acceptable to the Anglophone movement if given a special status 
on the grounds that the Anglophone population perceives itself as a distinct 
community defined by differences in official language and inherited colonial 
traditions of education, law, and public administration. Similar experiments 
have been tried in countries such as Canada where Quebec enjoys a special 
status, and in Spain. 
 
Ultimately such constitutional talks can only succeed if the regime is 
prepared to abandon its Gallic centralist conception of the state and the 
participants are allowed to think constructively and imaginatively about the 
most suitable solution to the Anglophone problem. This also requires Anglo-
phones knowing where their best interests lie and having leaders capable of 
articulating their community’s concerns and aspirations. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Anglophone and Francophone  
responses to the views of the  
Anglophone movements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Anglophone movements are inclined to look upon the Anglophone and 
Francophone population as homogeneous blocs, with the Anglophones usually 
being seen as loyal supporters and Francophones as fierce opponents. In this 
chapter a more refined picture of reality is presented.  
On the one hand, evidence is provided to substantiate the Anglophone 
movements’ perception. Generally speaking, Anglophones support the griev-
ances articulated by these movements and their call for a return to a federal 
state, in sharp contrast to Francophones who tend to deny the existence of an 
Anglophone problem and favour the creation of a decentralised unitary state. 
On the other hand, the internal divisions in both groups are highlighted. Anglo-
phones are clearly divided on the number of states there should be within a 
future federal state. Some support the two-state option championed by the 
Anglophone movements, while others favour a four- or ten-state option. 
Significantly, a minority of Francophones tends to sympathise with the Anglo-
phone cause and even supports the creation of a federal state, albeit differing, 
like the Anglophones, on the number of states within a future federal state. 
Of late, the situation has become even more complicated. Following the 
SCNC’s adoption of a secessionist stand, a growing number of Anglophones 
appear to support the achievement of an independent Southern Cameroons state. 
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Moreover, some members of the Francophone elite have begun to demand a 
larger measure of decentralisation than the Francophone-dominated state is 
willing to concede. 
 
 
Anglophone views 
 
As already pointed out in previous chapters, the feeling of communal disad-
vantage has become widespread in Anglophone Cameroon in the aftermath of 
reunification. Most Anglophones claim that their region has become subject to 
recolonisation, the coloniser having merely changed colour, and that they are 
being treated as second-class citizens in their own country. They often tend 
blame not only the Francophone-dominated state for their predicament but also 
the Francophone population as a whole. This is not surprising since they are in 
almost daily confrontation with overbearing Francophone government officials 
and oppressive Francophone soldiers and structures both in the Francophone 
region and in their own region. A young, highly educated Anglophone woman 
interviewed by Eyoh (1998a: 263) expresses her frustration about the second-
class citizenship of Anglophones as follows: 
 
No matter how bilingual you are, if you enter an office and demand something in 
French, because of your accent, the messenger may announce your arrival simply as 
‘une Anglo’ or respond in a manner intended to mock. You know that stereotypes 
are a normal part of life in Cameroon and the world over. But the constant reminder 
that as an Anglophone you are different creates the impression that we are second-
class citizens. This is what irritates Anglophone elites. You can imagine the 
frustrations of older and less educated Anglophones who have to deal with a bureau-
cracy which operates mostly in French and state officials who are so rude to the 
people they are supposed to serve. 
 
Again, a young Anglophone musician who returned to Cameroon in 2001 
after a five-year stay in South Africa was shocked by the behaviour of one of 
the Francophone cashiers in a large bakery in Douala, feeling like a stranger in 
his own so-called bi-lingual country. When he wanted to pay, he received a cool 
reception: ‘What do you want? Stop speaking English. We don’t speak that 
language here. Return to where you come from, John Fru Ndi’.1 
There is ample evidence to illustrate the increase in the distrust between the 
two parties to the union since reunification. It is even manifest, for instance, in 
Cameroon’s political grammar: in common parlance, Anglophones often refer 
to Francophones as ‘frogs’ while Francophones tend to refer to Anglophones as 
                                                 
1  Le Messager, 30 November 2001, p. 6. 
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‘Anglo-fools’ or ‘Biafrans’. By using the term Biafran, Francophones are 
expressing their strong belief that Anglophones are inclined to be secessionist. 
This led the Lord Mayor of Yaoundé, Emah Basile, to designate Anglophones 
as ‘enemies in the house’. As such, they should either voluntarily ‘go across our 
borders’ as Mbombo Njoya, the former minister of territorial administration and 
present Sultan of Foumban, once remarked after the launch of the SDF in 
Bamenda in May 1990 or be chased away (Ngniman 1993: 51). Owing to 
Anglophone opposition to the Francophone-dominated state, Francophones are 
also often inclined to perceive Anglophones as being ungrateful. In a CRTV 
interview, Charles Assale, the first prime minister of East Cameroon, told the 
Anglophone population that the British built only one house on its territory, 
which they destroyed on the eve of their departure. Reunification with Franco-
phone Cameroon brought about the level of development Anglophones 
currently enjoy. He also stated that the costs of the plebiscite campaign incurred 
by Foncha and his party were largely defrayed by Francophones. He further 
claimed that he himself was the one who personally handed over money for the 
West Cameroon budgetary envelope to Foncha.2 Assale’s interview was repeat-
edly broadcasted by CRTV as proof of Francophone kindness and Anglophone 
ingratitude. 
Stereotypes are commonplace in Cameroon to mark the assumed differences 
in values and attitudes between the two parties. In an article on Francophone 
‘Anglophobia’, Ngome (1993: 28) provides some striking examples of such 
stereotyping: 
 
Anglophones see Francophones as fundamentally fraudulent, superficial and given 
to bending rules: cheating of exams, jumping queues, rigging elections and so on 
(...). The Francophones are irked by what they see as the Anglophone air of self-
righteousness and intellectual superiority. 
 
In his pamphlet The Path to Social Justice, Ngam Chia (1990: 2) stresses the 
Francophone ‘neo-colonial’ mentality that compares most unfavourably with 
Anglophone independent-mindedness: 
 
The Francophone psycho-social background is neo-colonised and as such one must 
not expect them to be as independent-minded as the Anglophones. For instance, 
Anglophones see themselves as people who can live without depending on Britain 
and France for aid, but the Francophones do not even believe that they can run a 
simple administration in the Civil Service without the so-called expert directives 
from France. To blame them, nonetheless, is to undermine the deep French cultural 
alienation of East Cameroon. 
 
                                                 
2  Le Témoin, 3 June 1993, p. 12. 
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Anglophone leaders, some of whom speak impeccable French, have made 
use of such stereotypes to highlight the seemingly insurmountable gap between 
Anglophones and Francophones that allegedly prevents both parties from living 
together peacefully in the union. Of course, this was helpful in rallying the 
Anglophone population behind them in their pursuit of autonomy, either in the 
form of a return to the federal state or outright secession. 
Besides the various Anglophone organisations and political parties, some 
social groups in Anglophone Cameroon have played a significant role in 
sensitising the local population on Francophone domination and exploitation, 
and mobilising it in defence of its interests, particularly writers, journalists and 
church leaders. 
Several Anglophone writers have identified with the Anglophone struggle 
and contributed greatly to raising Anglophone consciousness and action 
(Lyonga et al. 1993). Three of the most important are mentioned here. Bate 
Besong, Anglophone Cameroon’s most versatile and charismatic playwright 
and poet, has always maintained that the Anglophone creative writer ‘must 
arouse his Anglophone constituency from the apathy and despair into which it 
has sunk’ and transform his writing into ‘hand-grenades’ to be used against 
Francophone oppressors (Ngwane 1993: 35). A cursory overview of his own 
writing leaves one in no doubt that Bate Besong has lived up to his own 
prescription. His Beasts of No Nation (1990) is a bitter indictment of the 
Francophone exploitation of the Anglophones who are reduced to ‘night-soil 
men’ (a metaphor for slavery). Throughout the play, the Francophones are 
presented as reckless destroyers of the nation because of their unbridled 
appetites and moral insensitivity. They are ‘ravenous wolves’ or ‘roaring lions’ 
seeking to devour all that crosses their path. They are ‘locusts’ who ‘eat tons of 
green’. They are ‘thieves of no nation’ who belong to a secret cult of ‘greed, 
grab and graft’. The exploited ‘Anglos’, however, are going to demand their full 
civil rights or, what the dramatist calls, their ‘identification papers’. The 
narrator, a kind of priest who will lead the down-trodden Anglos to the New 
Jerusalem, makes it clear that they will have their freedom – perhaps a nation of 
their own – or death. And the leitmotiv that runs through the play is: ‘A hero 
goes to war to die’ (cf. Ako 2001).  
Bole Butake in And Palm-Wine Will Flow (1990) uses the Grassfields Fon 
(chief) as a metaphor, an epitome of institutionalised corruption, greed and 
dictatorship in the country. He predicts participatory democracy for his people 
through a grassroots revolution. The presence of pro-democracy forces and 
imagery from the North West Province leaves the audience in no doubt about 
where Butake believes his revolution will start.  
For his part, Epie Ngome in What God Has Put Asunder (1992) uses an 
extended marriage metaphor to denounce the unitary state system and to uphold 
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the idea of a two-state federation for Anglophones and Francophones. It is the 
story of Weka, a child brought up in an orphanage under Reverend Gordon and 
Sister Sabeth. When Weka reaches marriageable age, two suitors ask for her 
hand in marriage. One is Mr Miché Garba and the other Mr Emeka, who grew 
up in the orphanage with Weka. Despite Emeka’s solid claims over Weka as a 
childhood friend, Garba has his way, but Weka accepts him reluctantly. Weka 
soon discovers that Garba is no good: he maltreats and neglects her. He exploits 
the rich cocoa farm left by her father and squanders the money on his 
concubines. He does not tolerate her questioning attitude. When she can stand 
him no longer, Weka escapes with her children to her father’s compound to 
rebuild his dilapidated house and their shattered lives. Garba pursues her there, 
threatening to forcefully take them back home to his house. Clearly, the 
marriage metaphor relates to the political union between Anglophone 
Cameroon and its Francophone counterpart, with Weka standing for the former 
West Cameroon, Emeka for Nigeria, and Garba for La République du 
Cameroun. Weka’s parents represent the British government that relinquished 
responsibility over Southern Cameroons. Reverend Gordon and the orphanage 
stand for the United Nations trusteeship mandate over Southern Cameroons. 
Garba’s neglectful but exploitative attitude towards Weka represents the 
attitude of the Francophone leadership towards Anglophone Cameroon, 
behaviour that has come to represent the central grievance in what Anglophones 
have identified as the ‘Anglophone problem’ in Cameroon (Nyamnjoh 1996e: 
350-51; Ambanasom 1996: 218-22). The major suffering inflicted by Miché 
Garba on Weka symbolises the creation of the unitary state in 1972:  
 
Once the festivities were over, he brought a fleet of trucks and bundled all my 
children and me out of our house. His drivers gathered all our stuff trampling and 
damaging many things etc ... and so he forced me to settle in with him. Since then, 
he has been forcing my children to learn his own mother tongue and to forget mine 
with which they grew up; I must abide by the customs of his clan, not mine, and ... 
in short he has simply been breathing down my neck since then (Ngome 1992: 53). 
 
The ultimate social relevance of What God Has Put Asunder to the 
Anglophone community lies in the fact that it has contributed in no small way 
to the overall education of the Anglophones. Its metaphorical style has been 
especially relevant during a period when censorship and repression made it 
virtually impossible to speak the language of freedom and survive. For a long 
time under the Ahidjo regime for example, when it was quite possible to 
become a prisoner without having committed a crime (cf. Mukong 1985), Mind 
Searching (cf. Nyamnjoh 1991) was about the only freedom Anglophones had 
to contemplate their predicament. 
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Anglophone drama written by these and other playwrights has been made 
accessible to the common man by various theatre groups including the Yaoundé 
Theater Troupe and the Flame Players (Doho 1996). They have not only played 
in Yaoundé and other Francophone towns but have also toured both Anglo-
phone provinces. Some groups have even performed in Europe. Plays staged by 
the Mountain Mourners in Germany have contributed inordinately to bringing 
the Anglophone plight to international attention.3 
The second group that has contributed immensely to Anglophone awakening 
are the Anglophone journalists and columnists such as Charlie Ndichia, Boh 
Herbert, Julius Wamey, Sam Nuvala Fonkem, Joseph Bannavti, Jing Thomas 
Ayeh, Hilary B. Fohtung, Taadom Sultan, the Postman and Rotcod Gobata 
(Nyamnjoh 1996e: 351-56). Their journalism is very similar in language, style, 
theme and value assumptions to the creative writings of Bate Besong, Bole 
Butake and Epie Ngome. Like the plays and novels of the creative writers, this 
journalism deals with present Anglophone frustrations as well as memories of 
the glorious past: myths, legends and fairy tales of the good old days when the 
Southern Cameroons was still under British colonial rule. The impression is 
given of a formerly virtuous community now corrupted by unification with the 
Francophones, an essentially dishonest lot. These journalists are eager to expose 
the contradictions and inconsistencies in the policies and actions of the Franco-
phone-dominated leadership of Cameroon and do not hesitate to recall the pre-
reunification situation in Southern Cameroons marked, according to them, by 
transparency, accountability and selflessness in the management of public 
affairs. 
Church leaders form the third group that has played a significant educational 
role in Anglophone Cameroon. Discussion here is restricted to the leaders of the 
three major mainstream Christian churches in Anglophone Cameroon, namely 
the Roman Catholic Church (RCC), the Presbyterian Church in Cameroon 
(PCC) and the Cameroon Baptist Convention (CBC). 
It is noteworthy that the RCC is well represented in both the Anglophone 
and Francophone parts of the country, in sharp contrast to the PCC and CBC, 
which have their main bases in Anglophone Cameroon. In fact, the RCC is the 
dominant Christian church in the Beti region of Francophone Cameroon, the 
region of the ethnic group in power (Ngongo 1982; Mveng 1990). As a result, 
the Biya government expected the RCC to maintain cordial relations with the 
state. Some of the leading Beti ideologues of the regime, like Professor Mono 
Ndjana, even pleaded for the RCC and the state to fuse (Pokam 1987). Indeed, 
until political liberalisation in 1990, the RCC leaders broadly identified with the 
                                                 
3  The Post, 2 March 2001, p. 3. 
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regime. The Archbishop of Yaoundé, Jean Zoa, himself a Beti, became the 
personification of the entente between the church and the regime in this period. 
Although the RCC leaders usually attempted to present a united front in 
public, one could nevertheless observe from time to time internal divisions 
along ethno-regional lines, in particular between Anglophones and Franco-
phones. The consecration in 1988 of the Anglophone Archbishop of Garoua, 
Christian Tumi, as the first Cameroonian cardinal appears not to have been well 
received by the Archbishop of Yaoundé who had been the leading figure in the 
RCC in the post-reunification period. It also sparked off much acrimony and 
discontent among Francophone Catholics, in particular in the Beti region. In a 
recent interview, in which he once again pointed at the exclusion of Anglo-
phones from real positions of power in the Francophone-dominated state, 
Cardinal Tumi remarked that ‘were it the prerogative of Cameroonians to 
choose a cardinal, he would not have been the one’.4 Another conflict between 
the two church leaders occurred in March 1990, when a CPDM-organised 
march against a precipitate introduction of liberal democracy ended with a mass 
in Yaoundé cathedral. This mass, which according to the CPDM organisers was 
intended ‘to pray for peace’, was celebrated by Jean Zoa. The media and the 
opposition, however, immediately interpreted this event as an expression of the 
archbishop’s support for the regime and the one-party system. In an interview 
given after the event, Cardinal Tumi seemed to agree with this interpretation, 
stating that he himself would never have officiated at such a service. Obviously 
irritated by the cardinal’s statement, Jean Zoa accused him of interfering in 
matters of the Yaoundé archdiocese that were not within his jurisdiction (Nwel 
1995: 172). 
Strikingly, the appointment in February 1987 of a Bamileke priest as 
auxiliary bishop in the Douala diocese gave rise to vehement protests from the 
autochthonous Douala priests against the Vatican’s refusal to elevate one of the 
many qualified indigenous priests to this high position and the alleged 
domination of the church hierarchy by the ethnically-related Francophone and 
Anglophone Grassfielders.5 A similar event occurred in Yaoundé in 1999 when 
the autochthonous Beti priests and elite protested against the appointment of a 
Bamileke bishop, André Wouking, as successor to Archbishop Jean Zoa who 
had died in 1998.6 Apparently the autochthonous Douala and Beti clergy and 
elite were determined to forestall an extension of alleged ‘Anglo-Bami’ 
                                                 
4  The Herald, 28-29 November 2001, pp. 1 and 3. 
5  The Vatican-addressed memorandum of the Douala priests on these issues can be 
found in Politique Africaine 35: 85-96. 
6  For Beti reactions to his appointment as Archbishop of Yaoundé, see, for instance, 
Cameroon Tribune, 19 July 1999, pp. 8-9 and La Nouvelle Expression, 21 July 
1999, p. 6. 
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domination7 from the economic and political domains to the religious domain 
(see Chapter 5). 
Following political liberalisation in 1990, both Francophone and Anglo-
phone bishops became increasingly critical of the regime. The National 
Episcopal Conference of Cameroon issued a number of pastoral letters in which 
it held the regime largely responsible for the deepening economic and political 
crisis manifest in the growing impoverishment of the population, widespread 
corruption, intensification of ethno-regional tensions and conflicts, and 
violation of human rights. In addition, the Anglophone hierarchy, especially 
Cardinal Tumi and Paul Verdzekov, Archbishop of Bamenda, regularly 
expressed their views on issues of Anglophone concern. As such, they became 
frequent targets of vehement government attacks. 
After his transfer from the distant archdiocese of Garoua to the archdiocese 
of Douala in 1991, Cardinal Tumi soon became one of the most notable figures 
in public life, constantly being tipped as a potential chairman whenever a 
national forum on politics or the constitution seemed imminent. Two events in 
1994 exemplified his continuing defence of Anglophone interests. In February 
1994, he publicly declared that he favoured federalism, citing diocesan 
autonomy in his own church and Swiss cantons as models.8 In December 1994, 
he, together with some other Anglophone leaders, withdrew from the 
Consultative Committee on Constitutional Reform ordered by the Biya 
government (see Chapter 4). In an interview with the journal L’Effort 
Camerounais in 1996,9 he declared that the new (1996) constitution ‘had not 
thoroughly examined the Anglophone problem which has become a national 
problem’. He added that, in the absence of any constitutional provision for the 
Anglophone problem, a new constitution would be required sooner or later.  
Following a period of relative silence, Cardinal Tumi recently started to 
voice his opinions on national and Anglophone issues once again. Since the 
year 2000 he has called, like the SDF and other opposition parties, for the 
installation of an independent electoral commission,10 stressing that the 
Francophone-dominated state has never organised any fair and free elections 
since reunification. He has also strongly condemned the extra-judicial killings 
by Special Forces of between 500-1000 criminal suspects in Douala. 
                                                 
7  In the autochthony-allochthony discourse, the Beti and Doula are inclined to lump 
the Anglophones (and even more specifically the Anglophone Grassfielders) and 
Bamileke strangers together as ‘Anglo-Bami’ whom they perceive as supporters of 
the main opposition party, the SDF. (See Geschiere & Nyamnjoh 2000 and Konings 
2001b.) 
8  Cameroon Post, 14-17 February 1994, p. 4. 
9  L’Effort Camerounais, 24 February-8 March 1996, p. 3. 
10  Jeune Afrique Economie, No. 317, 2-15 October 2000. 
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Unsurprisingly, he was quickly accused by the government of lying, anti-
patriotism, tribalism, ambitions of becoming president, violation of the principle 
of separation between state and church, lack of respect for those who govern, 
and insidious attempts to turn Cameroonians and the international community 
away from the determined efforts and sacrifices made by the government to bail 
Cameroon out of its economic crisis and insecurity. During an interview with Le 
Messager in November 2001,11 he declared that it was an understatement to say 
that Anglophones are marginalised since they have been simply silenced and 
abandoned in all aspects of public life following reunification. He called upon 
President Biya to enter into dialogue with the SCNC and implement regional 
autonomy as provided for in the 1996 constitution, claiming that the SCNC would 
become more militant if the government continued to ignore the plight of 
Anglophones. 
Compared to Cardinal Tumi, Archbishop Verdzekov’s demeanour appears 
quiet, but his convictions are equally direct and, therefore, contentious in the eyes 
of the government. During the state of emergency imposed by the regime on the 
North West Province after the fraudulent presidential election in 1992, Archbishop 
Verdzekov strongly criticised the government for the mass arrests and torture of 
SDF militants. Torture, he said, was a heritage of French colonialism but it had 
been intensified and extended to the Anglophone region after reunification 
(Eboussi Boulaga 1997a: 399). He subsequently hosted several RCC human rights 
groups in the ‘Bishop’s House’. In ‘A Humble and Earnest Appeal’ co-signed by 
the other Anglophone bishops, he urged Prime Minister Achidi Achu on 25 
September 1993 to preserve autonomous Anglophone education (Nyamnjoh 
1996a: 117-31). In 1993-1994, he and Bishop Pius Suh Awa of Buea allowed the 
Anglophone movements to hold AAC I and AAC II on church premises. In 1996, 
he said that he had no doubt that ‘an unwritten policy of absorption and 
assimilation of Anglophones had been actively pursued, and Anglophones felt 
that only through Frenchification could they be accepted as bona fide 
Cameroonians’.12  
Although the PCC and CBC are smaller and less influential churches in 
Cameroon, their leaders, too, have regularly acted as spokesmen for Anglo-
phone grievances and demanded a return to the federal state. For example, in a 
memo presented to President Paul Biya during his visit to Buea on 27 
December 1991,13 the PCC leaders expressed their support for the Anglophone  
                                                 
11  Le Messager, 26 November 2001, pp. 5-8. See also The Herald, 28-29 November 
2001, pp. 1 and 3. 
12  Paul Verdzekov, Archbishop of Bamenda, ‘A Talk at the Presentation of a Book 
Entitled The Cameroon GCE Crisis: A Test of Anglophone Solidarity’, 1 July 1996. 
13  This memo can be found in Nyansako-Ni-Nku 1993: 25. 
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struggle and a return to the federal state as follows: 
 
Our founding fathers established this country on the cornerstone of unity in diversity 
and bilingualism. But our experience of unification is that the Anglophones are being 
treated with benign neglect by all successive regimes since independence. Today the 
Anglophone Cameroonian has become terribly marginalised. Even the utterances of 
some leading Francophone Cameroonians only go to make the Anglophones feel 
unwelcome in their own country. 
Thirty years after independence, Anglophones are still being contemptuously 
referred to as ‘strangers’. Despite their competence, they are still for the most part 
only considered as second best in administrative and political appointments. 
Thirty long years after independence, the entire Anglophone Cameroon is still 
backward, underdeveloped., and tottering on a very rudimentary economy. Yet the 
entire Anglophone territory is absolutely rich in natural resources, and we see these 
resources being exploited every day. In fact, the more they are plundered, the more 
our territory reclines into poverty. 
Mr President, political systems are not static. In fact, they are supposed to evolve 
from one stage to another improving themselves in the process. Now we can 
confidently say that the unitary system has not been satisfactory at all. Consequently, 
we advocate the return to a federal system like most other liberal democratic 
societies today. The new federation should have a defined system of revenue alloca-
tion. 
 
In 1994 the PCC welcomed the AAC II after security forces had prevented it 
from holding its meetings in the Roman Catholic cathedral in Bamenda. During 
the ghost town campaign, on 15 May 1991, the Cameroon Baptist Convention 
(CBC) leadership delivered a message to the prime minister supporting a 
sovereign national conference. It was quite pointed about an Anglophone 
university and a federation (Takougang & Krieger 1998: 224-25).  
Unlike the leadership of these three major mainstream Christian churches, 
the leaders of the Pentecostal and Charismatic churches in Anglophone 
Cameroon have never directly addressed the Anglophone problem. Their 
message of revivalism, proposing religion as an alternative source of salvation 
and God as the answer to the sensitivities of power and to moral decadence, 
appears nevertheless to be indirectly relevant to the Anglophone predicament. 
Directly or indirectly, therefore, all the churches have contributed to the 
advancement of the Anglophone cause. Many Anglophones look forward to 
their Sunday sermons when pastors and priests are at their best in highlighting 
the socio-political and economic problems facing their congregations, and in 
castigating officialdom for power without responsibility (cf. Wirba 1992, 1993).  
While most Anglophones tend to support the grievances of the Anglophone 
movements about Francophone domination and their call for a federation, they 
disagree on the number of states in a future federal state. 
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The Anglophone movements propose a two-state (Anglophone-Franco-
phone) federation, though lately they have tended to advocate an independent 
Southern Cameroons state. One of the South West-based political parties, the 
Liberal Democratic Alliance (LDA), has always supported their position. This 
is not surprising since many LDA leaders, such as Barrister Sam Elad, Dr 
Simon Munzu, Ambassador (retired) Henry Fossung and Mola Njoh Litumbe 
acted simultaneously as SCNC leaders. What is peculiar to the LDA is that it 
tries to forestall North West domination in a future two-state federation or in an 
independent Southern Cameroons state. 
The pro-CPDM elite and chiefs, particularly in the South West Province, 
propose a ten-state federation, considering it a guarantee against renewed North 
West domination – a position supported by another South West-based political 
party, the Conservative Republican Party (CRP) (Menthong 1998: 21).  
Some Anglophone political parties champion a four-state federation. This 
used to be the position of the erstwhile South West-based National Democratic 
Party (NDP) of Ambassador (retired) Henry Fossung. In a 1992 party 
pamphlet,14 Fossung explains his party’s choice for a four-state federation as 
follows: 
 
The federal system in Cameroon is necessitated in the first place by the country’s bi-
cultural heritage with its two distinct Anglo-Saxon and Francophone cultures. 
However, for the purpose of balanced regional development and to redress the 
existing imbalance of the Francophone majority and the Anglophone minority (a 
legacy of our colonial heritage) a further division of the larger French-speaking 
territory into three separate states is proposed. Such a division should be on the lines 
of local socio-economic, cultural and geographical considerations. 
 
The four federated states would be the Western Federated State composed of 
the South West and North West Provinces, the Midwest Federated State made 
up of the West and Littoral Provinces, the Southern Federated State consisting 
of the Centre, South and East Provinces, and the Northern Federated State 
including Adamaoua, North and Far North Provinces. The federal capital 
Yaoundé would have a special status to be referred to as the Federal Govern-
ment Territory. Following his party’s merger with Njoh Litumbe’s Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) in 1993 to form the Liberal Democratic Alliance, 
Fossung was converted to the two-state federation, and after his election as 
SCNC chairman in 1996 he started to propagate an independent Southern 
Cameroons state. In the meantime, his original idea of a four-state federation 
had been taken up by the SDF. 
                                                 
14  See NDP, The New Cameroon as a Four-State Federation, Buea, 1992, pp. 10-11. 
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The position of the SDF, by far the most important party in the Anglophone 
region, on the future form of state has been evolving since its foundation in 
1990. It first championed a large measure of decentralisation within the unitary 
state. In its 1991 Proposals on Devolution of Power, the party attempted ‘to put 
into concrete form and detail its avowed slogan of “Power to the People”’. By 
introducing a large measure of decentralisation, the party intended ‘to put an 
end to the former system bedevilled by overcentralisation of decision-making 
with a huge bureaucracy at the centre’, and ‘to get the common people them-
selves directly involved in their own governance’.  
Given its growing membership in Francophone Cameroon, particularly 
among the Bamileke, the party increasingly presented itself as a national rather 
than an Anglophone party and adopted an ambivalent attitude towards calls 
from the newly emerging Anglophone movements for a return to a two-state 
federation (see Chapter 4). Its leadership tried to avoid alienating either its 
Anglophone or its Francophone members but this was not an easy task. The 
party’s Anglophone members tended to be simultaneously supporters of the 
Anglophone movements and were therefore inclined to bring pressure to bear 
upon the party leadership to insert federalism into the party programme – a 
move increasingly opposed by the party’s Francophone members. Like most 
other Francophones, the latter tended to adhere to the preservation of the unitary 
state, often equating federalism with secession. They rightly pointed out that 
some of the party’s basic documents, like the 1990 SDF Manifesto and the 1991 
SDF Proposals on Devolution of Power stressed the importance of national 
unity, allowing only for a large measure of decentralisation within the unitary 
state. The Francophone position was even backed by some of the party’s 
Anglophone leaders, notably by its founding secretary-general, Dr Siga Asanga. 
On some occasions, Asanga publicly stated that the party's embracement of the 
Anglophone cause and federalism would endanger its social-democratic 
ideology and national appeal.15 The issue became even more pertinent when the 
Francophone majority demanded a more equal representation in the still 
predominantly Anglophone party executive. Since the party chairman was an 
Anglophone, the Bamileke, who formed the largest part of the Francophone 
membership, claimed entitlement to the post of secretary-general that was 
second in the party’s hierarchy. 
The party chairman, John Fru Ndi, was under pressure from both sides to 
clarify his position on the growing Anglophone-Francophone divide in the 
party. Eventually, he appeared to yield to Anglophone pressure. He openly 
                                                 
15  See, for instance, Today, 20 March 1995, pp.1 and 5; and Weekly Post, 26-31 July 
1995, p.4. For some detailed discussion of Asanga’s opposition to the introduction 
of federalism into the party programme, see Konings 2001a. 
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declared himself to be opposed to Francophone domination of the SDF since the 
party owed its existence to the courageous initiatives and sacrifices of Anglo-
phones. He bluntly added that ‘it was unacceptable that a Bamileke would ever 
become Secretary-General of the SDF’ – a statement reminiscent of a similar 
declaration by Joseph Owona during his term as secretary-general at the 
presidency: ‘A Bamileke as President? Never!’ Fru Ndi’s clarification 
reinforced Anglophone influence in the party’s decision-making organs, but 
served to temper enthusiasm for the party among the Bamileke elite. At its 
Bafoussam Convention in July 1993 the SDF had already endorsed in principle 
the idea of a federal form of government. To appease the Francophones, the 
party refused to adopt the two-state federation as advocated by the Anglophone 
movements, leaving it instead to the people themselves to decide on the exact 
form of federation during a future sovereign national conference. Only one year 
later, on 22 August 1994, the SDF National Executive Committee modified the 
Bafoussam declaration of federalism. It now clearly opted for a four-state 
federation (an Anglophone state and three Francophone states as originally 
proposed by Fossung’s NDP) and Fru Ndi himself became a member of the 
Southern Cameroons Advisory Council (see Chapter 4). Partly as a result of his 
disagreement with the party’s endorsement of federalism, Secretary-General 
Siga Asanga was expelled from the party in 1995. A number of Bamileke and 
other Francophone party leaders also left the party voluntarily or forcibly. One 
of them, Dr Basil Kamdoum, then founded the Social Democratic Party (SDP) 
that was intended to form a social-democratic alternative to the SDF. However, 
it never really got off the ground, nor did the Social Democratic Forum created 
by Siga Asanga to protest his expulsion from the SDF. 
The SCNC’s adoption of a secessionist stand gave rise to repeated and 
sometimes serious conflicts with the SDF leadership. When SCNC leaders 
proposed boycotting the 1996 municipal elections, claiming that any elections 
called by the government of La République du Cameroun were irrelevant to an 
independent Southern Cameroons state, the SDF leadership refused to comply. 
Relations deteriorated after the proclamation of the restoration of the independ-
ence of the Federal Republic of Southern Cameroons (FRSC) by Justice Ebong 
on 30 December 1999. On 6 May 2000, the SDF National Executive Committee 
met to discuss the new developments on the Anglophone scene. During a 
stormy debate it decided to demand the resignation of some important party 
leaders. Dr Nfor Ngala Nfor, who used to be the chairman of the SDF Constitu-
tional and Political Affairs Committee, was asked to resign because of his 
recent acceptance of the positions of vice-chairman of the SCNC and vice-
president of the FRSC. Dr Luma, the second vice-president of the SDF, was 
asked to resign because he chaired the historic meeting on 1 April 2000 during 
which Justice Ebong was proclaimed president of the FRSC and Dr Nfor Ngala 
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Nfor was appointed as vice-president. Interestingly, this decision was later 
revoked on the grounds that Dr Luma had not yet accepted a leadership position 
in the SCNC and, above all, was one of the few South Westerners at the top of 
the party’s hierarchy. Albert Mukong, a human rights activist and founding 
member of the SDF, was also asked to resign because of his persistent militancy 
in the Southern Cameroons cause (see Chapter 4). The departure of these 
persons is clear proof that the SDF leadership is determined to purge the party 
of ‘extremist’ and separatist elements in order to maintain the support of its 
Francophone membership.16 Another SDF founding father and former SCNC 
leader, Professor Carlson Anyangwe who is still working abroad, has also 
recently distanced himself from the party, identifying himself more closely with 
the SCNC struggle for an independent Southern Cameroons state. That the SDF 
leadership is under strong pressure from its Francophone membership to 
maintain a certain distance from the Anglophone separatist tendencies was 
manifested again in June 2000, when Mr Chrétien Tabetsing, a Bamileke 
member of the SDF living in France who failed to unseat John Fru Ndi as party 
chairman during the SDF’s 1999 convention, called for the holding of an 
extraordinary convention. The purpose of this convention, he said, was to 
debate the Anglophone problem that had become a sensitive issue in Cameroon 
and was dividing the party into two opposing camps. He claimed that the SDF 
would disintegrate and cease to exist should Anglophone wishes prevail.17 
On 7 May 2000, the chairman of the SDF, John Fru Ndi, openly confessed 
that his party was at variance with the SCNC over the strategic options for 
solving the Anglophone problem. While his own party continues to view a four-
state federation as a panacea for the Anglophone problem, the SCNC was, he 
lamented, beating the drums of outright secession. He strongly condemned 
some SCNC activists who were issuing threats against the SDF ‘in a bid to 
persuade the party to dance to their independence song’. Instead of combating 
the Biya regime, the SCNC, he alleged, was now engaged in fighting the SDF. 
He blamed the SCNC authorities for ‘cowardly staying away when Anglo-
phones were being tried on questionable charges at the Yaoundé military 
tribunal’. Nevertheless, he urged them to bury their leadership squabbles and 
forge ahead to achieve their goals.18 A few weeks later a new clash between the 
SDF and the SCNC occurred when the SDF decided to participate in the 20 
May demonstrations – to commemorate the creation of the unitary state – while 
                                                 
16  See Scncforum, 26 May 2000, ‘Can the SDF Solve the Anglophone Problem?’ by 
N.N. Susungi. 
17  The Herald, 11 June 2000. 
18  Scnsforum, 19 May 2000, ‘Fru Ndi Dissociates SDF from Southern Cameroons 
Independence’. 
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the SCNC had called for a boycott.19 Recently, Fru Ndi has blamed President 
Biya for the radicalisation of the SCNC. Like Cardinal Tumi, he called on the 
president in 2001 to enter into negotiations with the SCNC leadership with a 
view to solving the Anglophone problem. 
 
 
Francophone views 
 
The Anglophone movements are inclined to present the Francophone popula-
tion as a monolithic bloc. They claim that the Francophone population as a 
whole tends to be deaf or hostile to Anglophone grievances and calls for a 
return to a federal state. They even regularly allege that the Francophone 
population is actively involved in Anglophone marginalisation and exploitation 
and firmly supports the unitary state system. It cannot be denied that the 
majority of the Francophone population tends to deny the existence of an 
Anglophone problem and strongly disapproves of Anglophone agitations. Two 
factors appear to be largely responsible for this situation. 
First, most Francophones have no idea what Anglophones are complaining 
about. They often stress that some Francophone regions are more marginalised 
than the Anglophone region and that there are close links between the ethnic 
groups on both sides of the Anglophone-Francophone divide that transcend any 
Anglophone-Francophone cleavage. Realising how ignorant most Francophones 
are of the history of the political union between the Southern Cameroons and La 
République du Cameroun and how little they know about federalism, Anglo-
phone leaders decided to intensify their efforts to educate Francophones about 
the Anglophone problem and the federal option. Some Francophone papers, 
especially those controlled by the Bamileke, began to devote more attention to 
the Anglophone cause and to interview Anglophone leaders.20 While they 
mostly did not support the federalist option advocated by the Anglophone 
movements and parties,21 they called upon the government to start negotiating 
with the Anglophones. The presence of bilingual Anglophone journalists in the 
editorial or news teams of these Francophone papers helped to popularise 
Anglophone issues among their Francophone readership. At one point, the main 
Anglophone papers (Cameroon Post, The Herald and Post Watch) even ran 
French editions of their papers, which usually consisted of translations of 
                                                 
19  Scncforum, 18 May 2000, ‘SDF Disagrees with SCNC over May 20 Boycott’. 
20  See, for example, La Nouvelle Expression, 13-17 January 1994, pp. 1-13, devoted 
almost entirely to AAC spokesman, Dr Simon Munzu’s ‘special club de la presse’ 
dubbed: ‘çe que veulent les Anglophones’. 
21  See Cameroon Today, 11 September 1992, p. 11, which reviews some reports of 
Francophone papers on the Anglophone problem. 
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English news stories. This has helped to bring the Anglophone problem to the 
Francophone consciousness. 
Second, Francophones are being constantly exposed to their elite’s usual 
defence of the unitary state and hostile reactions towards the Anglophone 
movement. In a recent article, for example, Professor Mono Ndjana (1996: 56) 
presents the establishment of the unitary state in 1972 as a manifestation of the 
Cameroonian people’s rejection of the Anglophone-Francophone divide intro-
duced by colonialism and their willingness to live together: 
 
Dans sa marche vers l'unité, le Cameroun a plutôt choisi la voie de la centralisation 
en vue d'une grande union nationale, non par annexion d'une partie par un autre, 
mais par consensus comme expression d’un vouloir-vivre-ensemble. Les deux 
grands ensembles concernés étaient les deux états du Camerounais ex-anglais et du 
Cameroun ex-français, à savoir les deux parties d'une entité initiale que la paren-
thèse coloniale avait accidentalement divisée. Le réferendum du 20 mai 1972, par 
lequel les deux états occidental (Anglophone) et oriental (Francophone) décidaient 
de quitter le statut d’états féderés, pour effacer la dualité qu’implique la fédération et 
de devenir la ‘République Unie du Cameroun’, était donc ... une sorte de retour 
institutionnel aux sources, ou, si l’on veut, une récupération politique d’un paradis. 
Ce retour sur soi de la nation, à travers un consensus de 99.97 %, est une sorte de 
rejet symbolique de l’intermède colonial qui avait consacré une éphémère dichoto-
mie sur la base d’éléments culturels importés. 
 
He strongly condemns all those ‘misguided’ Anglophone leaders who 
continue to propagate an Anglophone-Francophone divide for the purpose of 
advancing their own political careers. 
One should not, however, overlook the fact that there are even in Franco-
phone Cameroon some political activists and intellectuals who tend to sympa-
thise with the Anglophone cause, albeit without necessarily supporting the 
Anglophone call for federalism. Most of them belong to the opposition. 
Initially, this minority group had a largely UPC background. In 1972, the 
UPC in exile was the only political organisation that dared to condemn Ahidjo’s 
abolition of the federal state as ‘a thinly veiled attempt at annexation’ (Louka 
n.d.: 7). Henceforth it has never stopped drawing national attention to the 
frustrations and claims of the Anglophone community. Two UPC intellectuals 
have devoted some space to the Anglophone problem in their publications. In 
his book Introduction à la Politique Camerounaise, Abel Eyinga (1984: 271) 
denounces the Frenchification of Anglophone Cameroon and severely criticises 
the Francophone-dominated state’s neo-colonialism and repression. He looks 
upon the creation of the unitary state as the final step in the ‘dismantlement’ of 
Anglophone Cameroon. A few years later, in 1989, Elenga Mbuyinga (pseudo-
nym for Moukoko Priso), the present secretary-general of the UPC-
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MANIDEM,22 published a book entitled Tribalisme et Problème National en 
Afrique Noire in which he underscored the explosive nature of the Anglophone 
problem in Cameroon. 
Following the emergence of Anglophone movements during political 
liberalisation, the number of Francophone supporters of the Anglophone 
struggle has been expanding outside UPC circles. In a contribution to the 
Cameroonian opposition paper Challenge Hebdo in 1991,23 Achille Mbembe 
accused the regime of repressing the Anglophone minority and warned it of the 
harmful consequences of its policy: 
 
The failure to maintain national cohesion and to guarantee cultural pluralism without 
systematically resorting to repression has equally been manifested towards the 
question of the Anglophone minority.... 
The insistence of the regime to pursue a policy of political cohesion in line with 
the 1972 referendum on ‘unification’ has led to a growing malaise, notably among 
the youths and some intellectuals of the North West and South West Provinces. This 
malaise which the government did not want to admit ... has spread recently and has 
led to an increasing radicalisation of demands for autonomy. Hence the calls for a 
return to a federation or outright secession... 
The situation is potentially explosive and is superimposed particularly on the 
South West in a larger dispute concerning the exploitation of oil.... The situation 
being created in Anglophone Cameroon is no different from what has happened in 
countries like Senegal (Casamance) and Sudan (South), where real civil or 
undeclared wars exist. Once again it brings to light the inability of the present 
regime to assume in an inventive manner the cultural pluralism inherent to the 
country. 
 
Speaking to the journal Cameroon Life in July 1992,24 another well-known 
Francophone intellectual and political activist, Célestin Monga, stated that the 
Anglophone problem was the major challenge for Cameroon in the coming 
years. In the following year (1993), the famous Francophone writer, Mongo 
Beti (pseudonym for Alexander Biyidi Awala), a long-time political dissident 
and – since his return home from exile in France at the beginning of the 1990s – 
a loyal member of the SDF, equally expressed his support for the Anglophone 
cause as well as for federalism.25 
Some of those Francophone sympathisers, however, strongly disapprove of 
the way the Anglophone movements tend to present their cause. They maintain 
                                                 
22  UPC-MANIDEM stands for UPC Manifesto for the Institution of Democracy. It was 
launched by the UPC in exile in August 1974, three years after the execution of 
Ernest Quandie, the last historical leader of the party. 
23  Challenge Hebdo, 10-17 July 1991. 
24  Cameroon Life, Vol. 2, No. 7, July 1992, p. 6. 
25  See The Herald, 1-8 September 1993, p. 5. 
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that the tendency of Anglophone leaders to make the Francophone population 
as a whole responsible for the Anglophone predicament is likely to arouse 
misunderstandings and suspicion among Francophones, thus undermining their 
much-needed support. For example, Mr François Sengat-Kuoh, who used to be 
one of the regime’s leading figures before joining the opposition, regularly 
cautioned Anglophone leaders about this tendency. In 1995, he admitted that 
Ahidjo had charged him with writing the 1972 constitution that abolished the 
federation. He nevertheless blamed the Anglophone leaders in particular for this 
event, alleging that they had lacked the courage to push their case and state their 
problems. He stressed that Francophones shared Anglophone frustrations with 
the highly centralised unitary state but that they tended to present their desire 
for a larger measure of autonomy less vigorously than Anglophones. He, too, 
considers the Anglophone problem as one of the most important problems 
facing the country and found the attitude of the government in this respect 
irresponsible.26 The eminent Francophone professor of public law, Maurice 
Kamto, agrees with most of Sengat-Kuoh’s arguments. He insists that the 
Anglophone problem should be discussed frankly and in a spirit of patriotism 
and urges Francophones to desist from looking at federalism as a first step to 
secession.27 
Some Francophone scholars have started to carry out research on the Anglo-
phone problem. Political scientists like Sindjoun (1995) and Nkoum-Me-Ntseny 
(1996a and b, 1999) have studied the current Anglophone struggle in some 
detail but without giving any indication of how the problem could be solved. 
Legal scholars like Olinga (1994) and Donfack (1998) appear to believe that the 
Anglophone problem can be solved by the introduction of a larger degree of 
decentralisation in the unitary state than the government is currently proposing. 
Olinga (1994) in particular argues that the creation of a truly decentralised state 
structure, possibly – but not necessarily – based on the existing ten provinces 
(see also Donfack 1998), would kill two birds with one stone. First, decentrali-
sation offers a neat formula to fulfil the widespread wish in both Anglophone 
and Francophone Cameroon for a large measure of autonomy and to avoid the 
present dramatisation of the Anglophone-Francophone divide. Second, 
decentralisation would bring about a significant and necessary modernisation of 
the country’s administration, providing the state with an adequate tool to 
experiment with new forms to manage the geographical, human and socio-
political space. Olinga concludes that if one abstracts the Anglophone problem 
from its historical context, it is merely a problem of the Cameroonian state and 
it should take more seriously the potential benefits of a decentralised state 
                                                 
26  See Galaxie, 11 September 1995, p. 6 and Le Messager, 9 June 1992, p. 11. 
27  See Le Messager, 24 June 1993, p. 2. 
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structure. An anonymous Francophone scholar appears to have arrived at a 
similar conclusion: 
 
The Anglophone problem appears to be foremost a problem of the existing institu-
tions in the Cameroonian state rather than a problem of a national minority. Besides 
the Anglophones, there are also the Northerners and Westerners whose relations 
with the central power are equally tense, but not of a linguistic nature.28 
 
Olinga’s proposed solution to the Anglophone problem and his conception 
of the future form of state appear to be widely supported by Francophone 
political activists and intellectuals. There is, nevertheless, a tiny Francophone 
minority that favours a return to the federal state. 
Compared to Anglophone Cameroon, the idea of a federal state has fewer 
historical roots in Francophone Cameroon. Nevertheless, it was not totally 
absent in the period preceding independence and reunification. In 1956 and 
1957 before Ahidjo’s accession to power, the Fulbe elite in Northern Cameroon 
brought strong pressure to bear upon the French to institute a federal system in 
Francophone Cameroon, similar to the one in Nigeria. They felt that France had 
promoted the development of the south to the detriment of the north and, as a 
result, they advocated the creation of a federal state after independence to 
forestall southern domination over the north. After the accession to power of 
their ‘brother’ Ahmadou Ahidjo in 1958, who replaced the Southerner André-
Marie Mbida as prime minister (Bayart 1979: 46-52), the Fulbe elite withdrew 
their federalist demands. Ironically, dismissed from power, Mbida immediately 
requested the United Nations and France create a Southern State and institute a 
federation (Louka n.d.: 50-51; Fogui 1990: 81-83). His request was rejected. 
Influenced by France and steeped in French Jacobine political culture, Ahidjo 
and the vast majority of the Francophone elite advocated a strong unitary state 
for an independent and reunified Cameroon. They were only prepared to accept 
a federation between Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon as a temporary 
arrangement (see Chapter 2). 
The issue of federalism reappeared in Francophone Cameroon in the wake 
of political liberalisation and the Anglophone call for federalism. While most 
Francophone parties began to propagate a more or less decentralised unitary 
state, a few, some of them belonging to the (erstwhile) alliance of the extra-
parliamentary opposition, the Front of Allies for Change (FAC), supported the 
creation of a federation. 
The FAC, comprising 16 opposition parties, included the SDF, by far the 
most important member and a supporter of a four-state federation. In 1995, the 
                                                 
28  L.P., ‘Les Minorités Nationales’, Le Courrier des ACP, No. 140, July-August 1993, 
p. 81. 
 
158 
FAC decided to join forces with the SCNC in order to exert additional pressure 
on the Biya regime to redress the Anglophone problem.29 FAC members agreed 
upon three major points: (i) the establishment of a democratic state; (ii) the 
creation of a national, representative forum to debate the future form of state; 
and (iii) the approval of any new institutions by the people through a referen-
dum (Louka n.d.: 39). They clearly differed on the future form of state.  
Some FAC members, like the Union des Forces Démocratiques du 
Cameroun (UFDC) of Hameni Bieleu and the Mouvement pour la Démocratie 
Populaire (MDP) of Samuel Eboua opted for a large measure of decentralisa-
tion within the unitary state.30 Although these parties were prepared to support 
the Anglophone cause for strategic reasons (to bring down the regime and win 
votes among the Anglophones), they, like most other Francophones, actually 
denyed the existence of an Anglophone problem as such. In an interview with 
The Herald in June 1993, Hameni Bieleu declared: 
 
The ‘Anglophone problem’ is not just a problem of the Anglophones. It is a problem 
of all Cameroonians. Look at the Eastern Province. If we have to consider the plight 
of the inhabitants of the Eastern Province in terms of infrastructural development, 
there is nothing to write home about in the East. Yet their forest and other resources 
are being exploited at a devastating rate. We must not divide Cameroon between 
Anglophones and Francophones.31 
 
The position of the UPC-MANIDEM is somewhat more complicated. For 
this party, it is not the form of state that matters at this stage but the distribution 
of power within society. While the UPC-MANIDEM dismisses an internal 
federation, it proposes a progressive pan-Africanist federalism, which would 
unite Cameroon with Gabon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, the Central African 
Republic and Chad. The party still claims to support the Anglophone struggle 
but is strongly opposed to Anglophone secession. This is understandable. 
Having fought for many years for a genuine reunification of Francophone and 
Anglophone territories, the UPC-MANIDEM rejects any partition of Cameroon 
(Louka n.d.). 
It is necessary to emphasise that the position of the UPC-MANIDEM 
deviates from other factions in the UPC that are allied in one form or another to 
the ruling CPDM. One of these factions is led by Secretary-General Augustin 
Kodock, who was appointed minister of planning and regional development by 
Biya in 1992. This UPC faction is strongly opposed to a federation as demanded 
by the Anglophones. In 1993, Kodock declared: 
                                                 
29  See The Herald, 6-8 February 1995, p. 3 and 17-19 August 1995, pp. 1-2. 
30  See Le Messager, 5 December 1994, p. 5.  
31  The Herald, 9-16 June 1993, p. 6. 
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A federation is a sure recipe for bringing in the Nigerian army. Linguistic fraction-
ing brought about by colonisation cannot determine the future course of our country. 
The return of Anglophone Cameroon and the unification are the greatest achieve-
ments of Cameroon since independence.32 
 
Another faction of the UPC led by Professor Hogbe Nlend (secretary-
general) claims, like the UPC-MANIDEM, to sympathise with the Anglophone 
struggle. After running for the presidency in 1997, Hogbe Nlend was co-opted 
into the Biya government as minister of scientific research and had the courage 
in this function to challenge the continuing refusal of the government to enter 
into negotiations with Anglophone leaders.33 In an interview with the paper Le 
Messager in June 2000, he stated that the government had continued to pursue a 
policy of ‘accelerated Frenchification and assimilation’ of Anglophones rather 
than to seek viable solutions to the Anglophone problem. The solution, he said, 
was to provide Anglophone Cameroon with a special status. This would 
guarantee it the legitimate right to preserve its own cultural identity and its 
socio-political aspirations.34 
A few FAC members appear to support a federation. One of them is the 
Mouvement Progressive (MP) of Jean-Jacques Ekindi. Unfortunately, the 
position of this party on the future form of state reflects the opportunist 
behaviour of its leader.35 On 4 February 1992, Ekindi declared his support for a 
federal state. He appealed to President Biya to address the Anglophone problem 
immediately rather than to pretend that it did not exist. Dismissing the fears 
within government circles that federalism might be a first step towards separa-
tion, he said that none of the Anglophones parties had yet opted for secession.36 
Curiously, only a few months later in April 1992, he rejected federalism as a 
future form of state, saying that a federal system was more costly than a unitary 
one.37 True to his contradictory spirit, three years later in 1995, he attacked the 
                                                 
32  The Herald, 9-16 June 1993, p. 6. 
33  Professor Hogbe Nlend had already previously condemned the refusal of the regime 
to negotiate with the Anglophones. See, for example, Dikalo, 21-28 December 1995, 
p. 4. 
34  See SCNC forum, 7 June 2000. 
35  Ekindi used to be CPDM Wouri section president. In this capacity, he organised 
well-attended CPDM rallies in Douala after the launching of the SDF in May 1990, 
condemning multipartyism as being ‘precipitate’ and ‘an imported model’. 
Following the introduction of multipartyism in December 1990, he started opposing 
‘the Kaiser of Mvomeka’ (Paul Biya) and his ‘dubious regime’. Eventually, he 
formed his own party. See Cameroon Post, 30 April-6 May 1992, p. 2. 
36  Cameroon Post, 19-26 February 1992, p. 3. 
37  Cameroon Post, 30 April-6 May 1992, p. 2. 
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SCNC’s adoption of the ‘zero option’ (an independent Southern Cameroons 
state), calling it a declaration of war. He then declared that he still looked upon 
federalism as the best form of government for Cameroon but he warned that the 
most suitable type of federation should be an issue of national debate. He 
stressed that he was willing to contribute to the solution of the Anglophone 
problem, adding that his party stood for a ten-state federation.38 
Another FAC member that advocates federation is Dr Adamou Ndam 
Njoya’s Union Démocratique du Cameroun (UDC). The UDC has always 
insisted on government dialogue with the Anglophones and champions, like the 
MP of Jean-Jacques Ekindi, a ten-state federation.39 In July 1997, Dr Njoya 
declared that a federal constitution would be the only antidote to the economic 
and socio-political cancer that has penetrated so deeply into the fabric of 
Cameroonian society.40 
Interestingly, some small Francophone parties aligned to the regime in 
power appear to favour federalism as well. The Parti de l’Alliance Libérale 
(PAL) under Célestin Bedzigui proposes a ten-state federation. In an interview 
with Le Messager in 1992, Bedzigui remarked: 
 
Germany and the United States are no less united than France just because they have 
a federal system of government. We should put an end to the centralist Gaullist spirit 
inherited from France and then create efficient state structures. The national territory 
could be divided into ten states that are culturally homogeneous, demographically 
consistent and economically viable.41 
 
Two other Francophone parties aligned to the regime champion a four-state 
federation, namely the Congrès Panafricain du Cameroun (CPC) led by Dr 
Djoumbi Sango and the Parti de Solidarité du Peuple (PSP) led by Woungly 
Massaga, the former secretary-general of the UPC in exile. While both leaders 
propose to group the two Anglophone provinces (South West and North West 
Provinces) and the two neighbouring Francophone provinces (the Littoral and 
West Provinces) into one state, Woungly Massaga still leaves room for a 
separate Anglophone state (Menthong 1998: 21-22; Donfack 1998: 44). 
Finally, some Francophone political entrepreneurs have called from time to 
time for the creation of an ethnically-based federation, usually without 
mentioning the number of states. In 1991, for example, Enoh Meyomesse, 
editor-in-chief of the journal Le Courrier, proposed a Beti state comprising the 
                                                 
38  The Herald, 26-29 October 1995, p. 2. 
39  The Herald, 16-18 May 1994, p. 3 and 4-7 August 1995, p. 2. See also Donfack 
1998: 39. 
40  Cameroon Post, 22 July 1997, p. 4. 
41  This part of his interview with Le Messager can be found in Cameroon Today, 11 
September 1992, p. 11. 
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Beti Central, South and Eastern Provinces. Others have called for a Bamileke 
and a Bassa state. Again, others have called for an ethnically-based state that 
even transcends Cameroonian borders. Professor Joseph Owona, one of the 
regime’s strong men, once called for a Fang state comprising the Fang popula-
tion in Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Congo. The Mouvement de 
Renaissance Pahwin (MOREPAH) strives for a Pahwin state comprising the 
Pahwin and Pahwin-related groups in Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and 
Congo (Donfack 1998; Menthong 1998).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The tendency of the Anglophone movements to present Anglophones as 
supporters and Francophones as opponents of the Anglophone struggle is 
simplistic and even dangerous. Clearly, such a presentation tends to be harmful 
to the planning of these movements’ viable strategies for the achievement of 
their objectives and to undermine any Francophone sympathy and support.  
It cannot be denied, however, that there are significant differences between 
the Anglophone and Francophone responses to the Anglophone struggle. We 
have provided in this chapter some evidence that the majority of the Anglo-
phones tend to support the claims of the Anglophone movements, while the 
majority of the Francophones continue to deny the existence of an Anglophone 
problem. Obviously, this tends to reinforce mutual distrust, suspicion and 
stereotypes. 
On the other hand, Anglophones appear to be more divided than Franco-
phones on the future form of state. Although the majority of Anglophones agree 
in principle upon a federation as proposed by the Anglophone movements, they 
clearly differ on the number of states. The situation has become even more 
complicated by the fact that the Anglophone movements have increasingly 
opted for secession. In sharp contrast to the Anglophones, most Francophones 
simply dismiss a federation and favour a more or less decentralised state. 
Moreover, the tiny Francophone minority that sympathises with the Anglo-
phone struggle and champions the return to a federal state strongly rejects the 
current Anglophone separatist tendencies. 
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